Re: china-taiwan and limits of state action
David, You have a simple view of China-Taiwan relations, but you are more of a computer specialist than an Asia one, so your deficiency is quite forgivable. I recently heard a story about policeman in Taiwan who is close to retiring. When he was asked what he planned to do when he retires, he said that he wanted to go back to the Mainland. To the outsider, this would seem strange, but it would be hard to believe that Taiwan and China do not have a workable and effective MO. Someone who responded to your post stated that it is far more likely that China would be the aggressor in a cross-strait spat. Now, where the Taiwan-China working MO might break down would be when individuals act. In a way, hacking is the attack of the powerless: it allows geeks like us to launch an assault when we cannot afford tactical weapons. So it is wrong to think that angry Taiwanese would hesitate from waving the red in front of the bull. As you state, there is no cyberterror treaty governing how information regarding attacks is treated. Many of us take for granted that other informal arrangements govern how this information is treated. The questions you ask are valid. Indeed, they are some of the reasons why this listserve exists. You are asking core questions as to how we should treat state activity and personal responsibility. When you find the answers, let me know ; )
What happens if Taiwan's government says it wants to normalize relations with China (and vice versa), but the attacks continue? Will they have to find and punish their own citizens in order for the normalization to move forward? Where do treaty obligations compel a state to prosecute citizens for behavior which it may have tacitly encouraged before?
Interestingly enough, an attack where the originator is identified seems to be more of a problem. At least with an anonymous attack, a state can plausibly deny that one of its citizens was involved. In fact, you could see identified attacks on Chinese systems coming to be a form of civil disobedience if Taiwan were to go this route.
(I don't think Taiwan will - I'm just interested in this interplay between private action and the state's responsibility.)
Suppose Taiwan proves unwilling or unable to stop private citizens from attacking mainland Chinese systems. Now there seems to be a parallel with situations where states are considered either supportive of terrorism or too incompetent to prevent terrorist activity. Israel occupied southern Lebanon because it didn't see any other way to prevent terrorist activity. The alleged use of Libya and Sudan as "training grounds" could be viewed as a kind of jurisdictional arbitrage, and a kind which has been reacted against violently in the past. Fear of an analogous situation online seems to be behind the "world cyber-crime treaty" mentioned here recently.
Now bringing it closer to home, does that mean opposition to the world cyber crime treaty could be cast as "support for cyber-terrorism"?
-David
On Sat, 23 Dec 2000, Alex Shirado wrote:
David,
You have a simple view of China-Taiwan relations, but you are more of a computer specialist than an Asia one, so your deficiency is quite forgivable.
I suspected as much. The problem with this is that I saw the "individual action indistinguishable from state action" quickly and have been having a hard time thinking past it. I'm sure that the picture is much more nuanced than what I have... There are actually other "cyber-war" examples which come to mind where it wasn't clear whether an "attack" was the result of a state action or just some crackers. One such was when NATO's web site was defaced; there was a quote to the effect of "Now the war is fought on all fronts" which made the rounds. The quote is interesting first because it places defacing a web site on the same level as firing bullets at people. Next because I'm not sure if it was clear who exactly defaced the site. Recently I've heard that Israel and neighboring Arab countries are going back and forth. For instance http://www.all.net/intel/mid-east/10-26-2000-art1.html http://www.meib.org/articles/0011_me2.htm
I recently heard a story about policeman in Taiwan who is close to retiring. When he was asked what he planned to do when he retires, he said that he wanted to go back to the Mainland.
To the outsider, this would seem strange, but it would be hard to believe that Taiwan and China do not have a workable and effective MO.
I suppose the closest the U.S. has had to this was the Cold War. We did have some kind of MO with the USSR, but we didn't (don't) share the same kind of common heritage that China and Taiwan do.
Someone who responded to your post stated that it is far more likely that China would be the aggressor in a cross-strait spat. Now, where the Taiwan-China working MO might break down would be when individuals act. In a way, hacking is the attack of the powerless: it allows geeks like us to launch an assault when we cannot afford tactical weapons. So it is wrong to think that angry Taiwanese would hesitate from waving the red in front of the bull.
Yes - what seems interesting is that cracking makes offense as "democratic" as defense. That is, anyone with a weapon can defend their home and territory. That's what a militia is supposed to be, after all. (of course, given the massive inequality in weapons available to armies and available to private citizens, the militia may not last long...) But the local militia usually can't unilaterally launch an attack on some foreign country. (Well, maybe those on the border; the film "Canadian Bacon" comes to mind). A minor nitpick - it seems strange to say that we are "powerless" and then note how we can launch an assault. Maybe it would be better to say that this gives us a different kind of power or "redefines power."
As you state, there is no cyberterror treaty governing how information regarding attacks is treated. Many of us take for granted that other informal arrangements govern how this information is treated.
If we think about it at all. Perhaps you're living in a country where more people remember other countries exist. :-) In any case, I find it interesting to see the resistance to the current proposed cyber-crime treaty http://www.gilc.org/privacy/coe-letter-1000.html which rests on notions of human rights and so on. Values I agree with. At the same time, this seems to place the signing organizations "against" the Israelis, Chinese, or others who may find that current informal arrangements aren't enough.
The questions you ask are valid. Indeed, they are some of the reasons why this listserve exists. You are asking core questions as to how we should treat state activity and personal responsibility. When you find the answers, let me know ; )
That's why I'm posting here, after all. Thanks, -David
participants (2)
-
Alex Shirado -
dmolnar