On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 06:59:00AM -0400, grarpamp wrote:
On 10/13/19, jim bell <jdb10987@yahoo.com> wrote:
arbitrarily-long hops (256 hops? 65,536 hops? An even larger power-of-2 hops?)
Hops, alone, don't add much protection beyond a good routing of 3 to 9 or so. They're more for fucking with traditional jurisdictional log reconstruction trails,
That's a point.
than dealing with GPA's, GT-1's and GAA'a including Sybil
GPA - Global Passive Adversary GAA - Global Active Adversary GT-1 - ??
that can just follow traffic patterns across the mesh bisecting in real time, or more generally... sort and match traffic patterns between all sets of two edge hosts.
"between two edge hosts (aka src and dst)" is the point why more than say 3 to 9 hops adds little to nought - and if you're onion routing, not only reducing bw by [header_size] per layer, but consuming overall network bandwidth according to hop count (again, to little or no advantage to privacy).
If applied together with other tech, especially regarding nets where you want any kind of useable stream
(even delivery of storage or msgs is in a way a stream),
indeed
beyond those hops is going to get really unperformant, and less security return than thought.
No increase in security in relation to conceivable attacks. Jurisdictional hops - e.g. through Russia if you're avoiding USGov etc - sound conceptually useful.
You can demo today by recompile Tor and Phantom and tweak I2P, to set arbitrary hop levels beyond single digits... are you more secure from G* as result... probably not.
Link(s) to Phantom please?