--On Thursday, April 03, 2014 8:09 AM -0400 John Young <jya@pipeline.com>
wrote:
That doesn't sound like something John Young would write.
> The CIA is the principal customer of NSA products outside
> the military. When global cyber spying Cybercom was proposed
> NSA did not want to do it, claiming it exceeded NSA's military
> mission.
The idea that the US military, who are the ones really running the show,
woudn't want to increase their power is just...too exceedingly naive.
> However, the pols, and CIA, wanted that very excess,
> in particular for spying inside the US, ostensibly banned for the
> CIA but now needed for terrorists inside.
>
> CIA (long FBI opponents) thought FBI could not cope with inside
> terrorists, using 9/11 as an example, and advocated NSA involvement
> with its much greater technical capability, but more importantly, its
> military-privileged secrecy not susceptible to full congressional
> oversight, courts and FOIA.
>
> The joint CIA-NSA Special Collection Service (SCS) has
> been doing for decades what NSA is now alone accused of doing:
> CIA provided the targets, NSA did the technical collection from
> those global stations identified by xKeyscore (most in embassies
> or nearby).
>
> What is bizarre is how little CIA is mentioned in news furor about
> NSA, as if NSA did its work in isolation from the IC and without
> oversight of the 3 branches.
>
> SCS also does burglaries, code snatches, decrypts, doc drops,
> stings, ploys, blackmail, the panoply of CIA operations. The increased
> civilian target panoply bestowed upon NSA came from CIA demands
> channeled through ODNI.
>
> Reviewing what little has been released of the Snowden documents
> they are quite similar to what SCS has been doing with the addition
> of the US as target. FISA had to be rejiggered for the US domain.
>
> Most national leaders, like POTUS, are considered to be military
> commanders thus fair game for NSA along with CIA. Nothing
> exceptional about the recent revelations of spying on chiefs of
> state.
>
> NSA technical collection capability was developed for the
> military, not civilian use. Now expanded to CIA full dominance
> territory. FISA had to be rejiggered for using it against civilians.
> And is still being rejiggered these days.
>
> NSA's recent attempt to slough off Cybercom and return to
> its military mission, has been rejected by the civilian overseers
> following CIA guidance and fear-mongering of civilians, especially
> those inside the US. The last thing CIA and its supporters want
> is a revelation of its manipulation of civilian leaders institutionalized
> by the 1947 National Security Act (also opposed by the military).
>
> -----
>
>
> At 10:56 PM 4/2/2014, DG wrote on cypherpunks:
>
>> [ disclaimer, Geoff Stone is a friend of mine ]
>>
>>
>> www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/what-i-told-the-nsa_b_5065447.ht
>> ml?utm_hp_ref=technology&ir=Technology
>>
>> What I Told the NSA
>>
>> Because of my service on the President's Review Group last fall,
>> which made recommendations to the president about NSA surveillance
>> and related issues, the NSA invited me to speak today to the NSA
>> staff at the NSA headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland, about my
>> work on the Review Group and my perceptions of the NSA. Here,
>> in brief, is what I told them:
>>
>> From the outset, I approached my responsibilities as a member
>> of the Review Group with great skepticism about the NSA. I am
>> a long-time civil libertarian, a member of the National Advisory
>> Council of the ACLU, and a former Chair of the Board of the
>> American Constitution Society. To say I was skeptical about
>> the NSA is, in truth, an understatement.
>>
>> I came away from my work on the Review Group with a view of
>> the NSA that I found quite surprising. Not only did I find
>> that the NSA had helped to thwart numerous terrorist plots
>> against the United States and its allies in the years since
>> 9/11, but I also found that it is an organization that operates
>> with a high degree of integrity and a deep commitment to the
>> rule of law.
>>
>> Like any organization dealing with extremely complex issues,
>> the NSA on occasion made mistakes in the implementation of its
>> authorities, but it invariably reported those mistakes upon
>> discovering them and worked conscientiously to correct its
>> errors. The Review Group found no evidence that the NSA had
>> knowingly or intentionally engaged in unlawful or unauthorized
>> activity. To the contrary, it has put in place carefully-crafted
>> internal proceduresto ensure that it operates within the bounds
>> of its lawful authority.
>>
>> This is not to say that the NSA should have had all of the
>> authorities it was given. The Review Group found that many of
>> the programs undertaken by the NSA were highly problematic and
>> much in need of reform. But the responsibility for directing
>> the NSA to carry out those programs rests not with the NSA,
>> but with the Executive Branch, the Congress, and the Foreign
>> Intelligence Surveillance Court, which authorized those programs
>> -- sometimes without sufficient attention to the dangers they
>> posed to privacy and civil liberties. The NSA did its job --
>> it implemented the authorities it was given.
>>
>> It gradually became apparent to me that in the months after
>> Edward Snowden began releasing information about the government's
>> foreign intelligence surveillance activities, the NSA was being
>> severely -- and unfairly -- demonized by its critics. Rather
>> than being a rogue agency that was running amok in disregard
>> of the Constitution and laws of the United States, the NSA was
>> doing its job. It pained me to realize that the hard-working,
>> dedicated, patriotic employees of the NSA, who were often
>> working for far less pay than they could have earned in the
>> private sector because they were determined to help protect
>> their nation from attack, were being castigated in the press
>> for the serious mistakes made, not by them, but by Presidents,
>> the Congress, and the courts.
>>
>> Of course, "I was only following orders" is not always an
>> excuse. But in no instance was the NSA implementing a program
>> that was so clearly illegal or unconstitutional that it would
>> have been justified in refusing to perform the functions
>> assigned to it by Congress, the President, and the Judiciary.
>> Although the Review Group found that many of those programs
>> need serious re-examination and reform, none of them was so
>> clearly unlawful that it would have been appropriate for the
>> NSA to refuse to fulfill its responsibilities.
>>
>> Moreover, to the NSA's credit, it was always willing to engage
>> the Review Group in serious and candid discussions about the
>> merits of its programs, their deficiencies, and the ways in
>> which those programs could be improved. Unlike some other
>> entities in the intelligence community and in Congress, the
>> leaders of the NSA were not reflexively defensive, but were
>> forthright, engaged, and open to often sharp questions about
>> the nature and implementation of its programs.
>>
>> To be clear, I am not saying that citizens should trust the
>> NSA. They should not. Distrust is essential to effective
>> democratic governance. The NSA should be subject to constant
>> and rigorous review, oversight, scrutiny, and checks and
>> balances. The work it does, however important to the safety
>> of the nation, necessarily poses grave dangers to fundamental
>> American values, particularly if its work is abused by persons
>> in positions of authority. If anything, oversight of the NSA
>> -- especially by Congress -- should be strengthened. The future
>> of our nation depends not only on the NSA doing its job, but
>> also on the existence of clear, definitive, and carefully
>> enforced rules and restrictions governing its activities.
>>
>> In short, I found, to my surprise, that the NSA deserves the
>> respect and appreciation of the American people. But it should
>> never, ever, be trusted.
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