One of the perennial highlights of the International Association for Cryptologic
Research's Crypto conference is the "invited talk." For an hour each
year, a prominent scholar shares a big idea or new perspective on the
protocols, algorithms, and math problems that underlie cutting-edge
encryption. It's usually a deeply technical bacchanal, but this year was
not. Prolific academic cryptographer Seny Kamara of Brown University
had something other than formulas and theorems on his mind.
"So
an actual question then is OK, well, what am I doing here, right?"
Kamara asked the livestream attendees. "Why am I giving a talk at Crypto
if I'm not talking about technical things? And, you know, basically I'm
here because Ahmaud Arbery was killed in February, because Breonna
Taylor was killed by a police officer in March, and because George Floyd
was also killed by police officers in May."
The talk, dubbed Crypto for the People and given on August 19, examined the question of who really benefits
from encryption technologies and advances in cryptographic research. It
sounded a call to reexamine research priorities that today largely serve
the interests of governments and corporations instead of marginalized
people, be they racial minorities, immigrants, women, the LGBTQ
community, or others. As an immigrant and Black American—and one of the
few Black academic cryptographers in the world—Kamara pointed out that
even the open source community and movements like the cypherpunks
largely don't directly work to address these needs. They are focused on
taking power from corporations and developing technologies to defend
people from mass government surveillance and digital intrusion, but
generally not on developing encryption technologies and new areas of
abstract theory that are specifically motivated by the needs of
underserved communities.
"As
long as I’ve been studying and working in cryptography and computer
science, about 20 years now, it was always very clear to me that my own
work and other people’s work was disconnected from my life experiences,"
Kamara tells WIRED. "I believed it could have an impact on people’s
privacy as a whole, but I didn't think I would have cared about any of
it when I was 13 or 15 and growing up in New York City. And that
disconnect always bothered me."
So much of cryptographic research
is abstract and mathematical—divorced from real-world conditions—that it
can be easy to simply let all lines of inquiry exist only in that
theoretical space. And Kamara argues that even when encryption
technologies are brought to underserved communities, they arrive
retrofitted from other research projects, rather than conceived based on
the needs of the vulnerable and the specific threats they face.
"As
academics working on policy questions, we motivate our work in grant
applications and so on by arguing that it benefits the people in some
way," says Abdoulaye Ndiaye, a macroeconomics researcher at New York
University who discovered Kamara's Crypto talk on Twitter. "However, the
consumers of our research are other academics, government institutions,
and, in some fields, businesses. There is this underlying assumption
that these entities will implement the research and it will trickle down
to the underserved people. Dr. Kamara highlighted that in cryptography
the incentives of the government and the business are not necessarily
aligned with underserved people, the missing link in this trickle down."
Encryption
technologies do provide protection to vulnerable groups around the
world like political dissidents, activists, and journalists. Kamara's
talk made the case, though, that purpose-built cryptography could
accomplish so much more.
In
his own research at Brown, for example, Kamara and his colleagues have
done work motivated by law enforcement databases in the United States
that track alleged criminals like possible gang members. In a 2015 audit
of a California state platform called CalGang, for example, 42 people
entered in the database were under the age of 1 year old. In a sample of
100 entries from the database, 13 of the people represented should not
have been in the database at all, and 131 of the 563 evidence points
used against the 100 people were not supported.
So
Kamara has worked on developing secure database schemes in which data
can be audited and checked privately but transparently, that does not
allow data to be exported or duplicated, and that deletes entries
automatically after a given amount of time without special authorization
from an authority like a judge.
"I think there is an intersection
between traditional cryptography and privacy and what I was calling
'crypto for the people,'" Kamara says. "There is research and there are
tools that can be beneficial to large subsets of people, as in the encrypted messaging app Signal.
But there are also problems and adversarial models that are unique to
marginalized groups, and those problems are not being investigated. For
example, not everyone ends up in a gang database, and certainly very few
cryptographers or academic computer science researchers end up in gang
databases."
Kamara also advocated using the flexibility and
security of tenured professorships as an opportunity to push the
envelope of what cryptographic research can be—including in the case of
his own talk. "I went into it thinking, 'I’m glad I have tenure, because
this is going to cost me,'" he says. But Kamara says the response has
been very positive so far. "I’m sure there are many others who disagree
and didn’t like the talk, but so far they haven’t reached out to let me
know," Kamara says.
The long-standing question of morality in
cryptography rarely makes it to the foreground, even within the academic
community itself. The discourse flared up in the wake of Edward
Snowden's 2013 revelations about mass digital surveillance by the
National Security Agency, particularly after a seminal 2015 paper by UC Davis cryptographer Phillip Rogaway, which made the case that
cryptography is "an inherently political tool" with "an intrinsically
moral dimension."
"I plead for a reinvention of our disciplinary
culture to attend not only to puzzles and math, but, also, to the
societal implications of our work," Rogaway wrote.
Five years
later, he says he doesn't see many changes in the research most
cryptographers are doing or the topics they are discussing at
conferences. But he adds that he was impressed with Kamara's talk and
the steps it took to move the discourse forward. The essay Rogaway wrote
in 2015, he says, would now include not just a discussion of the
ethical need to defend the masses against mass surveillance, but an
entreaty that the academic community focus more of its work on serving
marginalized groups.
"We
don’t work in a vacuum and we’re not pure mathematicians," Rogaway told
WIRED. "As much as certain cryptographers would like to see themselves
as doing pure mathematics on some kind of quest of discovery, that’s not
an apt description of where we sit. The field does have these very
strong political connections and connections to power. And if we just
say, 'Oh, that’s not my domain,' that in itself is a really politically
situated, ahistorical view and ultimately quite elitist."
Today,
partly because of rapidly expanding anti-abuse work on social networks
and communication platforms, the idea of an ethical imperative in
privacy technologies has become more mainstream. But much of the actual
work in cryptography remains fundamentally abstract. The practical
applications that do exist often originated with a narrow field of view.
"Building
the same stuff you always did but claiming that it's for people in
marginalized communities is not the same thing as human-centric threat
modeling," wrote Lea Kissner, a cryptographer and security engineer
focused on anti-abuse and privacy, in a series of tweets about Kamara's talk last week.
The
type of tailored, threat-specific research Kamara described requires
intimate knowledge of the actual, nuanced needs of a marginalized group.
Kamara emphasized in his talk that the cryptography community needs to
be much more inclusive and representative if it wants to help the
vulnerable. And researchers need to seek firsthand expertise to gain a
deeper understanding case by case.
"I
think the only reason we have a hard time imagining what this looks
like is because, effectively, we’ve been trained for 40 years to do
corporate research. So we lack the imagination, skills, and knowledge to
do research 'for the people,'" Kamara says. "But diversity is crucial
for this."
Following the shootings of Breonna Taylor, George
Floyd, and Jacob Blake, Kamara says fellow cryptographers and other
computer scientists have reached out to him to talk about systemic
changes that could be aided by technical solutions to reduce police
brutality. Kamara says he welcomes these discussions, "but most of those
people have never been attacked by the police. They don’t understand
the psychological pressure you’re under and the confusion you’re
experiencing when five cops are running at you. These kinds of details
matter."