On 2/24/16, Steve Kinney <admin@pilobilus.net> wrote:
... But in the same press release, EFF endorses absurd non sequiturs that demonstrate painful ignorance of the subject matter at hand. The EFF endorses the assertations that the only way to obtain access to encrypted data stored on an iPhone is to manually key in a password on the device itself,
not the *only* way...
that removing a software function that deletes a stored key hash after n. failed decryption attempts voids the security of the encrypted data stored on that device,
not voids, but weakens. Apple creating and signing and deploying said feature is certainly a measurably more significant risk than if they did not, right? the FBI would like such a weakening to exist in a vacuum, yet reality insists otherwise.
and that doing this to one iPhone would affect the security of all iPhone users.
it does, the question is by how much. (remember the OPM? :)
Either people without the slightest understanding of how cryptography works /or/ how computer forensics works are calling the shots at EFF, or someone there has deliberately stood up strawmen for the FBI'a attorneys to knock down, or... damn if I know
plenty of fail all around! no need to prune sets so preemptively... ;) best regards,