Re: [dgc.chat] Fwd: [NEC] #2.12: The RIAA Succeeds Where the CypherPunks Failed
At 12:39 PM 12/17/2003, Patrick Chkoreff wrote:
Well, Clay Shirky has done it again, writing a very insightful article on the current digital scene, this time on the unintended but beneficial consequences of RIAA's crackdown on file sharing.
Here is one particularly telling excerpt:
Note that the broadening adoption of encryption is not because users have become libertarians, but because they have become criminals; to a first approximation, every PC owner under the age of 35 is now a > felon.
http://www.shirky.com/writings/riaa_encryption.html I'm not sure if Clay ever hung out on the cypherpunks list. None of this comes as a surprise. Most knew early on that widespread adoption of crypto would require a killer app and that cypherpunks were not delivering these apps because one could not predict what they would be. They would surely not be PGP and other encrypted email nor digital cash unless and until there was a small but lucrative market that could be addressed by such technology or a large market with broad citizen support. That file sharing could be it was also recognized a long time ago on the cypherpunks list. The really interesting aspect of this is what it portends for the future. If, as Clay suggests, the current situation is like Prohibition from citizen perspective can we expect a similar repeal of government surveillance? If not, what will happen as large numbers of citizens adopt P2P systems that not only flaunt copyright law but communications more dear to those in power? steve "For nothing is more destructive of respect for the government and the law of the land than passing laws which cannot be enforced. It is an open secret that the dangerous increase of crime in this country is closely connected with this." -- Albert Einstein, "My First Impression of the U.S.A.", 1921
On Wednesday, December 17, 2003, at 09:38 PM, Steve Schear wrote:
Note that the broadening adoption of encryption is not because users have become libertarians, but because they have become criminals; to a first approximation, every PC owner under the age of 35 is now a felon.
http://www.shirky.com/writings/riaa_encryption.html
I'm not sure if Clay ever hung out on the cypherpunks list. None of this comes as a surprise. Most knew early on that widespread adoption of crypto would require a killer app and that cypherpunks were not delivering these apps because one could not predict what they would be.
Right, a fair point. I've heard cypherpunks say that and I do think Clay was being a bit hard on them. To place the cypherpunks in the best possible light, perhaps better than they deserve, we might say it's sort of like criticizing Nikola Tesla for not routing an AC power grid through rural Tennessee.
They would surely not be PGP and other encrypted email nor digital cash unless and until there was a small but lucrative market that could be addressed by such technology or a large market with broad citizen support. That file sharing could be it was also recognized a long time ago on the cypherpunks list.
Yes, I have seen statements to that effect. Mind you, I only had occasional exposure to the cypherpunks list via Hettinga's feed. Which is probably fine because I have heard that receiving the cypherpunks list is like drinking from a fire hose, and Hettinga seems to forward the really informative and entertaining stuff from Tim May, Adam Back, et al anyway.
The really interesting aspect of this is what it portends for the future. If, as Clay suggests, the current situation is like Prohibition from citizen perspective can we expect a similar repeal of government surveillance? If not, what will happen as large numbers of citizens adopt P2P systems that not only flaunt copyright law but communications more dear to those in power?
Right, on the one hand it's cool that hordes of otherwise ordinary computer users can become interested in "darknets," but on the other hand it's a bit scary that the sheer scale of it is orders of magnitude beyond getting a whiskey in a speakeasy. This could either thoroughly discourage the government or motivate them to do really draconian things like requiring computers and chips to meet a specific government specification which severely limits how they function. They're working on it.
steve
"For nothing is more destructive of respect for the government and the law of the land than passing laws which cannot be enforced. It is an open secret that the dangerous increase of crime in this country is closely connected with this." -- Albert Einstein, "My First Impression of the U.S.A.", 1921
Yes, a good observation from the time of the first big "War on Drugs," that is, the demon alcohol, wrecker of homes and corrupter of public morals, as anyone who has watched "Cops" can attest. Now I need a drink -- a glass of port sounds good. -- Patrick
At 09:24 PM 12/17/2003, Patrick Chkoreff wrote:
The really interesting aspect of this is what it portends for the future. If, as Clay suggests, the current situation is like Prohibition from citizen perspective can we expect a similar repeal of government surveillance? If not, what will happen as large numbers of citizens adopt P2P systems that not only flaunt copyright law but communications more dear to those in power?
