From: jim bell <jdb10987@yahoo.com>

From: Ben Tasker <ben@bentasker.co.uk>

On Thu, Feb 23, 2017 at 1:37 PM, jim bell <jdb10987@yahoo.com> wrote:
Court rules assault weapons are not protected under Constitution http://dailym.ai/2mmUuqG via http://dailym.ai/android

I'm no fan of the US's view on firearms, but this makes no sense to me:

'Put simply, we have no power to extend Second Amendment protection to the weapons of war,' wrote Judge Robert King


 " We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms. Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those “in common use at the time.” 307 U. S., at 179. We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of “dangerous and unusual weapons.” See 4 Blackstone 148–149 (1769); 3 B. Wilson, Works of the Honourable James Wilson 79 (1804); J. Dunlap, The New-York Justice 8 (1815); C. Humphreys, A Compendium of the Common Law in Force in Kentucky 482 (1822); 1 W. Russell, A Treatise on Crimes and Indictable Misdemeanors 271–272 (1831); H. Stephen, Summary of the Criminal Law 48 (1840); E. Lewis, An Abridgment of the Criminal Law of the United States 64 (1847); F. Wharton, A Treatise on the Criminal Law of the United States 726 (1852). See also State v. Langford, 10 N. C. 381, 383–384 (1824); O’Neill v. State, 16Ala. 65, 67 (1849); English v. State, 35Tex. 473, 476 (1871); State v. Lanier, 71 N. C. 288, 289 (1874).
    It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful in military service—M-16 rifles and the like—may be banned, then the Second Amendment right is completely detached from the prefatory clause. But as we have said, the conception of the militia at the time of the Second Amendment ’s ratification was the body of all citizens capable of military service, who would bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty. It may well be true today that a militia, to be as effective as militias in the 18th century, would require sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at large. Indeed, it may be true that no amount of small arms could be useful against modern-day bombers and tanks. But the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change our interpretation of the right.


However, the only reason that M16's are relatively rare is that they have been restricted/taxed/semi-outlawed since their origin.  Thus, that sounds like a self-fulfilling prophecy.

              Jim Bell

Also:  I should add that this material I quoted above amounts to ONLY "dicta", short and plural for "Obiter dictum".
"Dicta" is any statement made in a legal opinion that was not necessary to come to the conclusion the opinion stated.  Such dicta are not considered binding on any court.    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Obiter_dictum  

"

      Jim Bell

Significance of obiter dicta[edit]

A judicial statement can be ratio decidendi only if it refers to the crucial facts and law of the case. Statements that are not crucial, or which refer to hypothetical facts or to unrelated law issues, are obiter dicta. Obiter dicta (often simply dicta, or obiter) are remarks or observations made by a judge that, although included in the body of the court's opinion, do not form a necessary part of the court's decision. In a court opinion, obiter dicta include, but are not limited to, words "introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument".[2] Unlike ratio decidendi, obiter dicta are not the subject of the judicial decision, even if they happen to be correct statements of law. The so-called Wambaugh's Inversion Test provides that to determine whether a judicial statement is ratio or obiter, you should invert the argument, that is to say, ask whether the decision would have been different, had the statement been omitted. If so, the statement is crucial and is ratio; whereas if it is not crucial, it is obiter.
If a court rules that it lacks jurisdiction to hear a case (or dismisses the case on a technicality), but still goes on to offer opinions on the merits of the case, such opinions may constitute obiter dicta. Other instances of obiter dicta may occur where a judge makes an aside to provide context for the opinion, or makes a thorough exploration of a relevant area of law. If a judge, by way of illumination, provides a hypothetical example, this would be obiter even if relevant because it would not be on the facts of the case, as in the Carlill case (below).
University of Florida scholars Teresa Reid-Rambo and Leanne Pflaum explain the process by which obiter dicta may become binding. They write that:[3]
In reaching decisions, courts sometimes quote passages of obiter dicta found in the texts of the opinions from prior cases, with or without acknowledging the quoted passage's status as obiter dicta. A quoted passage of obiter dicta may become part of the holding or ruling in a subsequent case, depending on what the latter court actually decided and how that court treated the principle embodied in the quoted passage.