On Thu, Aug 13, 2020 at 02:10:48PM -0700, Se7en wrote:
Due to a major oversight, the New York Time's digital collection of private, privleged, and confidential documentation is avalible for download.
Archive it fast.
<https://kiwifarms.net/threads/nyt-secure-server-leak.74777/>
Via clearnet HTTP, and via FTP.
Definitely needs many eyes. One way to browse is click on Google's "images" link. Much more fasterer browsing through documents. I don't know how revelatory such things might prompt humans to actually live a human right - we can only hope... https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/578-beatles-uk-court-judgment/3fb570... Neutral Citation Number: [2019] EWHC 60 (Admin) Case No: CO/3449/2018 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION DIVISIONAL COURT Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL Date: 18/01/2019 The mischief this provision is aimed at is the disclosure (“revealing”) of information which, by its nature, is very personal. Indeed, much of it is of a nature that many people would keep tightly held and discuss with few, if any. Recital 37 to the LED indicates that that such processing merits “specific protection as the context of [the] processing could create significant risks to the fundamental rights and freedoms” of the data subject. Sir James submits, correctly in our view, that the term “religious or philosophical beliefs” could not include extreme religious violence. We would add that a mindset which impels a person to commit criminal acts of violence could not be seen as a “political belief” for these purposes. A paedophile who has an unshakeable belief that sex with children is in their interests, or any other criminal with a profound belief that his criminality is not wrong, could not rely on their motivation as a political or philosophical belief and thus engage these provisions. No more can a person alleged to use terrorist violence for what he considers to be justifiable political or religious ends, were that motivation referred to in the evidence collected as part of a criminal investigation. In our judgment, the Home Secretary is right to submit that these provisions should not be interpreted to give a heightened degree of protection in respect of terrorist offences which advance “a political, religious, racial or ideological cause” compared with non-ideologically driven crimes. https://int.nyt.com/data/int-shared/nytdocs/docs/224/224.pdf United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit No. 06-3376 LYNNE BLOCH , HELEN BLOCH , and NATHAN BLOCH , Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. EDWARD FRISCHHOLZ and HORELINE TOWERS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION , Defendants-Appellees. ARGUED FEBRUARY 20, 2008—DECIDED JULY 10, 2008 Although we can accept in the abstract Mr. Doe’s argu- ment that a government may not punish pure thought, we cannot accept his further submission that, in subjecting him to this ban, the City “punished” him for “pure thought.”8 8 It is important to note that the City, in banning Mr. Doe from the parks, was not “punishing” him at all. Rather, the ban was a civil (i.e., nonpunitive) measure designed for the protection of the public. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105-06 (2003) (finding the Alaska sex offender registration statute nonpunitive); see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997) (explaining regarding Hendricks, the challenger of the civil commitment statute at issue: “This admitted lack of volitional control, coupled with a prediction of future dangerousness, adequately distinguishes Hendricks from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings”). It is unquestionable that a governmental entity has broader powers to operate both substantively and procedurally in the civil, as opposed to criminal (i.e., punitive), context. See generally Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies To Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 Hastings L.J. 1325, 1343-44 (1991)... The City has not banned him from having sexual fantasies about children. It did not ban him from the public parks because he admitted to having sexual fantasies about child- ren in his home or even in a coffee shop. The inescapable reality is that Mr. Doe did not simply entertain thoughts; he brought himself to the brink of committing child molesta- tion. He had sexual urges directed toward children, and he took dangerous steps toward gratifying his urges by going to a place where he was likely to find children in a vulnera- ble situation. To characterize the ban as directed at “pure thought” would require us to close our eyes to Mr. Doe’s actions. It also would require that we give short shrift to Mr. Doe’s condition as an admitted pedophile who continues to have difficulty controlling his urges. The law has long recognized that not every individual is equally capable of controlling his desires and preventing them from becoming actions which injure others. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 93 (2003) (explaining, in upholding Alaska’s sex offender registration statute, that “an imposition of restrictive measures on sex offenders adjudged to be dangerous is a legitimate nonpu- nitive governmental objective and has been historically so regarded” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). As Justice Holmes wrote, “the character of every act de- pends upon the circumstances in which it is done.” Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Mr. Doe is an admitted sexual addict with a proclivity toward children; as such, he belongs to a group of persons who are more susceptible to having sexual desires with respect to children and to acting on those urges. We cannot ignore, nor can we say the law somehow commands the City to ignore, Mr. Doe’s pedo- philia and the history of his battle with that affliction. Facing this reality certainly does not license society, acting through government, to exile, harass or marginalize Mr. Doe, but it permits government to fulfill its responsibility to protect vulnerable children in dangerous situations. In short, we must recognize the actual situation confront- ing the City as well as the parents and children who look to that City for protection. The children and their parents are not concerned about Mr. Doe’s thoughts. They are con- cerned about his coming to the park to achieve sexual grati- fication. They do not need to wait until a child is molested to take steps to protect their children. The First Amendment does not prohibit the City from taking the action it did to protect its children. It does not require the City to act in an ostrichlike fashion and expose the children of the City to the risk that, on a future date, a child will wander further from the group, present a better opportunity and experience the tragic consequences. ... Further, in Free Speech Coalition, the government proposed a similar theory in defense of the ban of virtual child pornography. 535 U.S. at 253. Attempting to prevent the potential indirect harm to children posed by pedophiles, Congress reasoned that the virtual pictures may serve to “whet” the appetites of pedophiles and may be used to convince a reluctant child to participate in sexual acts. Id. at 241. In line with its previous stance in Stanley, the Court squarely rejected this theory: “The government ‘cannot con- stitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of control- ling a person’s private thoughts.’ First Amendment freedoms are most in danger when the government seeks to control thought or to justify its laws for that impermissible end.” Id. (quoting Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566). Citing criminal statutes 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2251, which prohibit sexual abuse, the Court reasoned that “Congress may pass valid laws to protect children from abuse,” however, “[t]he prospect of crime . . . by itself does not justify laws suppressing pro- tected speech.” Id. at 245 (emphasis added). ...