I can’t verify if it’s a fake
Monero fanboi's, anti-Zcash'ers, BTC Maxi's, GovPolBank's, competing 'privacy coins' are often dishonestly or unknowledgably fake about the setup's capabilities and exploits. If their shillbias doesn't at least hint that others indicate that it might be done securely with benefit, that's one tipoff re what are surely still premature conclusions.
Correctness: if any corrupted parties (for example, bribed by the adversary) act dishonestly, for example, share information in private or perform actions that deviate from the norms of the protocol, the protocol should not allow the dishonest parties to be able to make honest parties get the wrong result or disclose their secrets.
Quoteable to shills who misinterpret the definition of 'trusted setup'. When in doubt, compete and compare openly and objectively without shill, and if unsure, and deployment demands additional risk intermediation, then compose the best elements of both until such time of clarity, or seek other methods.
In 1987, Goldrakh, Mikali and Wigderson extended two-party protocol to multi-party.
From work prior to at least 1984... 1986 - Proceedings 27th IEEE Symposium Foundations Computer Science 1989 - Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics J. Comput. Vol18 Feb 1989 The Knowledge Complexity Of Interactive Proof Systems Shafi Goldwasser , Silvio Micali , and Charles Rackoff MIT NSF DCR-84-13577 DCR-85-09905 , UToronto NSERC A3611 Abstract. Usually, a proof of a theorem contains more knowledge
Proc. 27th IEEE Symp Foundations Computer Science 1986 pp174-187 Goldreich , Micali , Wigderson Proofs that yield nothing but their validity and a methodology of cryptographic protocol design Proc 19th ACM Symp Theory of Computing 1987 pp218-229 Goldreich , Micali , Wigderson How to play any mental game Proc 18th Symp Theory of Computing 1986 pp59-68 Goldwasser , Sipser Private coins versus public coins in interactive proof-systems Oren 1987: Cunning power of cheating verifiers Luby 1983: Simultaneously exchange a secret bit than the mere fact that the theorem is true. For instance, to prove that a graph is Hamiltonian it suffices to exhibit a Hamiltonian tour in it; however, this seems to contain more knowledge than the single bit Hamiltonian / non-Hamiltonian. In this paper a computational complexity theory of the "knowledge" contained in a proof is developed. Zero-knowledge proofs are defined as those proofs that convey no additional knowledge other than the correctness of the proposition in question. Examples of zero-knowledge proof systems are given for the languages of quadratic residuosity and quadratic nonresiduosity. These are the first examples of zero-knolwdge proofs for languages not known to be efficiently recognizable. Key words. cryptography, zero knowledge, interactive proofs, quadratic residues AMS(MOS) subject classifications. 68Q15 , 94A60