Does Short-selling Discipline Earnings Manipulation?

xNY.io recently collated international graduate scholar working notes coining the "Crypto Computer Crimes Manual" as per best disclosure practices to illustrate various potential scenarios when market conditions are met and a Board of Directors potentially exploits blockchain technological software innovation with forecastable reckless consequences.

The Disciplined Short Sellers Handbook serves as a Manual supplement ... Detailing the hypothesis that short-selling has a disciplining role vis-à-vis the managers forcing them to reduce earning manipulation.

Across 33 countries, the Handbook documents a significantly negative relationship between lending supply and activism in the short sell market and earnings manipulation.

Collectively, findings suggest that short selling provides an external governance
mechanism to discipline managerial incentives.

xNY.io highlights that the authors of the faculty and research study confirm the main hypotheses and provide evidence of a beneficial effect of the short-selling market on the corporate market. In other words, short-selling generates a disciplining effect similar to the effect produced by the contestability of the firm in the context of M&As.

In this regard, short selling contributes not only to the information environment of the market but also to the contracting institutions of the real economy. Suggesting that in general the disciplining role of short-selling is the strongest for firms with weak internal governance or less transparent information environments.

We share 58 highlights to the Handbook as a disclosure technique, foreshadowing xNY.io's disciplined approach to trading in the near term (subject to regulatory scrutiny).

Gunnar Larson - xNY.io | Bank.org

MSc - Digital Currency

MBA - Entrepreneurship and Innovation (ip)

G@xNY.io

+1-646-454-9107

New York, New York 10001