Canada's high-tech spies (CSE) leave (commissioner) Lamer in the
dark <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20060626.wcse0626/BNStory /National/home> Canada's high-tech spies leave Lamer in the dark JIM BRONSKILL Canadian Press [The Globe and Mail, June 27, 2006] Ottawa b The watchdog over Canada's eavesdropping agency says he's not getting the detailed information he needs to be sure the secretive spy outfit is obeying the rules. In his annual report, Antonio Lamer laments a "lack of clarity" in the information the Communications Security Establishment provides when seeking ministerial permission for sensitive operations. The disagreement raises questions about whether Mr. Lamer, as CSE commissioner, can provide full assurances that the spy agency is meeting all legal requirements. The Ottawa-based CSE, an ultra-secret wing of the Defence Department, monitors foreign radio, telephone, fax, satellite and computer traffic for information of interest to Canada. The intelligence is used in support of Canadian crime-fighting, defence and trade policies. Military listening posts assist the agency's efforts to intercept the communications of foreign states and organizations, as well as the phone calls and messages of suspected terrorists, drug traffickers and smugglers. The CSE has long been prohibited from directing its surveillance at Canadians or anybody in Canada. However, the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 gave the CSE authority to tap into conversations and messages even if those communications begin or end in Canada. For instance, the CSE could now intercept a phone call from a member of Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network somewhere in Asia to a residence in Montreal. Various safeguards, including the need for the defence minister's approval, were built into the practice. Mr. Lamer, a former Supreme Court chief justice, recently concluded his term as CSE commissioner, an independent watchdog who scrutinizes the spy agency's activities to ensure compliance with the law. In his final report, he says there should be a clear linkage between the government's intelligence priorities, the targets chosen and the activities for which ministerial approval is needed. But supporting documentation provided by the CSE as part of its requests for authorization address foreign intelligence requirements "only in general terms." The dispute stems from differing legal interpretations held by Mr. Lamer's independent counsel and the deputy minister of Justice, whose department provides legal direction to the CSE. "The lack of clarity in this regard has made it difficult for my staff to assess compliance with certain of the conditions that the legislation requires to be satisfied before a ministerial authorization is given." Mr. Lamer says he has "offered specific recommendations" to the defence minister and CSE to iron out "ambiguities" in the legislation governing the CSE. As a result, Mr. Lamer qualifies his finding that CSE activities 2005-06 complied with the law "as it is currently interpreted by the Department of Justice." CSE spokesman Adrian Simpson said Monday that, as a government agency, the organization "must follow the interpretation" of the Justice Department. Mr. Simpson added that the CSE "takes great pains to comply with all of the laws of Canada." Mr. Lamer says his one regret is leaving the post "without a resolution of the legal interpretation issues that have bedevilled this office since December 2001." "I wish my successor well in bringing this matter to a satisfactory conclusion for all concerned." Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor's office had no immediate comment. A spokesman for Mr. Lamer was unavailable. Mr. Lamer's concerns emerge as the CSE's American counterpart, the National Security Agency, faces the glare of controversy. In December, the New York Times disclosed that U.S. President George W. Bush had authorized the NSA to eavesdrop on Americans and others inside the United States without court-approved warrants, as has been the recognized practice there. Despite pointed criticism from privacy advocates, U.S. officials have defended the program. --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo@metzdowd.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]
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