On Sat, Aug 20, 2016 at 10:06 AM, oshwm <oshwm@openmailbox.org> wrote:
As a first relatively easy step towards a generic browser supporting multiple mixnets this might not be a bad start.
It wrestles control of TBB from TorCorp and with additional protocols would remove the dependancy on the compromised Tor exit nodes, possibly even use some sort of 'least cost routing' style of algorithm to spread traffic across the fastest or most secure network depending on user preference and based on destination.
Maybe add an element of randomness to mixnet choice as well to make traffic analysis more difficult :)
beautiful
Longer term goals should be development of a secure browser from the ground up, not basing it on any Mozilla/Apple/Google code - and having it audited.
On 08/20/2016 12:04 AM, Александр wrote:
Great news.
For those who have suggested it there's already plans and a roadmap for
On 20/08/16 07:40, Mirimir wrote: the
fork of Tor. Two concurrent networks which are compatible with a singular browser would greatly diversify the ecosystem and give users more choice. At this point this is the only way forward imo. More info: https://rotorbrowser.com I don't see the point. As Juan so likes to remind us, Tor design is fundamentally flawed, in that it's vulnerable to global adversaries. Which, in practice, means US military. So how would a fork not be vulnerable as well? Instead, why not develop something better?
-- Cari Machet NYC 646-436-7795 carimachet@gmail.com AIM carismachet Syria +963-099 277 3243 Amman +962 077 636 9407 Berlin +49 152 11779219 Reykjavik +354 894 8650 Twitter: @carimachet <https://twitter.com/carimachet> 7035 690E 5E47 41D4 B0E5 B3D1 AF90 49D6 BE09 2187 Ruh-roh, this is now necessary: This email is intended only for the addressee(s) and may contain confidential information. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use of this information, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this email without permission is strictly prohibited.