Kissinger: Nation-State Collapsing, Film At 11
http://online.wsj.com/article_print/SB119526852466996657.html
The Wall Street Journal
COMMENTARY: THE WEEKEND INTERVIEW
Henry Kissinger
Diplomacy in the Post-9/11 Era
By DAVID B. RIVKIN JR.
November 17, 2007
"Whoever the next president is, the new administration will be extremely
disappointed if it believes that our relationships will mend because its
leader has a different name . . . . Personal diplomacy and
relationship-building, although important, are rarely the paramount drivers
of global affairs. These are shaped importantly by the long-term national
interest."
Thus spake Henry Kissinger when I sat down with him recently in New York.
Though I'd met him once or twice over the years, I had never seen him in
situ -- ensconced in his Park Avenue office. To be honest, I was expecting
gilded furniture and sumptuous carpets -- the kind of quarters Clemens von
Metternich, one of Mr. Kissinger's own diplomat heroes, had in Habsburg
Vienna.
I was, therefore, a little surprised to be ushered into a functional space
with nondescript appointments, including a 25-year-old Sony Trinitron
placed as if to emphasize he doesn't watch much TV. The man who negotiated
the United States out of Vietnam, took Nixon to China, and initiated
ditente with the Soviet Union, received me like the college professor he
once had been -- surrounded by his books and mementos.
It is, of course, a rare opportunity to speak with one of history's makers
and Mr. Kissinger remains one of the country's most prescient observers of
world affairs. I began by asking him about the institutional atmosphere in
Washington, the hothouse of American foreign policy. The capital is far
more poisonous today than at any time in the recent past, I suggested --
including Mr. Kissinger's heyday during the Vietnam War, when the early
Cold War-era comity between the political parties and the executive and
legislative branches was already degrading.
Mr. Kissinger leaned forward to answer my questions with studied
deliberation. In part, he felt that this was institutional. Congress has
itself changed. The "tradition of long-serving senior politicians from both
parties who were devoted to a truly national service has passed, or largely
so." The entire system, especially as it has been transformed by the
communications revolution, "is now much more driven by short-term political
calculations, the need to keep powerful and vocal constituencies happy, and
an eye on the next election." This effect, Mr. Kissinger posited, has been
enhanced by the 24-hour news cycle -- "more information, and less content."
But Mr. Kissinger also dismissed the idea that there was ever some golden
age for the domestic fundamentals of American foreign policy. With a wry
smile, and a clearly bemused eye, he noted that the 1960s and '70s -- when
he served as both national security adviser and secretary of state under
two presidents (holding both jobs during Nixon's second term) -- were not
"idyllic." "I thought," he said, "it was very rough."
The dominant theme of today's Washington battles is that most of America's
current problems are self-inflicted wounds attributable to overly muscular
and "unilateralist" Bush administration policies. Critics say that if only
the U.S. were less eager to impose its will on other countries, whether in
pursuit of traditional realpolitik goals or idealistic democracy-promotion,
we would encounter a great deal less hostility. As Zbigniew Brzezinski, one
of those critics and Mr. Kissinger's long-time intellectual sparring
partner, puts it in his recent book, what much of the world wants from the
U.S. is "respect" and recognition of its "dignity" defined as the ability
to manage their own affairs as they see fit.
Mr. Kissinger agreed with the point that other nations will have to have
scope to develop their own identities. But he pointed out that to have
world order, "these identities need to be reconciled into some general
consensus." An American strategy of benign neglect may, in any case, no
longer be realistic in an age of increasing global integration when
relatively small transnational networks or failed states can project power
against democratic societies with devastating consequences.
Meanwhile, most of today's international actors, "including states,
international organizations, and nongovernmental actors, are disenchanted
with different aspects of the existing world order." Unfortunately, Mr.
Kissinger noted, few of these actors are willing to play a constructive
long-term role, preferring merely to challenge American policies when they
involve risks.
So can our democracy effectively manage long-term foreign policy problems
in a world of varied belief systems in which the U.S. is invariably urged,
and sometimes required to deal with many imperfect, or even profoundly
unsavory, regimes?
"You know," Mr. Kissinger reminded me in an accent as unique and
recognizable in American history as Jack Kennedy's, "for somebody like me
who, in his youth, lived in a dictatorship, the virtues of democracy don't
have to be underlined." Of course, "the United States must operate in a
democratic manner, and our foreign policy must reflect and properly balance
both value and power considerations."
