Prior to 1964, there was a doctrine that "public accommodations" had to serve all customers, in large part because those customers had no or little choice but to deal with the government or business.   There were very few "public accommodations".  Utilities, ferries, motels on highways, etc.  And that made sense.    

But the 1964 Civil Rights Act decided that it was okay for governments to force businesses to not discriminate, analogous to the fact that prior to 1964, many governments REQUIRED businesses to discriminate ("Jim Crow Laws").   As a libertarian, I cannot abide such control by government.   Also, I am quite confident that in the situation where government neither required nor prohibited businessess from engaging in discrimination, very few businesses would engage in any such discrimination unless the public considered it reasonable.  ("No shirt, no shoes, no service").  

                  Jim Bell

From:   

scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol52/iss1/2/      

A 1968 law article.

"Under English common law, it was the duty of-a common carrier to serve all persons 5 without imposing unreasonable conditions.6 The English courts considered that "a person [who] holds himself out to carry goods for everyone as a business . .. is a common carrier,"' and that any member of the public may create a, contract with the carrier by accepting its general offer.8 The rule remains the same today.9 Wherever English common law was exported, the rule that carriers had to serve the public without unreasonable discrimination went with it. The rule is therefore found in cases from Australia," Burma,1 Canada,12 India,13 Ireland,' 4 and New Zealand. 15 An early South African case held that since a public utility must serve the whole public, an electric tramway could not refuse to carry non-Europeans,"8 although a later case held that race was a reasonable ground for refusal to carry passengers.7 >From its earliest days, American law followed the English ruleI ' 8 that railroads and ,other common carriers were legally bound to carry all persons and could not unreasonably exclude anybody, but they had power to make reasonable regulations and discriminations, and excludepassengers on reasonable grounds. 9 Even before the Civil War the Illinois Supreme Court had pointed out that ferrymen were common carriers because '!he enjoys'a franchise-a special privilege, which is granted to 'him in 'conseqfience of his superior qualifications to fill a public trust. 2 0 ° That court also pointed'out that "railroads are .'. common highways ... in the sense of being compelled to accept of each and all, and take'and catry to the extent of their ability."21' The rule remains unchanged to the present time. Thus it has been held that because of the special privilege of a monopoly franchise given to a common carrier to peiform a service for the public,22 the carrier, like other public utilities, cannot abandon its service without permission of the authorized governmental commission.2 3 Thus, a recent case has noted- "This duty of a common carrier to meet the needs of the public arises from its acceptance and enjoyment of the' powers and privileges granted by'the State and endures 'so long as they' are retained."24 A distinguishing hallmark of common ;carriers is the obligation to carry all persons without unreasonable discrimination.2 5 Conversely, a carrier which reserves the right to pick and choose its passengers is not a common carrier.26 Thus, common carriers of passengers could not engage in racial discrimination merely by virtue of common law or statutory rules prohibiting unreasonable discrimination, entirely aside from any special statute banning racial discrimination.17 Under English common law, a similar rule applied to innkeepers,2 who were likewise bound to accommodate all travelers, unless they had reasonable cause to refuse.2 9 The rule was similar in Scotland, although there hotels could pick the class of guests they chose to accommodate." Cases to the same effect are found in Australia,3' Canada, 32 Ireland,33 and South Africa. 34 Thus, when a Negro sued a London hotel for refusing him accommodations, he was allowed to recover on the theory that such discrimination was simply one of the many types of unreasonable discrimination, and no special consideration was paid to the fact that racial discrimination was involved. 35 The Lord Justice-Clerk of the Scottish Court of Session observed in a similar case: It is obvious that the defenders are not entitled to exclude the pursuer from their hotel because he is a Jew; and it would have made no difference, in my opinion, had it been proved that he is a Jew of German origin. An individual is not responsible, and ought not to be made responsible, for his ancestry. 3"