On Sun, 10 Oct 2021 16:40:59 +0000 PrivacyArms <privacyarms@protonmail.com> wrote:
I know website fingerprinting. Thanks for the link.
well, notice that in that case a single ISP, or even 'compomised' entry node can get an idea of what the users are doing.
According to my research, Tor drug dealers are arrested by OpSec leaks other than their Tor connection.
I don't think that's necessarily 'your' research. That's more like the propaganda that comes from the tor mafia and the so called 'legal system' and that you are naively repeating. Although it is possible that some people get caught thanks to, say, 'exploits' in php or webservers, it's impossible to know when that happens. Look, syverson himself admits how bad tor is. https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/ccs2013-usersrouted.pdf "An adversary that provides no more bandwidth than some volunteers do today can deanonymize any given user within three months of regular Tor use with over 50% probability and within six months with over 80% probability." "Some users experience over 95% chance of compromise within three months against a single AS or IXP." "Against an AS-level adversary, our results show compromise is highly likely in the worst case scenario regardless of user behavior. 45.9%, 64.9%, and 76.4% of Typical, IRC, and BitTorrent samples use a compromised stream within one day." etc
What would be sufficient against a global passive attacker? A strong onion routed network that puts an additional mix network on top of the onion routing net?
I'm anything but an expert but it seems that a requirement is to have constant rate links, or 'padding'. Which is something the tor mafia stubbornly resists, because they say "it wastes bandwith". But that's a lie because the bandwidth could and should be used for filesharing. AND THEN you realize that the tor mafia is so corrupt that they are even AGAINST file sharing, just like their pentagon-hollywood masters tell them to. Filesharing is a human right and anybody who actually defends human rights would help filesharing as much as possible ESPECIALLY when their 'anonimity' system could be made sensibly better by 'optimizing' it for filesharing.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ On Sunday, October 10, 2021 6:24 AM, Punk-BatSoup-Stasi 2.0 <punks@tfwno.gf> wrote:
On Sun, 10 Oct 2021 02:47:35 +0000 PrivacyArms privacyarms@protonmail.com wrote:
That would mean: Tor is dead, right?
Right. Actually that's something that tor's 'designers' knew and admitted since day 0. Ask fairbrother. Or take a look at tor's literature where they state that tor doesn't work against a 'global passive adversary'
https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/48502/tor-traffic-correlation-a...
"A global passive adversary is the most commonly assumed threat when analyzing theoretical anonymity designs. But like all practical low-latency systems, Tor does not protect against such a strong adversary."
Take into account that tor is a cyberweapon created and maintained by the US military. It allows the US government to attack people all over the world by providing 'anonimity' to US criminals, but it doesn't give the same ability to people who oppose those US criminals. Which is hardly surprising. Why would the pentagon criminals help their victims.
It cannot be so easy, because lots of people hide successfully behind Tor.
Well, it's 'easy' if you're the criminal mafia that rules the world, and accomplices. On the other hand, yes, you can certainly hide succsefuly behind tor or other proxies depending on who your 'adversary' is. But I'd mention that a lot of people who sell drugs on the 'darknet' end up in jail, so it looks to me that tor is rather shitty.
Also, note there's an attack that doesn't use traffic correlation, it only requires the attacker to see the (encrypted) traffic between you and your 'guard node'.
look up "Website Fingerprinting"
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ On Sunday, October 10, 2021 12:43 AM, Punk-BatSoup-Stasi 2.0 punks@tfwno.gf wrote:
On Sun, 10 Oct 2021 01:06:19 +0100 Peter Fairbrother peter@tsto.co.uk wrote:
Also any traffic which goes through the US or UK is traffic-compromised.
actually it's any traffic going through networks 'owned' by the jew-anglo-US nazis. And those networks are everywhere, not only inside the US-UK-isreal cessspool.
Plus, traffic going through the networks of 'allies' of the above mentioned trash, like, say, the european turds who get their marching orders from the jew-anglo-US nazis, should be considered 'compromissed' as well.
ps: isn't agent fairbrother funny, trying to pose as a non-government shill?
Peter Fairbrother