...However none of the mentioned below router nicknames or fingerprints was found in the current local cache file. -------- Original Message -------- Subject: High-traffic Colluding Tor Routers in Washington, D.C. Confirmed Date: Thu, 12 Apr 2007 23:35:52 -0400 From: Nostra2004@Safe-mail.net To: cypherpunks@jfet.org A group of 9 Tor routers also functioning overtly or indirectly as Tor exit nodes have been observed colluding on the public Tor network. The colluding routers map to two /16 IP subnets administered by Cogent (formerly by PSINet) [1]. Traceroute reveals all routes to these routers pass through Rethem.demarc.cogentco.com (38.112.12.190) at the final hop. Analysis of a local snapshot of the Tor cached-routers file from 2006-05-27 first suggested the presence of colluding routers. The analysis yielded the following information: - 9 Tor routers self-identified as aala, donk3ypunch, TheGreatSantini, mauger, paxprivoso, soprano1, hubbahubbahubba, m00kie, and joiseytor together reported carrying what amounted to 11% of the traffic on the Tor network at the time of the snapshot, while the remaining 89% of Tor traffic was carried by the other 551 (approximated) routers. - All 9 of these routers appear to be located in the Washington, D.C. area. - 5 of these routers are on the same 149.9.0.0/16 IP subnet. - 4 of these routers are on the same 154.35.0.0/16 IP subnet. - All 9 routers reported running Tor 0.1.0.16 on FreeBSD i386 machines. - All 9 routers reported nearly identical uptimes. - 3 of the 5 routers on the 149.9.0.0/16 IP subnet reported providing outproxy service for DNS, HTTP, POP3, IMAP, HTTPS, AIM and IRC traffic on Tor. - The other 2 routers on the 149.9.0.0/16 IP subnet reported rejecting all outproxy traffic. - The 4 routers on the 154.35.0.0/16 IP subnet reported providing outproxy service for the above traffic plus SSH and NNTP. Collusion was definitively established by the following method: 1. The following lines were added to the local torrc: ExitNodes donk3ypunch,mauger,paxprivoso,soprano1,hubbahubbahubba, m00kie,joiseytor StrictExitNodes 1 2. The local Tor client was restarted so the new configuration would take effect 3. Using Tor as an HTTP proxy, the websites of the IP address mirror services whatismyip.com and whatsmyipaddy.com were visited repeatedly over the course of one hour The results: An IP address of 149.9.0.25 was always reported by the IP address mirror services. This is not the IP address of any of the exit nodes forced by the new torrc configuration, but rather the address of aala, one of the 2 other colluding Tor routers which report themselves as rejecting direct Tor HTTP outproxy traffic. Although further testing is needed, it appears that all 8 of the other Tor routers identified may be forwarding their HTTP outproxy traffic to the router known as aala, and that aala may be performing the exit node duties on their behalf. aala may perform exit node duties for all protocols supported by this collusion network--not merely HTTP. This strategy would make aala a single point of transit (and possible data retention or traffic analysis) for up to 11% of the traffic leaving and entering the Tor network through exit nodes. The function in this collusion network of the router identified as TheGreatSantini is still undetermined. Its published exit policy, like aala's, purported to reject all outproxy traffic, yet it hasn't been observed acting as an outproxy as aala has. It may simply serve as an intermediate router. Due to the sheer amount of traffic apparently passing through this collusion network, consolidation and analysis of exit node traffic is only one of several forms of anonymity attacks made more feasible. Hence these 9 routers appear to pose a significant anonymity threat to users of the public Tor network. ------------------------------------------- Excerpted router descriptor data [2] of colluding routers taken from snapshot of local Tor cached-routers file on 2006-05-27 1. router aala 149.9.0.25 9001 0 9030 platform Tor 0.1.0.16 on FreeBSD i386 published 2006-05-27 16:39:07 opt fingerprint 3F8A 0FF0 39E0 E047 6EF9 24C2 7519 2A59 E6AE 58FB uptime 2462963 bandwidth 2097152 5242880 695815 reject *:* (Observed throughput for this router: 695.82 KB/s) 2. router donk3ypunch 