But, Mr. Kissinger noted, it is important to recall that the American
Republic was not originally designed to sustain an ability to pursue a
complex foreign policy. The Framers tended to assume that, once
independent, the U.S. could operate reasonably well in relative isolation.
These attitudes persist. As a result, Mr. Kissinger posits, Americans have
little patience "for a long time of foreign tension."
Because of this, "presidents tend to present difficult cases, particularly
those involving military engagements, to the American people in terms of a
finite timeline. As a result, they often end up implying, or promising,
achievements that may not be possible in the short term -- and that are by
no means guaranteed over the long term."
Foreign policy, he emphasized, "is not something easily put on the clock."
It must "not oscillate wildly between excesses of commitment and excesses
of withdrawal."
I glanced over his window sills, crammed with photographs of Mr. Kissinger
and the world's leaders, toward the Manhattan skyline and inquired about
the vitality of some of the key international institutions, and especially
the U.N. "The Security Council," he insisted, "must be reformed, since --
at the present time -- it does not represent the realities of the
international community because major countries like India, Japan, Germany
and Brazil are not included."
At the same time, he explained that this reform is unlikely, since it would
either involve expansion of the veto-wielding permanent membership --
rendering the Security Council even less capable of decisive action -- or
elimination of the veto.
"This would be unacceptable to the United States and the other four
permanent members," particularly in a world where the Council's actions,
whatever their merits, are imbued with a great deal of perceived
legitimacy. "But some change is necessary. The Council itself is breaking
down -- the interests of its permanent members are simply not sufficiently
parallel on a number of issues to permit a unanimous decision and the
Security Council can only reflect the attainable consensus. It cannot by
itself create it."
This led to discussion of whether international institution building,
accompanied by an all-out effort to restore the Cold War-era level of
trans-Atlantic comity within NATO, would be a good investment for the U.S.,
and especially whether this should be a priority for the next
administration. Mr. Kissinger was skeptical of the prospects for success.
He also emphasized some profound changes in today's geopolitical
environment. He pointed out that the world we have known for 300 years now
-- the "Westphalian" international system that arose after Europe's wars of
religion and is based on the nation-state -- is "collapsing." This may be a
much more profound shift than the move from dynastic to national
motivations following the 1814-15 Congress of Vienna (about which Mr.
Kissinger has written) and a more serious challenge to international
stability than that posed by states such as Nazi Germany or the Soviet
Union. The nation-state is weakening in Europe, he observed, and has met
with mixed success in other parts of the world. "Only in Russia, the United
States and Asia can it be found in its classic form."
Meanwhile, across the Middle East and southern Asia, although nationalism
remains a powerful force, many cast themselves as a part of a greater
Islamic community defined in opposition to the West. In Mr. Kissinger's
view, a single formula will no longer adequately describe this
international system.
This brought us inexorably back to America's most important relationship --
with most of the world's other democracies in Europe. Mr. Kissinger pointed
out that, in the immediate post-war period, "Europe was far weaker than
today, but still prepared -- with leaders like Adenauer, Schuman and
Monnet, to conduct a real and assertive foreign policy -- even if under the
American security blanket and with a modicum of trans-Atlantic discord."
But today, fundamental philosophical differences divide the U.S and Europe
across a range of key foreign policy issues. Europeans and Americans, I
suggested, disagree as to both means and ends -- especially the legitimacy
of the pre-emptive use of force without an explicit blessing from the
Security Council, as well as in their basic assessment of the gravity of
the threats posed by transnational terror networks, which cannot be either
bargained with or deterred.
The real difference, Mr. Kissinger interjected, lay in "what government[s]
can ask of their people." It is because "European governments are not able
any more to ask their people for great sacrifices," he argued, that they
have so readily opted for a "soft power" approach to so many foreign policy
issues. This will, of necessity, make it harder for Europe to reach a
consensus with the U.S.
This is exactly what makes dealing effectively with growing threats so
difficult. The question of how to deal with Iran and its nuclear ambitions
naturally comes to mind. There is no doubt that Iran's acquisition of
nuclear weapons would be an extremely destabilizing development and cannot
be tolerated by the U.S. Mr. Kissinger's view is that the U.S. must make a
serious effort with Iran. He said that negotiations could work in the right
circumstances and if there was enough determination behind them. "What you
mustn't do," he cautioned, "is to identify diplomacy with escalating
[Western] concessions." Right now we are "sliding into a position that we
neither negotiate enough nor put out enough red lines."
