On Wed, Aug 17, 2016 at 09:42:15AM +0200, rysiek wrote:
Dnia środa, 17 sierpnia 2016 14:01:02 CEST Zenaan Harkness pisze:
On Tue, Aug 16, 2016 at 09:07:59PM -0600, Mirimir wrote:
On 08/16/2016 12:09 PM, jim bell wrote:
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AP ('Assassination Politics'; https://cryptome.org/ap.htm ) can be considered to be 'death arbitrage' with a few key differences: The person who will die isn't part of the agreement, and doesn't profit when the initial deal is struck, nor later.
Ah, but someone with a huge bet on their death could commit suicide, and so their estate would profit. Or is that against AP rules?
"The rules" are the rules formed in the respective contracts, presumably - how could it be any other way?
Therefore unsuccessful or "gamed" contracts would be the fodder of lessons learnt for future contracts in the competitive market for assassination contracts, which is that which AP presupposes...
Yeah, because that approach worked so well for The DAO. :)
I like comedy as much as you, but a joke does not take away from the principle of a competitive market for systems, over the long term. The DAO was not a single contract, nor a series of contracts. It was "a contract in a competitive market for contracts" in the sense that it was "a decentralised investment fund/ market maker" in the market for "decentralized investment funds/ market makers". But I assume you knew that..