On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 6:56 AM, coderman <coderman@gmail.com> wrote:
... That's what I've been talking about in earlier answers: the ability of the government to go back to taps collected years earlier to look for material with which to influence potential witnesses in the present.
i noticed in the new sigint memo there were a few justifications for bulk collection: """ In particular, when the United States collects nonpublicly available signals intelligence in bulk, it shall use that data only for the purposes of detecting and countering: (1) espionage and other threats and activities directed by foreign powers or their intelligence services against the United States and its interests; (2) threats to the United States and its interests from terrorism; (3) threats to the United States and its interests from the development, possession, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction; (4) cybersecurity threats; [ED: WTF???] (5) threats to U.S. or allied Armed Forces or other U.S or allied personnel; and (6) transnational criminal threats, including illicit finance and sanctions evasion related to the other purposes named in this section. """ half of these could be argued law enforcement domain; why is the power of the IC applied to potential crimes of "cybersecurity threat", "transnational criminal threats", and "illicit finance"? this is looking less like reigning in and more like white wash with retroactive indemnification... 0. "PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE/PPD-28 : Signals Intelligence Activities" http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1006318/2014sigint-mem-ppd-rel.pdf