Mr. Kissinger added, however, that the use of force against Iran cannot be
ruled out. Diplomacy not backed by the potential use of force is impotent.
This was part of our problem in dealing with Iraq for many years.
When it comes to dealing with our European allies over the longer term,
there will continue to be some fundamental disagreements. But "to the
extent the problem is characterized by some of our allies as the management
of American power, then it is important neither to be immobilized because
of a fear of unilateral action, nor to attempt to create an international
system based upon it."
Here, Mr. Kissinger suggested that a useful lesson can be taken from 19th
century Britain -- act unilaterally when you must, but create a framework
in which other powers are reassured by an "understanding of predictable"
actions and an underlying agreement on objectives.
By the time I left Mr. Kissinger's office, I had a genuine feeling of
unease about the future. But had I raised this with Mr. Kissinger, I
suspect he would have simply said that this goes with the territory. Great
states have great responsibilities. They must expect great challenges, and
they must be prepared to meet them.
Mr. Rivkin, a lawyer based in Washington, served in the Justice Department
under Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush.
--
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga
Rivkin's assessment of Kissinger's political prescience is a little missing in facts. Kissinger didn't architect any kind of 'deal' with Vietnam: The Vietcong chased our guys up the stairs of the ebassy to the choppers. China? Initiated by Mao. Let's not forget Kissinger's accidental sumoning of the Khmer Rouge and the subsequent ongoing instability in Burma. No, Kissinger was a lucky fuckup. -TD ----------------------------------------
Date: Sat, 17 Nov 2007 09:58:14 -0500 To: clips@philodox.com; dgcchat@dgcchat.com; cypherpunks@al-qaeda.net From: rah@shipwright.com Subject: Kissinger: Nation-State Collapsing, Film At 11
The Wall Street Journal
COMMENTARY: THE WEEKEND INTERVIEW
Henry Kissinger Diplomacy in the Post-9/11 Era
By DAVID B. RIVKIN JR.
November 17, 2007
"Whoever the next president is, the new administration will be extremely disappointed if it believes that our relationships will mend because its leader has a different name . . . . Personal diplomacy and relationship-building, although important, are rarely the paramount drivers of global affairs. These are shaped importantly by the long-term national interest."
Thus spake Henry Kissinger when I sat down with him recently in New York. Though I'd met him once or twice over the years, I had never seen him in situ -- ensconced in his Park Avenue office. To be honest, I was expecting gilded furniture and sumptuous carpets -- the kind of quarters Clemens von Metternich, one of Mr. Kissinger's own diplomat heroes, had in Habsburg Vienna.
I was, therefore, a little surprised to be ushered into a functional space with nondescript appointments, including a 25-year-old Sony Trinitron placed as if to emphasize he doesn't watch much TV. The man who negotiated the United States out of Vietnam, took Nixon to China, and initiated ditente with the Soviet Union, received me like the college professor he once had been -- surrounded by his books and mementos.
It is, of course, a rare opportunity to speak with one of history's makers and Mr. Kissinger remains one of the country's most prescient observers of world affairs. I began by asking him about the institutional atmosphere in Washington, the hothouse of American foreign policy. The capital is far more poisonous today than at any time in the recent past, I suggested -- including Mr. Kissinger's heyday during the Vietnam War, when the early Cold War-era comity between the political parties and the executive and legislative branches was already degrading.
Mr. Kissinger leaned forward to answer my questions with studied deliberation. In part, he felt that this was institutional. Congress has itself changed. The "tradition of long-serving senior politicians from both parties who were devoted to a truly national service has passed, or largely so." The entire system, especially as it has been transformed by the communications revolution, "is now much more driven by short-term political calculations, the need to keep powerful and vocal constituencies happy, and an eye on the next election." This effect, Mr. Kissinger posited, has been enhanced by the 24-hour news cycle -- "more information, and less content."
But Mr. Kissinger also dismissed the idea that there was ever some golden age for the domestic fundamentals of American foreign policy. With a wry smile, and a clearly bemused eye, he noted that the 1960s and '70s -- when he served as both national security adviser and secretary of state under two presidents (holding both jobs during Nixon's second term) -- were not "idyllic." "I thought," he said, "it was very rough."
The dominant theme of today's Washington battles is that most of America's current problems are self-inflicted wounds attributable to overly muscular and "unilateralist" Bush administration policies. Critics say that if only the U.S. were less eager to impose its will on other countries, whether in pursuit of traditional realpolitik goals or idealistic democracy-promotion, we would encounter a great deal less hostility. As Zbigniew Brzezinski, one of those critics and Mr. Kissinger's long-time intellectual sparring partner, puts it in his recent book, what much of the world wants from the U.S. is "respect" and recognition of its "dignity" defined as the ability to manage their own affairs as they see fit.
Mr. Kissinger agreed with the point that other nations will have to have scope to develop their own identities. But he pointed out that to have world order, "these identities need to be reconciled into some general consensus." An American strategy of benign neglect may, in any case, no longer be realistic in an age of increasing global integration when relatively small transnational networks or failed states can project power against democratic societies with devastating consequences.
Meanwhile, most of today's international actors, "including states, international organizations, and nongovernmental actors, are disenchanted with different aspects of the existing world order." Unfortunately, Mr. Kissinger noted, few of these actors are willing to play a constructive long-term role, preferring merely to challenge American policies when they involve risks.
So can our democracy effectively manage long-term foreign policy problems in a world of varied belief systems in which the U.S. is invariably urged, and sometimes required to deal with many imperfect, or even profoundly unsavory, regimes?
"You know," Mr. Kissinger reminded me in an accent as unique and recognizable in American history as Jack Kennedy's, "for somebody like me who, in his youth, lived in a dictatorship, the virtues of democracy don't have to be underlined." Of course, "the United States must operate in a democratic manner, and our foreign policy must reflect and properly balance both value and power considerations."
But, Mr. Kissinger noted, it is important to recall that the American Republic was not originally designed to sustain an ability to pursue a complex foreign policy. The Framers tended to assume that, once independent, the U.S. could operate reasonably well in relative isolation. These attitudes persist. As a result, Mr. Kissinger posits, Americans have little patience "for a long time of foreign tension."
Because of this, "presidents tend to present difficult cases, particularly those involving military engagements, to the American people in terms of a finite timeline. As a result, they often end up implying, or promising, achievements that may not be possible in the short term -- and that are by no means guaranteed over the long term."
Foreign policy, he emphasized, "is not something easily put on the clock." It must "not oscillate wildly between excesses of commitment and excesses of withdrawal."
I glanced over his window sills, crammed with photographs of Mr. Kissinger and the world's leaders, toward the Manhattan skyline and inquired about the vitality of some of the key international institutions, and especially the U.N. "The Security Council," he insisted, "must be reformed, since -- at the present time -- it does not represent the realities of the international community because major countries like India, Japan, Germany and Brazil are not included."
At the same time, he explained that this reform is unlikely, since it would either involve expansion of the veto-wielding permanent membership -- rendering the Security Council even less capable of decisive action -- or elimination of the veto.
"This would be unacceptable to the United States and the other four permanent members," particularly in a world where the Council's actions, whatever their merits, are imbued with a great deal of perceived legitimacy. "But some change is necessary. The Council itself is breaking down -- the interests of its permanent members are simply not sufficiently parallel on a number of issues to permit a unanimous decision and the Security Council can only reflect the attainable consensus. It cannot by itself create it."
This led to discussion of whether international institution building, accompanied by an all-out effort to restore the Cold War-era level of trans-Atlantic comity within NATO, would be a good investment for the U.S., and especially whether this should be a priority for the next administration. Mr. Kissinger was skeptical of the prospects for success.
He also emphasized some profound changes in today's geopolitical environment. He pointed out that the world we have known for 300 years now -- the "Westphalian" international system that arose after Europe's wars of religion and is based on the nation-state -- is "collapsing." This may be a much more profound shift than the move from dynastic to national motivations following the 1814-15 Congress of Vienna (about which Mr. Kissinger has written) and a more serious challenge to international stability than that posed by states such as Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union. The nation-state is weakening in Europe, he observed, and has met with mixed success in other parts of the world. "Only in Russia, the United States and Asia can it be found in its classic form."
Meanwhile, across the Middle East and southern Asia, although nationalism remains a powerful force, many cast themselves as a part of a greater Islamic community defined in opposition to the West. In Mr. Kissinger's view, a single formula will no longer adequately describe this international system.
