More notes. I do my best thinking when I'm stuck in traffic, it seems. Again, this will need discussion, and at this point with people who've built CouchApps and can actually speak to how they do or do not work, and under what circumstances. I'm also probably missing some important stuff. ----- problem: addressing practically everybody is behind at least one NATting firewall these days IP addresses are dynamic, so you can't count on a buddy being reachable at the same IP for very long having the Network25 app post its current IP address somewhere (a field on a blog, to a mailing list, Tweet) or get a dynamic DNS hostname every time isn't really workable. in fact, it outs the user in obvious ways, and not everyone is okay with that another problem: Port forwarding. there are some solutions to this, but not all of them work well, work at all, or are suitable. multiple layers of NAT make this solution suck. solution used by TorChat, which would probably work for us: Tor hidden service addresses TorChat creates a unique hidden service address for you when you set it up. when you add people to your buddy list, it stores <public key>.onion in the list, and it's up to you to set an alias ("qwertyuiopasdfgh.onion" == "Bryce A. Lynch") on it Network25 should be able to do the same thing the Zero State is talking about using Tor for general communications in the future, anyway, this would be a perfect time to start When the Network25 socnet software starts up, it looks to see if Tor is running, if it has any hidden services configured, and if any of those services correspond to a unique port that Network25 uses shell/batch scripts FTW if not found, it tells the Tor daemon to create a hidden service descriptor, copies the public key/.onion hostname into the user's Network25 profile, and announces it to that person's friends so they know where to find zir and can start synching databases the name of the hidden service is then added to a field in your profile document, so when people friend you on the network they know how to reach you: public profile document (gets replicated) { _id: "Bryce A. Lynch", _interests: ["long walks on the beach", "moonlit nights", "massively distributed systems", "tor", "writing stuff about CouchApps in Tomboy"], _friends: ["friend", "friend", ...], _publickey: "<public key>", _toraddress: "qwertyuiopasdfgh.onion", ... } this means that CouchDB (configured to use Tor rather than IP address/ports combos) knows how to reach your copy of the socnet software and sync its copies of users' databases (profile, timeline, forums/communities/mailing lists/distribution lists/news feeds) this also helps authenticate users, in the same way that hidden services are authenticated (there is a corresponding private key which is never shared by Tor). if the public key (.onion) and private key (on your box) don't match, then the service isn't trusted because database creation in CouchDB is cheap, there is no reason why there can't be multiple databases in every user's profile b" user profile b" shared public forum (anologous to the Doctrine Zero mailing list) b" specific forums (public or not) (anologous to zs-p2p, zs-arg mailing lists) b" personal blog b" blogs specific to the projects the user is working on (which themselves can have multiple people posting to them, because they're distributed) b" private blogs/chat forums for specific people b" blog/news feed/private messages from everyone the user has friended in Network25 b database: amon_zero_public_feed b database: amon_zero_private_messages b database: amon_zero_philosophical_pontification b database: bryce_a_lynch_public_feed b database: bryce_a_lynch_project_byzantium b database: bryce_a_lynch_3d_printing b database: bryce_a_lynch_private_messages b database: zs_med_discussion b database: zs_arg_plot restricted databases are only replicated by members that are part of that project or group a list of authorized users and their corresponding public keys are part of the database for every forum a majority of people in a private forum have to vote to include that person? all messages are encrypted to the public keys of everyone authorized to participate in that form/replicate that database private databases are only replicated by people they're shared with, i.e., a personal chat feed for one other person is only in two places in the Network25 socnet, your machine and theirs consider making private databases purgeable, i.e., either or both people can have their copy of the socnet software dump the database so that there is no record of the discussion on either side this is where PKE or OTR would come into play - even if the database were recovered somehow, it should be difficult for the attacker to figure out what the cyphertext is I don't know how easy, or how safe implementing crypto at the level of a CouchApp is. all of us are going to have running copies of the Tor Browser Bundle, and all of us are going to have copies of the CouchDB stack and Network25 app, so it would be possible to use a crypto.cat-like plugin for the TBB which implements the encryption/decryption/acquisition of a buddy's public key/addition of key to the user's profile database how much disk space will this take up? I don't know yet. will CouchDB contact other nodes over Tor? I don't know yet. have to test it out. encryption/decryption of data before it enters/leaves the CouchApp? good question. I don't have enough experience yet with CouchApps to say, but would love to talk to someone who does -- The Doctor [412/724/301/703] [ZS (MED)] https://drwho.virtadpt.net/ "I am everywhere." -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "ZS-P2P" group. To post to this group, send email to zs-p2p@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to zs-p2p+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE