it is relative common for authentication hardware tokens with asymmetric crypto to never divulge the private key .... there is big issue then whether 1) the key pair is actually generated on the chip (and never divulged) or 2) the keys are generated externally and injected into the chip (with special compensating procedures that the chip never leaks the private key ... and there is no record kept by the generation/injection process). specifications for asymmetric cryptography for data encryption may include key escrow of the private key (allowing business continuity for data that has been encrypted with the public key). lucky green <shamrock@cypherpunks.to on 8/6/2002 4:04 am wrote: Probably not surprisingly to anybody on this list, with the exception of potentially Anonymous, according to the TCPA's own TPM Common Criteria Protection Profile, the TPM prevents the owner of a TPM from exporting the TPM's internal key. The ability of the TPM to keep the owner of a PC from reading the private key stored in the TPM has been evaluated to E3 (augmented). For the evaluation certificate issued by NIST, see: http://niap.nist.gov/cc-scheme/PPentries/CCEVS-020016-VR-TPM.pdf

If I buy a lock I expect that by demonstrating ownership I can get a replacement key or have a locksmith legally open it.

It appears the days when this was true are waning. At least in the PC platform domain. --Lucky --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo@wasabisystems.com --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo@wasabisystems.com