In a 9 February 2022 hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, Crisis Group’s Senior Afghanistan Consultant Graeme
Smith outlined two long-term ways the U.S. can mitigate Afghanistan’s
humanitarian and economic crises in the aftermath of war and subsequent
Taliban takeover.
Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member Young, and distinguished members of
the Subcommittee, thank you for your attention to this important subject
and for inviting me to testify.
I am a Senior Consultant for the International Crisis Group, which
covers more than 50 conflict situations around the world, including
Afghanistan, with the aim of helping to prevent, resolve or mitigate
deadly conflict. I have worked in the country since 2005.
In previous years, I listened to U.S. congressional hearings from
Kandahar or Kabul, sometimes with gunfire or explosions in the
background. The Internet connection was not always good, but I heard
enough to understand that the United States had ambitious plans for
Afghanistan.
Now the guns are silent. America has withdrawn its forces. In the
aftermath of war, the United States and its allies should focus on more
modest plans, such as easing restrictions on the Afghan economy and
saving the lives of starving people. These are not the lofty goals of
the past decades. What is required now is urgent action to help address
basic needs.
Tens of millions of lives are at stake. Afghanistan ranks as world’s
largest humanitarian crisis, and there is a serious risk of widespread
famine. The United Nations estimates that 97 per cent of Afghans could
fall into poverty this year. People are so desperate that they are
selling their own daughters, anything to survive.
U.S. and European envoys signalled that they understand these
life-or-death issues at a recent meeting in Norway. They committed to 1)
“helping prevent the collapse of social services” and 2) “supporting
the revival of Afghanistan’s economy.” Further steps are now required to
achieve those two objectives.
1. Help Prevent the Collapse of Essential Public Services
The United States has donated generously to emergency relief efforts,
funding humanitarian agencies that are sending bags of food and other
assistance into Afghanistan. However, such short-term assistance is not
enough because this is not a natural disaster; it’s a man-made crisis
resulting from the end of the war economy and the economic isolation
imposed by Western governments on the new Taliban regime and – in effect
– on the Afghan population. The Afghan state is collapsing. Half a
million government employees lack salaries, and essential services such
education, sanitation, and agricultural programs are not being
delivered. Entire systems such as the electrical grid could fall apart.
The United States, among others, invested billions of dollars to build
these state services over the last two decades.
a) Support the Public Sector with Existing Funds
The largest support mechanism for civil servants’ salaries before the
Taliban takeover was the World Bank’s Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust
Fund (ARTF), a pool of aid to which the United States and other donors
contributed. The fund has about $1.2 billion in unspent money waiting to
be disbursed, which could be allocated immediately to health,
education, and other social services. Health funding is uncontroversial
because implementing partners are outside the Afghan state — but health
programs cannot stand alone because otherwise the clinics will be
overwhelmed by the medical needs of a starving population. Some funding
should be directed to the public sector in areas such as agricultural
support and village-level development programs. Support should be
targeted at Afghan livelihoods — not the state-building efforts of the
past, in which donors supplied 75 per cent of the Afghan government’s
budget. Safeguards could be put in place to prevent the Taliban from
diverting funds. Notably, nearly all of the civil servants on the job
today were hired before the Taliban arrived in Kabul.
b) Build on Progress in Education
The biggest employer in the country is the education system, but
right now there is no plan for paying 200,000 teachers and staff through
the school year. The United Nations has successfully negotiated with
the Taliban to allow girls’ secondary schools to re-open in some
provinces, and building on that momentum now depends on making funds
available to reward progress. The United States and its allies should
offer funding for education in provinces where the UN has verified that
secondary education is open for boys and girls. None of these transfers
would reach Taliban appointees because the teachers were already
registered for electronic salary payments. The United Nations Children’s
Fund, UNICEF, has started using these channels to pay teachers small
emergency stipends, proving that the mechanisms work.
2. Support Economic Revival
Even more urgent than channeling targeted support to the public
sector is releasing the chokehold on the private sector. Afghanistan
needs a viable economy because humanitarian assistance will never be
sufficient or sustainable. Unfortunately, many parts of the Afghan
economy cannot function because of Western sanctions, asset freezes, and
other economic restrictions.
a) Allow the Central Bank to Function
The United States has worked with the United Nations in recent months
toward setting up a humanitarian currency swap mechanism, which, if
implemented, could inject some of the cash liquidity that is urgently
required for the functioning of the Afghan economy. These swaps involve
humanitarian actors giving U.S. dollars to approved Afghan businesses in
exchange for local currency. However, currency swaps are a short-term
and limited workaround to make up for the lack of a functioning central
bank. Swaps cannot supply all of the hard currency required — among
other things, for imports of food and medicine.
