Maybe I wasn't clear what I meant by saying "denial of service attack". I wasn't referring to jamming the airwaves themselves: Attempting to do that would be extremely difficult, and essentially impossible, as you understand below. Here is what I meant: Suppose it became common knowledge that a (free) service existed, call it a variant on a Dark Market. Anyone could send data to the specific Dark Market page, and that data would then be transmitted, with a specified spectrum spreading code. That system would transmit that data, with that spreading code, for concreteness let's say over Manhattan. I am supposing that the transmitting capacity would be limited to, say, 1 million bits per second. What would happen if a malicious actor sent huge amounts of data, far in excess of 1 million bits per second, to this service for transmission? If the service was free, he could easily do that. He could clog up the transmission system quite easily. The service would still operate, kinda sorta, but it would still be unusable to the average potential customer, because it would always be 'full'. Transmission delays could be enormous. How to avoid this? One solution would be to charge for such transmissions. A charge as little as 1 cent per one million bits would earn the operator of the system $36.00 for each hour of operation. If said malicious operator did indeed clog up that system, it would cost him $36 per hour to do so. But, that level of earnings would then motivate other people to set up similar systems. However, I think a better system would be a bidding-type arrangement. If usage was low, the bid would be very low, essential zero cost. Only if the usage was high, say over 3/4 of the capacity of the system, would "bidding" resolve whose data gets transmitted. If there was indeed a denial-of-service attack going on, raising usage close to 100% of capacity, the price could go way up, making a lot of money for the operator of the system. Jim Bell On Sunday, January 13, 2019, 12:40:08 AM PST, grarpamp <grarpamp@gmail.com> wrote: On 1/12/19, jim bell <jdb10987@yahoo.com> wrote:
"denial of service attacks"?
The concept is that the RF as roughly described in whatever paper cannot be jammed or DOS'd... your RF would appear as noise to all but those holding the RF spectrum noise key, so the only way to jam it, if you even knew it was in use in the first place (say by noting an overall spectrum power bump) would be to raise the noise floor by emitting... you guessed it, random noise... which would wipe out the S/N dB's you need for your own comms be they traditional AM / FM / etc, or this keyed noise tech. So you'd end up in a mutually assured destruction, essentially who can throw more power in the air. You'd probably be able to get more local power up, hop by hop, than a wide area adversary tying to blanket you, so you'd win. You need the RF noise key to cipher the RF, so the underlying data packets are always secure and unaffected by the above. Data would be affected by nodes that are involved in the data layer, before it gets pushed up to or down from RF. That's a trusted evil maid problem and thus out of scope.