On Mon, Apr 01, 2019 at 04:48:43PM +1100, Zenaan Harkness wrote:
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ On Sunday, March 31, 2019 7:14 PM, grarpamp <grarpamp@gmail.com> wrote:
https://loki.network/ https://github.com/majestrate/torrent.ano http://anodex.oniichanylo2tsi4.onion/ https://i2pd.website/ https://github.com/loki-project/loki-network/blob/master/docs/high-level.txt https://www.reddit.com/r/i2p/
On Sun, Mar 31, 2019 at 06:42:54PM +0000, furrier wrote:
Monero fork with premine, governance tax, and 50% funds lockup for "market-based sybil resistance". Good luck, I'll pass.
Also, it wasn't clear from a quick look, do they utilize I2P at the networking layer or did they roll out they own custom solution like Kovri?
Loki network appears to be a ground up rewrite of I2P, with an eye to the lower latency and clear-net accessibility of Tor, with newer (presumably better) crypto than I2P.
This is correct.
Appears to ignore the fundamental currently-missing feature in all mix-/ anon-/ dark-/ onion-/ etc- nets in existence today - i.e. chaff fill, which implies some sort of badwidth/ time reservation/ promise between nodes, which is (re)negotiated from time to time between nodes.
This chaff fill feature is the single currently-missing feature which is required to begin to handle the problem of global (in a network sense) passive adversaries, aka GPAs - i.e. the NSA, the CIA, the FSB, etc, i.e. those well-funded entities paid for and run by nation-state actors who generally oppress the fundamental rights of the rest of us, such as the rights to live, trade, and move about within our communities.
I am personally convinced that a flat traffic shape will only dare attackers to cut links between parts of the network, effectively making an even larger traffic shape to corrilate with. I am not convinced low latency systems can be immune to traffic shape corrilation and hence that being said, I think state actors are out of scope of the current threat model of llarp. This may or may not change.