On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 2:34 AM, brian carroll <electromagnetize@gmail.com> wrote:
coderman wrote:
you're wrong.
perfect. thank you
brian: you're a verbose individual. but you respond usefully *grin*
i think i grasp a fundamental concept of crypto that relates size of message (message length) with design of algorithmic structure needed to successfully embed or hide the message else hidden order may be easily visible/discovered
it is interesting how these fundamentals change across public key systems, and the ideal one time pad. symmetric ciphers are a particular beast... (and combined authentication and encryption modes even more particular ;)
i still contend this is different for set theory and models of noise ...
in that 'keys' could function differently in bit set approach though perhaps rekeying is universal as a security principle yet potentially flawed if it could reveal a particular structure leading to its compromise...
in a poor implementation or protocol, re-keying can provide an opportunity for cipher suite downgrade or other privacy destroying attacks. effective frequent re-keying requires the other INFOSEC/OPSEC dependencies be met!
whereas reusing an 'infinity key' (regenerating keys or using same key in new instantiations, accessing different arbitrary structure as keychain multitool) may function in a different context than existing approaches,
note that for all intents and purposes, you should use a fresh, absolutely random key for each re-keying. key "stretching" or derivation methods suffer the same types of vulnerabilities over large enough output that the original cipher does. instead of spending your time trying to securely "stretch" a few keys, just generate a large number of perfectly random keys instead!