This brought us inexorably back to America's most important relationship -- with most of the world's other democracies in Europe. Mr. Kissinger pointed out that, in the immediate post-war period, "Europe was far weaker than today, but still prepared -- with leaders like Adenauer, Schuman and Monnet, to conduct a real and assertive foreign policy -- even if under the American security blanket and with a modicum of trans-Atlantic discord."
But today, fundamental philosophical differences divide the U.S and Europe across a range of key foreign policy issues. Europeans and Americans, I suggested, disagree as to both means and ends -- especially the legitimacy of the pre-emptive use of force without an explicit blessing from the Security Council, as well as in their basic assessment of the gravity of the threats posed by transnational terror networks, which cannot be either bargained with or deterred.
The real difference, Mr. Kissinger interjected, lay in "what government[s] can ask of their people." It is because "European governments are not able any more to ask their people for great sacrifices," he argued, that they have so readily opted for a "soft power" approach to so many foreign policy issues. This will, of necessity, make it harder for Europe to reach a consensus with the U.S.
This is exactly what makes dealing effectively with growing threats so difficult. The question of how to deal with Iran and its nuclear ambitions naturally comes to mind. There is no doubt that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons would be an extremely destabilizing development and cannot be tolerated by the U.S. Mr. Kissinger's view is that the U.S. must make a serious effort with Iran. He said that negotiations could work in the right circumstances and if there was enough determination behind them. "What you mustn't do," he cautioned, "is to identify diplomacy with escalating [Western] concessions." Right now we are "sliding into a position that we neither negotiate enough nor put out enough red lines."
Mr. Kissinger added, however, that the use of force against Iran cannot be ruled out. Diplomacy not backed by the potential use of force is impotent. This was part of our problem in dealing with Iraq for many years.
When it comes to dealing with our European allies over the longer term, there will continue to be some fundamental disagreements. But "to the extent the problem is characterized by some of our allies as the management of American power, then it is important neither to be immobilized because of a fear of unilateral action, nor to attempt to create an international system based upon it."
Here, Mr. Kissinger suggested that a useful lesson can be taken from 19th century Britain -- act unilaterally when you must, but create a framework in which other powers are reassured by an "understanding of predictable" actions and an underlying agreement on objectives.
By the time I left Mr. Kissinger's office, I had a genuine feeling of unease about the future. But had I raised this with Mr. Kissinger, I suspect he would have simply said that this goes with the territory. Great states have great responsibilities. They must expect great challenges, and they must be prepared to meet them.
Mr. Rivkin, a lawyer based in Washington, served in the Justice Department under Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush.
-- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
_________________________________________________________________ Share life as it happens with the new Windows Live.Download today it's FREE! http://www.windowslive.com/share.html?ocid=TXT_TAGLM_Wave2_sharelife_112007
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 At 6:28 AM -0500 11/18/07, Tyler Durden wrote:
The Vietcong chased our guys up the stairs of the ebassy to the choppers.
After a so-called "democratic" congress took away *all* their money?
We were winning in Viet Nam. Hell, we *won* the Tet "offensive", for that
matter.
We lost on college campae, where history is written, apparently, by losers.
And in the media, which is the first draft of same, also written by losers,
in the long run.
Unwash you mind, Tyler, and learn not to regurgitate leftism so much, hmmm?
Yes, boys and girls, "empires" are, currently, like for the last 12,000
years or so, what happens when you win too many fights. Life's a bitch and
then the empire falls. Which is what Kissinger, oddly enough, is saying.
Which is nonetheless true even if The Dick Cheney, er, Darth Vader, Of The
Nixon Administration said it.
Better inside the tent pissing out, frankly.
If you really want to freak your knee-jerk reflex out, go read, horrors,
Victor Davis Hanson's "Carnage and Culture", and come back when you change
your underwear. The west wins wars because it makes more stuff and kills
more people. The VietCommies are knocking on *our* door to do business, not
us on theirs. They used the *West's* technology, and even one of its more
broken pseudo-sciences-cum-religions, Marxism, because they had none of
their own that would work. Still do.
Certainly, crypto, and geodesic networks, have the potential to re-organize
society, because society maps pretty much to is communications
architectures, but, at the moment, we're still stuck in a world of
hierarchy and book-entry transactions. Lots of people nailing manifestos on
the church doors (see this list, 15 years ago, now...), but nobody's
printed 'em for the peasants and princes to read and burn down the
cathedrals with yet.