Afghanistan needs an entity to serve the functions of a central bank,
holding U.S. dollar currency auctions, printing local currency, and
regulating the banking sector. A variety of options are under
discussion, but the most straightforward and durable solution would be
reviving Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB), the central bank. This might require
foreign technical assistance, and “ring-fencing” DAB to keep it
independent from the Taliban-controlled government. The United States
should exercise leadership at the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund to obtain these institutions’ help with DAB’s
rehabilitation.
b) Describe a Path Toward Unfreezing Assets
The central bank’s frozen assets remain stuck in political and legal
complications, mostly in the United States, but the U.S. government
should immediately signal an intention to someday return these state
assets to DAB on behalf of the Afghan people. While litigation is
pending, the U.S. could ask European partners to return the DAB assets
located in their jurisdictions. The U.S. could also return to their
rightful Afghan owners the hundreds of millions of dollars among the
frozen assets that comprise private deposits in Afghan banks. These
owners include small businesses and ordinary Afghans who have been
deprived of their savings. As reserves become available, the United
States should return them in gradual tranches, monitoring closely for
unintended effects. The U.S. should also insist on the appointment of
qualified officials to DAB and undertakings by central bank officials to
respect the Afghan laws that constrain the uses of reserves.
c) Reduce the Impact of Sanctions
The U.S. Department of the Treasury should be commended for
publishing general licenses exempting from sanctions enforcement the
delivery of humanitarian aid. However, many sectors of the Afghan
economy remain negatively affected by the threat of U.S. sanctions
enforcement. It is not feasible for the U.S. Treasury to devise lists of
all of the various sectors of the Afghan economy that should be
permitted; instead, U.S. officials must start thinking about what should
not be allowed. This would mean relieving the Afghan people of the
broad effects of sanctions that are choking the economy and, instead,
targeting sanctions to people and activities of concern. (For example,
an arms embargo could help to address proliferation concerns in the
region.) Tailoring sanctions in this way would better fit their original
purpose, which was not to constrict the entire Afghan public sector or
the country’s economy. The financial sector may require extra
assurances: to allow Afghan banks to regain access to the global
financial system, the U.S. government must actively encourage
international banks to resume transactions with Afghanistan.
This set of proposals is not only the best way to save lives. This
kind of pragmatic engagement with the Taliban-controlled government is
also the most reliable way of protecting U.S. interests. Keeping
economic pressure on the Taliban will not get rid of their regime, but a
collapsing economy could lead to more people fleeing the country,
sparking another migration crisis. It would result in more smuggled
drugs and weapons. It might also raise the threat of terrorism.
America’s reputation would also suffer if the U.S. legacy in the country
was a famine.
Unfortunately, avoiding catastrophe requires cooperation with the
Taliban on the issues I have discussed. That is, for many, more than
distasteful after two decades of war. In power, the Taliban continue to
flout human rights standards, as illustrated by the recent arrests of
female activists. Still, sometimes it is necessary to work with bad
actors for the sake of a greater good. That is not easy. Months of
conversations between the Taliban and Western officials have not
resulted in much cooperation on basic tasks.
The impasse is partly the Taliban’s fault, because they have not yet
accepted Western donors’ reasonable demands: among other things,
allowing universal education of girls and women of all ages. But part of
the stalemate results from the U.S. and its allies pushing for
unrealistic goals, such as an “inclusive” government with more ethnic
minorities and women. American officials may be correct that the Taliban
should select a more participatory form of government for the sake of
legitimizing and stabilizing their regime, but U.S. diplomats can no
longer expect to successfully insist on such things. Considering the
Taliban’s strength on the ground, the new authorities in Kabul feel
justified in rejecting what they view as Western meddling.
The way forward is limited cooperation on narrow goals. We can still
dream of an Afghanistan at peace with itself and the world, a country
that recovers from a terrible succession of wars and finds a way to
sustain its own population. America had bigger plans at the beginning,
but in the end this is what can, and must, be achieved. I look forward
to your question