On 6/2/19 7:51 PM, grarpamp wrote: [...]
It’s been more than six years since Edward Snowden went public. After all the breathless headlines, Hollywood movies, book deals, Pulitzer prizes, and glossy primetime biopics. What, pray tell, has come of it? For the average American – bupkis. In fact, mass surveillance is actually growing by leaps and bounds. Such that those who wish to salvage the remnants of their individual privacy will be forced to make some tough choices in the years ahead.
Every public conflict and controversy set in motion by the Snowden Affair arrived at the same conclusion: A decisive win for the U.S. intelligence community. Examples: Per precedents set, the NSA may now 'hack into' computers used by Congressional staff members at will, and lie to Congress under oath, with no consequences other than getting whatever results they want. Our No Such Agency could not have gotten better results if they handed Snowden exactly what they wanted published, and assured he gave everything he had to agents under their own direct control. Thanks to Global Research, I get to say I told you so, just days after the Snowden Affair jumped into the headlines: https://www.globalresearch.ca/nsa-deception-operation-questions-surround-lea...
The kernel of an approach can be found out in the field. Where poor security is fatal. Hunted by the world’s most formidable military, the head of ISIS is still alive thanks to solid operations security, also known as OPSEC. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is definitely a leader who appreciates OPSEC. According to the New York Times, “he eschews all electronic devices, which could identify his location, and probably communicates through a series of couriers.” The key to staying vertical, then, is the process surrounding the couriers. How they’re compartmented, screened, and arranged to create a resilient communication network. No doubt al-Baghdadi is aware that a flawed courier scheme was a significant factor in the downfall of Osama bin Laden.
Ah, good old fashioned ... should we call it "disinformation" or Big Lie propaganda? I guess that depends the context and audience. ISIS, the mercenary army formerly known as Al Qaida, was founded by Zbigniew Brzezinski during the Carter Administration as a deniable channel to funnel arms and intelligence to anyone interested in kicking Soviet ass in Afghanistan. In an amazing series of coincidences, the actions of Al Qaida by any name have always directly advanced the agendas of U.S. Security State oligarchs and their radical fringe right wing extremist DemoPublican political partners. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, if any such person exists, will continue to work hand in glove with U.S. three letter agencies as long as he lives, because reasons: Whatever inducements prompted him to join up, and a desire to stay alive. As for our Mr. Bin Ladin, the fog of war makes it difficult to say with certainty that he died of complications secondary to kidney failure in the mountains of eastern Afghanistan during the winter of 2001-2; if not, he most likely remains alive. The guy Seal Team Six murdered shortly before getting murdered themselves had "wrong place, wrong time" problems.
Edward Snowden likes to promote strong cryptography. Leaving people with the notion that staying under the radar is a matter of leveraging a technical quick fix. But recent history shows that trusting your life to an allegedly secure communication platform is an act of faith. And not an advisable one, especially when state sponsored operators enter the picture. Achieving higher levels of security requires a disciplined process which is anything but a quick fix and which often entails giving up technology. Even cartel bosses learn this lesson: security technology fails. Both my design and by accident. Spies win either way.
Quite so: Cryptographic tools and manipulated network comms have potential uses in the context of larger and much more time/energy intensive operational security a.k.a. 'tradecraft' strategies. But never as a substitute for deception and misdirection, physical security techniques, etc. First time amateur 'operatives' may stand a chance of getting away with leaking high value confidential documents and information - if nothing connects them, more than hundreds of other people, with that information; if they come up with clever strategies to disassociate themselves from that information's escape into the wild (ideally, an obvious target of opportunity the leak will get blamed on); drop everything at one go with no advance warning to anyone living or dead; then go on with their lives exactly as if they know nothing about what happened.