Though, strangely enough, Kissinger himself notes, underneath his black
helmet and around puffs of his ventilator, and if you can bestill your
jerking knees that long to read that far, that the nation-state's days are
numbered.
Probably, I would claim, because of geodesic networks, and maybe even
crypto :-).
Kewl.
Cheers,
RAH
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP Desktop 9.0.6 (Build 6060)
iQA/AwUBR0BwB8PxH8jf3ohaEQKUwwCgqhgDzNCSn3s3qMZGiB+mLiQLJ50An3Dw
eeK89iW2Zto4yDV0kDK0Q3N0
=wn6r
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
--
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga
Huh? Me, a leftist?
OK, I read Chomsky sometimes. He's right about some things. The one (only?)
thing the best leftists are good at is pointing to a lot of the bad shit in
'capitalist' (read: US) society that nobody wants to see.
But as for the communists, war has had little to do with it. The soviets in
the end beat themselves and imploded their economy, and the practical Chinese
recognized the inevitable. Come to think of it, the one thing that might end
up killing the US is the hard-on sported by the so-called right wing to
convert the US economy into a command-driven one via the military industrial
complex. In other words, the problem with the republicans is that they're
Stalinists in disguise and, as you look to point out, supply and demand (or
physics) will get them in the end: You can only print up so much funny money.
As for winning in Vietnam...do you mean in this universe? And saying that we
were 'winning' except for the cut in funds is kinda like saying "we were
winning except for running out of bullets and soldiers"...
-TD> Date: Sun, 18 Nov 2007 12:02:01 -0500> To: camera_lumina@hotmail.com;
clips@philodox.com; dgcchat@dgcchat.com; cypherpunks@al-qaeda.net> From:
rah@shipwright.com> Subject: RE: Kissinger: Nation-State Collapsing, Film At
11> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----> Hash: SHA1> > At 6:28 AM -0500
11/18/07, Tyler Durden wrote:> >The Vietcong chased our guys up the stairs of
the ebassy to the choppers.> > After a so-called "democratic" congress took
away *all* their money?> > We were winning in Viet Nam. Hell, we *won* the Tet
"offensive", for that> matter.> > We lost on college campae, where history is
written, apparently, by losers.> And in the media, which is the first draft of
same, also written by losers,> in the long run.> > Unwash you mind, Tyler, and
learn not to regurgitate leftism so much, hmmm?> > Yes, boys and girls,
"empires" are, currently, like for the last 12,000> years or so, what happens
when you win too many fights. Life's a bitch and> then the empire falls. Which
is what Kissinger, oddly enough, is saying.> Which is nonetheless true even if
The Dick Cheney, er, Darth Vader, Of The> Nixon Administration said it.> >
Better inside the tent pissing out, frankly.> > If you really want to freak
your knee-jerk reflex out, go read, horrors,> Victor Davis Hanson's "Carnage
and Culture", and come back when you change> your underwear. The west wins
wars because it makes more stuff and kills> more people. The VietCommies are
knocking on *our* door to do business, not> us on theirs. They used the
*West's* technology, and even one of its more> broken
pseudo-sciences-cum-religions, Marxism, because they had none of> their own
that would work. Still do.> > Certainly, crypto, and geodesic networks, have
the potential to re-organize> society, because society maps pretty much to is
communications> architectures, but, at the moment, we're still stuck in a
world of> hierarchy and book-entry transactions. Lots of people nailing
manifestos on> the church doors (see this list, 15 years ago, now...), but
nobody's> printed 'em for the peasants and princes to read and burn down the>
cathedrals with yet.> > Though, strangely enough, Kissinger himself notes,
underneath his black> helmet and around puffs of his ventilator, and if you
can bestill your> jerking knees that long to read that far, that the
nation-state's days are> numbered.> > Probably, I would claim, because of
geodesic networks, and maybe even> crypto :-).> > Kewl.> > Cheers,> RAH> >
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----> Version: PGP Desktop 9.0.6 (Build 6060)> >
iQA/AwUBR0BwB8PxH8jf3ohaEQKUwwCgqhgDzNCSn3s3qMZGiB+mLiQLJ50An3Dw>
eeK89iW2Zto4yDV0kDK0Q3N0> =wn6r> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----> > -- >
-----------------> R. A. Hettinga
participants (2)
-
R.A. Hettinga -
Tyler Durden