At 06:56 PM 12/17/01 -0600, Jim Choate wrote:

On Mon, 17 Dec 2001, Trei, Peter wrote:

...

Yes, I have read the letter - they need to treat input from known remailers differently due to worries over spam and flooding attacks, so they treat other known remailers as priviliged sources of high volume traffic.

Can't spam be repelled by not forwarding email not encrypted to the remailer's key?

...

This does not invalidate my point - that such special treatment could lead a remop into legal problems. We have two different problems, with mutually undesirable solutions.

If the sending node doesn't know about the destination node, how does it konw where to send the traffic (even if the sender provides the address)? The reality is that the remailers must 'know' of each other one way or another. Simply being part of a 'remailer network' (anonymous or not) tends to already put one in a 'conspiratorial' situation.

Isn't it sufficient for a remailer node to publicly broadcast its existance (and the protocols it handles)? This seems to work and there is no cooperation required --just a one-way broadcast. Mere advertising is not evidence of a conspiracy.