----- Forwarded message from Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> ----- Date: Fri, 04 Oct 2013 13:15:48 +1300 From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> To: jamesd@echeque.com Cc: cryptography@randombit.net Subject: Re: [cryptography] the spell is broken Message-Id: <E1VRt3c-00044Z-W7@login01.fos.auckland.ac.nz> "James A. Donald" <jamesd@echeque.com> writes:
By moving away from anything NIST has touched he deprives the NSA of leverage to insert backdoors,
Just as a bit of a counterpoint here, how far do you want to go down this rathole? Someone recently pointed me to the latest CERT vuln. summary (because of a few interesting entries there): https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/bulletins/SB13-273 Now this is just a single weeks' worth, and yet look at all the remote-code- execution and seize-control-of-device issues in just that seven-day stretch. The NSA doesn't really need to backdoor crypto when the barn door isn't just propped wide open, it's entirely missing in some cases. (I completely support Jon's position in terms of being seen to do the right thing, but there are more things to worry about than just backdoored crypto). Peter. _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5