UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT JUNIOR WARDRICK, Defendant-Appellant. No. 02-4494 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT September 24, 2003, Argued November 20, 2003, Decided OUTCOME: Defendant's convictions and sentence were affirmed. As Judge Widener has recently recognized, the knock and announce requirement serves three purposes: "(1) protecting the safety of occupants of a dwelling and the police by reducing violence; (2) preventing the destruction of property; and (3) protecting the privacy of occupants." United States v. Dunnock, 295 F.3d 431, 434 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Bonner v. Anderson, 81 F.3d 472, 475 (4th Cir. 1996)). We have recognized that, HN6[]under appropriate exigent circumstances, strict compliance with the knock and announce requirement may be excused. United States v. Grogins, 163 F.3d 795, 797 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding no-knock entry justified where officers had reasonable suspicion that entering drug "stash house" would be dangerous and drug dealer frequenting house could not be found elsewhere). When the authorities "have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence ...would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of []crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of the evidence," an entry without knocking [*13] is justified. Richards, 520 U.S. at 394; see also United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 140 L. Ed. 2d 191, 118 S. Ct. 992 (1998) (upholding no-knock entry where suspect had violent past, access to weapons, and vowed not to do "federal time"). In this situation, the state court judge made a specific determination that the circumstances explained in the Overfield Affidavit justified the issuance of a no-knock search warrant. As the Overfield Affidavit recounts, Wardrick had a violent criminal history, including a battery conviction stemming from resisting arrest. Moreover, the affidavit suggested that Wardrick, a convicted felon, illegally possessed firearms. Indeed, Wardrick had threatened, in the presence of Det. Overfield, that he always carried a loaded gun and that he "never missed." Lastly, Det. Overfield reasonably believed that Wardrick would be present when the warrant was executed. As the Overfield Affidavit reflects, several records indicated that 1808 Division Street was Wardrick's primary residence, and two automobiles registered in his name had been parked outside the residence only days before the search warrant was secured. Based on [*14] our review of the Overfield Affidavit, we agree with the district court that it was reasonable for Det. Overfield and the state court to believe that execution of the search warrant would be dangerous. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40-41 n. 12, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726, 83 S. Ct. 1623 (1963) HN7[](determining lawfulness of entry depends on "what the officers had reason to believe at the time of their entry") (emphasis in original). In such circumstances, the issuance of the no-knock search warrant was justified, and the district court did not err in declining to suppress the evidence on this basis.