Thanks Eugen, It looks like the IBM TPM chip is only a key store read/write device. It has no code space for the kind of security discussed in the TCPA. The user still controls the machine and can still monitor who reads/writes the chip (using a pci bus logger for example). There is a lot of emphasis on TPM != Palladium, and TPM != DRM. TPM can not control the machine, and for DRM to work the way RIAA wants, TPM won't meet their needs. TPM looks pretty useful as it sits for real practical security tho, so I can see why IBM wants those !='s to be loud and clear. Bearing in mind though that DRM/Paladium won't work at all if it can't

at Friday, January 24, 2003 4:53 PM, Mike Rosing <eresrch@eskimo.com> was seen to say: trust its hardware - so TPM != Paladium, but TPM (or an improved TPM) is a prerequisite.