149.9.25.222 9001 0 9030 platform Tor 0.1.0.16 on FreeBSD i386 published 2006-05-27 16:00:20 opt fingerprint AA40 19D8 5823 518F 0904 3F05 E61E AE5E 52CA 78B4 uptime 2460631 bandwidth 2097152 5242880 700879 accept *:53 accept *:80 accept *:110 accept *:143 accept *:443 accept *:5190 accept *:6660-6669 reject *:* (Observed throughput for this router: 700.88 KB/s) 3. router TheGreatSantini 149.9.92.194 9001 0 9030 platform Tor 0.1.0.16 on FreeBSD i386 published 2006-05-27 17:39:30 opt fingerprint 2C75 CCA2 A663 5D80 B286 B2EC 88AC A449 333F 6018 uptime 2466570 bandwidth 2097152 5242880 683980 reject *:* (Observed throughput for this router: 683.98 KB/s) 4. router mauger 149.9.137.153 9001 0 9030 platform Tor 0.1.0.16 on FreeBSD i386 published 2006-05-27 11:39:56 opt fingerprint 00E0 3AAF EE0A 45BF E617 7DD3 E45B 91B2 EC15 E554 uptime 2445004 bandwidth 2097152 5242880 728744 accept *:53 accept *:80 accept *:110 accept *:143 accept *:443 accept *:5190 accept *:6660-6669 reject *:* (Observed throughput for this router: 728.74 KB/s) 5. router paxprivoso 149.9.205.73 9001 0 9030 platform Tor 0.1.0.16 on FreeBSD i386 published 2006-05-27 18:20:52 opt fingerprint 66E8 A96B 5AB3 702A 16F3 85CD A11F 569A 3302 7224 uptime 2469058 bandwidth 2097152 5242880 801391 accept *:53 accept *:80 accept *:110 accept *:143 accept *:443 accept *:5190 accept *:6660-6669 reject *:* (Observed throughput for this router: 801.40 KB/s) 6. router m00kie 154.35.36.18 9001 0 9030 platform Tor 0.1.0.16 on FreeBSD i386 published 2006-05-27 09:39:34 opt fingerprint 72C7 F3BA AF5B 4AF6 878F 6970 5842 80B2 F97A 07D4 uptime 2437788 bandwidth 2097152 5242880 774745 accept *:22 accept *:53 accept *:80 accept *:110 accept *:119 accept *:143 accept *:443 accept *:5190 accept *:6660-6669 reject *:* (Observed throughput for this router: 774.75 KB/s) 7. router hubbahubbahubba 154.35.47.59 9001 0 9030 platform Tor 0.1.0.16 on FreeBSD i386 published 2006-05-27 12:39:56 opt fingerprint 86C8 B35E D131 1782 490B 7E8F FD79 F23D 51D4 620F uptime 2448609 bandwidth 2097152 5242880 696962 accept *:22 accept *:53 accept *:80 accept *:110 accept *:119 accept *:143 accept *:443 accept *:5190 accept *:6660-6669 reject *:* (Observed throughput for this router: 696.96 KB/s) 8. router soprano1 154.35.72.223 9001 0 9030 platform Tor 0.1.0.16 on FreeBSD i386 published 2006-05-27 20:20:58 opt fingerprint F902 4CBC D340 93C4 D9E1 D1F7 FA82 F5D4 A57F 25B5 uptime 2476261 bandwidth 2097152 5242880 857343 accept *:22 accept *:53 accept *:80 accept *:110 accept *:119 accept *:143 accept *:443 accept *:5190 accept *:6660-6669 reject *:* (Observed throughput for this router: 857.34 KB/s) 9. router joiseytor 154.35.85.17 9001 0 9030 platform Tor 0.1.0.16 on FreeBSD i386 published 2006-05-27 20:00:30 opt fingerprint 7BC2 DC0A 06CA C5B6 21BE D132 AD3A 7217 0BBF 5FDB uptime 2475043 bandwidth 2097152 5242880 729315 accept *:22 accept *:53 accept *:80 accept *:110 accept *:119 accept *:143 accept *:443 accept *:5190 accept *:6660-6669 reject *:* (Observed throughput for this router: 729.32 KB/s) ------------------------------------------- Total Observed Throughput of Above Washington, D.C. Routers: 6.67 MB/s Total Observed Throughput of All Known Running Tor Routers *: ~60.00 MB/s * Taken from aggregate stats of all known (~560) running Tor routers at [3] Notes on select router descriptor fields: bandwidth <bandwidth-avg> <bandwidth-burst> <bandwidth-observed> Estimated bandwidth for this router, in bytes per second. The "average" bandwidth is the volume per second that the OR is willing to sustain over long periods; the "burst" bandwidth is the volume that the OR is willing to sustain in very short intervals. The "observed" value is an estimate of the capacity this server can handle. The server remembers the max bandwidth sustained output over any ten second period in the past day, and another sustained input. The "observed" value is the lesser of these two numbers. uptime The number of seconds that this OR process has been running. References: [1] http://serifos.eecs.harvard.edu/cgi-bin/exit.pl [2] http://tor.eff.org/cvs/tor/doc/tor-spec.txt [3] http://www.noreply.org/tor-running-routers/ Found at: http://jadeserpent.i2p.tin0.de/tor-dc-nodes-2.txt ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE