" The frequency at which a key should be changed in order to maintain an minimum level of protection depending on the number of unrolled rounds computed per cycle is explored."

Here some attacks were made against Simon and Speck.

In my lay opinion, RC4 is more secure for the internet of things. The greatest vulnerability for computers is memory bound errors, not... uh. Malicious javascript sending a DDOS on an 100 megabit uplink to a server so a passive adversary can collect ciphertexts and do statistical analysis. Naturally everyone says that no one was fired for using AES, but who was fired for not putting a password on a database?

I think if the RC4 round function was applied key length bytes more times (128-bit key, 16 more key schedule rounds), the first few bytes will have less bias, and the only related key recovery attacks apply to the first few bytes.

An additional xor to mask the output or input of a byte lookup may improve things.

Or use an ARX cipher as a NLFSR, like the Lex cipher.

In any case, don't use error correction codes in cryptography.

This is some kinda multidimensional chess.