Greetings, p2p-hacker folks, This list seems to be the most direct spiritual successor to the cypherpunks list, which is where I'd want to raise this issue if it still existed. As most of you are undoubtedly aware, the sudden surge in attention Wikileaks has gained in the last months have resulted in at least half a dozen imitation "leaks" sites -- from OpenLeaks, founded by former Wikileaks staff who have different ideas on how such a site should operate, to regional whistle-blower and transparency sites such as Brusselsleaks, Balkanleaks, Pirateleaks.cz, etc. Let me first state I think that this is absolutely a good thing -- in principle. Relying on a single initiative such as Wikileaks both gives way too much power to the organization in question, and makes it a high-profile target. The rise of independant leak publishers decentralizes the fundamental service these sites provide, and brings attention back to the content of their publications rather than the personalities of the individuals involved. It's also problematic for a number of reasons: firstly, reputation. Who is BrusselsLeaks? Why should a whistleblower trust that the operators of that site have his/her interests in mind? What's to say they're not an initiative of an intelligence agency? I'm not sure there's anything to be done about that, except wait and let these other players earn their own reputation capital. However, it's painfully clear to me that a number of these sites don't have the first clue when it comes to technological measures they should be taking to protect their sources. E.g., BrusselsLeaks is running their operation with Wordpress and Hushmail -- hardly a hardened solution. Wikileaks has had four years and the input of top network security experts, cryptographers, p2p-hackers, and cypherpunks, to create a system hardened against predictable threats. It's quite likely that had Bradley Manning not made the mistake of "confessing" to a government snitch posing as a journalist, he'd not be in jail today. Wikileaks, according to what I can gather from press reports and comments from people involved, as well as examining their site, relies on a Tor Hidden Service setup for receiving submissions. That alone is hardly enough to protect the site from attacks on the anonymity of its sources, the integrity and security of its site, or its network presense, but already requires a level of technical sophistication that is lacking in most of these "copy-cat" sites. I'd like to see us come up with an easy-to-deploy solution for launching a leaks site with the security considerations addressed, perhaps in the form of a "soft appliance" distribution, but first we need a basic requirements document. What are the technical security requirements of such a service? Off the top of my head, I think we can divide this into three parts: 1. General site security. The website/servers need to be resistant to compromise, and also need to be prepared for the same. The credibility of Wikileaks would be severely damaged if an attacker were able to, for example, introduce fake diplomatic cables to the cache of documents waiting to be released, so that the Wikileaks staff inadvertantly published false information. So in addition to protecting against breakins, the system needs to be designed to maintain data integrity in the face of compromise. 2. Source protection. The site needs to provide a means for whistleblowers to contact the site operators, discuss issues, and submit documents in an anonymous manner. Wikileaks solves this with Tor, though there might be other ways. We need a clearly defined threat model to build against, and must keep in mind that usability is a security concern -- we have to assume that the whistleblowers are not geeks, and the site operators may not be, either. 3. Censorship resistance. If 2. brings to mind Tor, 3. brings to mind the Eternity Service. In this model, the publisher does not need to be anonymous, but the data needs to be authenticated and the service distributed. The CouchDB-based mirrors of the Afghanistan War Diaries provide a promising first-attempt; to be successful, these sites need to be able to leverage jurisdictional arbitrage and distributed hosting to resist network denial of service attacks and legal attacks aimed at taking their sites offline, as well as data corruption attacks aimed at invalidating the material by attacking its credibility with the introduction of false documents, etc. 3.a. would be a way for third-parties to obtain the material provided by these services in an anonymous fashion; I see this as lower priority than the other issues, but still something to think about. My goal here is to develop a formal, realistic model for the operation of a legitimate journalistic whistle-blower material clearinghouse. I'm basically proposing we replicate in public, with peer-review, the process I assume Wikileaks itself has undergone for the design of their system. Let's identify the likely attacks and attack vectors for given adversaries, compose a solution based on available technology, and assemble it in as easily deployable a manner as possible. Who else is interested? Let's get this discussion rolling. Best, Len _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers@lists.zooko.com http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE