Recent traffic on anonymous remailers/servers:

From: Eli <ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu>

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From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM> This method of posting does not allow you to receive replies. I have set "nicknames" for these two accounts as "Untraceable account" which will appear in the "From" line on the postings. Hopefully that will offer a clue that the normal reply mechanism doesn't work. Maybe the nickname should say so more explicitly?

The security provided by this technique could be provided without the IMHO serious disadvantage of having no return address. Eric's hybrid approach, where a pseudonym server hands mail to an remailer chain, is secure (barring sophisticated traffic analysis) if you trust the last remailer in the chain. Julf, have you thought about whether you want to do something like this?

Hal

Here's an idea I haven't seen suggested before, which would remove the need for a pseudonym server: The way things stand now, chaining Cypherpunk remailers works by nesting PGP encryptions of the form <remail header> *********** message text *********** If you want to chain remailers, you encrypt the above, make IT the new message text, and then add another header, and so on until you get bored. My proposal is for a modification of this protocol to allow for pseudonymous return mail addresses, like this: The trick would be to separate the message text from the remailer routing information, in a message of the form *********** ROUTING INFORMATION *********** *********** MESSAGE TEXT *********** where both blocks are encrypted with PGP. The message text would be encrypted with the PGP public key of the intended final recipient of the message, and would not be modified by the intermediate anon remailers. The routing information would be for the benefit of the remailers only. It would be created by the RECIPIENT and made publicly available as a pseudonymous mail address. It would work like this: Suppose user foo@bar.com wishes to establish a pseudonymous identity, and wants to route it through anon remailers "anon1" and "anon2". What he does is take a message of the form :: Request-Remailing-To: foo@bar.com and encrypts it with server anon1's PGP public key, to create <ANON1 ENCRYPTED ADDRESS>. Then he adds another header to make :: Request-Remailing-To: anon1 <ANON1 ENCRYPTED ADDRESS> and encrypts THIS with anon2's public key to make <ANON2 ENCRYPTED ADDRESS>, and adds a header to make :: Request-Remailing-To: anon2 <ANON2 ENCRYPTED ADDRESS> Obviously, this procedure can be nested to arbitrary depth, chaining through as many anon servers as you like. The trick is that this address block can be made PUBLIC, since the only way to unwind the routing is to have access to the secret keys of all the intermediate anon servers, and the identity of the recipient is protected. foo@bar.com then anonymously posts a PGP public key and a routing block to some public forum, and people can communicate with him without having any idea as to his actual identity. When I want to send a message to him, I encrypt the message with his provided public key, and then add the encrypted routing header, which he has also provided. I give him my own pseudonymous mail routing header to allow him to reply. This seems to me to be a very robust pseudonymous mail system which could be implemented by relatively minor changes to the existing Cypherpunk remailer structure. It has the additional advantage of being decentralized and maintenance-free. It could be used for pseudonyms on net news, e-mail, wherever, and could presumably be integrated in some way into Julf's anon server. Comments? -- Will