Re: Market Competition for Security Measures
On Wednesday, October 24, 2001, at 11:33 AM, Meyer Wolfsheim wrote:
Largely, I am in agreement. However, in the paragraphs I've quoted below, Tim touches on a counter-argument and dismisses it. I'll like to expand upon that a bit.
I didn't "dismiss" it. In fact, I wrote more about this issue, which I haven't seen brought up by anyone else here, than 95% of all posts to Cypherpunks have in their entire amount of original material!
(There are interesting issues of "danger to others." Friedman the Younger covers this in his recent book on economics. "Law's Order." To wit, XYZ Airlines, with no security procedures, might be denied use of various airports, etc. A standard tort issue. The outcome is not precisely known, but a move toward "market competition for security measures" would flesh out many of these issues and outcomes.)
I think that this "danger to others" issue will lead us right back where we started. It would not simply be an issue of various airports denying use, but also communities denying airspace rights. And you can bet that, in a world where airlines were permitted to have no security procedures, XYZ Airlines would also have to abide by "no-fly zones" set up by the larger, more security-conscious cities, enforceable by SAMs.
I never claimed that a stable end-state is that of some airlines have "no security procedures." Such was not the case before 911, so it is even less likely today. I don't know what the evolution will look like. The ecology of the security measures will probably, if allowed to by regulators, have a few hyper-conscious players like El Al, a few cattle car playes like People Express, and a bunch of players in between. I was not "dismissing" this issue of collateral damage, of tort damage. I said Friedman explores such things in great detail. However, the current system does not allow the positive effects I described. Any airline in the U.S. (or many other countries) which attempted some obvious security measures would face lawsuits by "discriminated against" customers. This is a more pressing problem than some extremely unlikely scenario wherein some carrier adopted a "no security procedures" policy.
There would probably be places in the mid-west that permitted such airlines to operate their services. But the market would surely kill them swiftly if they were denied the ability to fly or land in any popular area. Customers would go elsewhere, not because of the lax security, but because of the limited service offerings.
You are making my point, not arguing against it. I never claimed that a spectrum of security measures would be a stable, or even a short-term, state. May's Law: The longer the essay, the more complaints there are that it was not detailed enough. --Tim May "That government is best which governs not at all." --Henry David Thoreau
On Wed, 24 Oct 2001, Tim May wrote:
I didn't "dismiss" it. In fact, I wrote more about this issue, which I haven't seen brought up by anyone else here, than 95% of all posts to Cypherpunks have in their entire amount of original material!
My apologies. Dismiss was not the correct word. I suppose I view this issue as a larger hurdle then you do.
I never claimed that a stable end-state is that of some airlines have "no security procedures." Such was not the case before 911, so it is even less likely today.
[snip]
You are making my point, not arguing against it. I never claimed that a spectrum of security measures would be a stable, or even a short-term, state.
Okay. I took your thoughts to mean that you were envisioning a market where the level of security provided by the airlines was completely under the control of the airlines themselves, and would be adjusted by the airlines according to the demands of the customers (and to a lesser extent, the employees and share-holders) so that the airline could remain profitable. My point was that such a system wouldn't get off the ground. The issue isn't simply *actual* collateral damage. Airlines would have to get permission to use the airspace their planes would occupy. If an airline's proposed security measures didn't meet with the requirements for the community controlling the airspace that airline wished to utilize, the airline wouldn't ever have the chance to see how the market would react to its security offering. I think it's a non-starter, because the potential collateral damage and the reliance on third-party "right-of-ways" is too great. Such a system could work well in other instances, though. Compare to private railway lines. A private train service would be able to initiate such a system with much greater ease, since there is much less potential collateral damage, and less use of third-party resources and property. Call me a pessimist, but I can't see how an airline with "less than acceptable for the Common Good" security measures would ever be able to begin operating. I don't think we'd ever have the opportunity to see what the market reaction would be -- the airline would not fly one plane.
May's Law: The longer the essay, the more complaints there are that it was not detailed enough.
Oh, Tim... I wasn't complaining. You asked for thoughts, and I was offering mine. -MW-
participants (2)
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Meyer Wolfsheim -
Tim May