Right, on the one hand it's cool that hordes of otherwise ordinary computer users can become interested in "darknets," but on the other hand it's a bit scary that the sheer scale of it is orders of magnitude beyond getting a whiskey in a speakeasy. This could either thoroughly discourage the government or motivate them to do really draconian things like requiring computers and chips to meet a specific government specification which severely limits how they function. They're working on it.
True, but if the masses understand what s at stake for them they will reject all such solutions where it counts: at the sales counter. The following is from a posting by John Gilmore, early employee of Sun Microsystems, founder of the EFF and founding cypherpunk extraoridair. I usually don't forward so much content from another list, in this case the cryptography list, but John's rants are usually quite coherent and incisive. This one is no exception. --begin forward At 01:53 PM 12/16/2003, John Gilmore wrote: TCPA is being built specifically at the behest of Hollywood. It is built around protecting "content" from "subscribers" for the benefit of a "service provider". I know this because I read, and kept, all the early public design documents, such as the white paper http://www.trustedcomputing.org/docs/TCPA_first_WP.pdf (This is no longer available from the web site, but I have a copy.) It says, on page 7-8: The following usage scenarios briefly illustrate the benefits of TCPA compliance. Scenario I: Remote Attestation TCPA remote attestation allows an application (the "challenger") to trust a remote platform. This trust is built by obtaining integrity metrics for the remote platform, securely storing these metrics and then ensuring that the reporting of the metrics is secure. For example, before making content available to a subscriber, it is likely that a service provider will need to know that the remote platform is trustworthy. The service provider's platform (the "challenger") queries the remote platform. During system boot, the challenged platform creates a cryptographic hash of the system BIOS, using an algorithm to create a statistically unique identifier for the platform. The integrity metrics are then stored. When it receives the query from the challenger, the remote platform responds by digitally signing and then sending the integrity metrics. The digital signature prevents tampering and allows the challenger to verify the signature. If the signature is verified, the challenger can then determine whether the identity metrics are trustworthy. If so, the challenger, in this case the service provider, can then deliver the content. It is important to note that the TCPA process does not make judgments regarding the integrity metrics. It merely reports the metrics and lets the challenger make the final decision regarding the trustworthiness of the remote platform. They eventually censored out all the sample application scenarios like DRM'd online music, and ramped up the level of jargon significantly, so that nobody reading it can tell what it's for any more. Now all the documents available at that site go on for pages and pages saying things like "FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication. Hierarchical to: No other components. FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow access to data and keys where entity owner has given the 'world' access based on the value of TCPA_AUTH_DATA_USAGE; access to the following commands: TPM_SelfTestFull, TPM_ContinueSelfTest, TPM_GetTestResult, TPM_PcrRead, TPM_DirRead, and TPM_EvictKey on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated." But the historical record is clear that DRM was "Usage Scenario #1" for TCPA. Now, back to Hollywood. If you have not read "This Business of Music" (a thick book on how musicians can arm themselves with knowledge to get slightly less screwed by the record industry -- including sample contracts and explanations of the impact and history of each provision), you won't know the long history of why Hollywood can be trusted only to cheat everyone they deal with. A music-industry contract equivalent to charging for 30% more seconds than you deliver, is the provision for "breakage". No artist gets paid for more than 90% of the albums that the record company sells, because in the days of shellac records, about 10% of them would break in shipping. That problem largely went away with vinyl records, and went even further away with CDs. Today's actual breakage is way under 1%. But record companies won't sign a contract that pays the artist for more than 90% of the albums shipped on CD. That 10% underpayment of musicians goes straight back to the record company's profits. Their DRM software will cheat users the same way -- or a different way -- or a hundred different ways. And TCPA will make it un-auditable by us. --end forward steve
participants (2)
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Patrick Chkoreff -
Steve Schear