-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 All, please forgive the cross-posting, I haven't been following any of these lists recently, but have a vested interest in this conversation and would like to be CC'd on this thread in the future. First, can somebody please send me a reference for this alleged "Robot CA" article so I can read it. Second, since there appears to be some interest in addressing "informal key exchange," I'd like to propose a simple and effective solution - The Semiautomatic Web of Trust (SWOT). SWOT extends the existing PGP Web of Trust by making keysigning far more promiscuous. Based on the tenet that we build trust in keys by using them, SWOT calls for PGP implementations to track the usage of a key, and at some user-defined threshold, sign the key (with an attribute that indicates it was signed in this manner). At some other user-defined threshold, my client can upload this signed key to the keyservers. In this way, the web of trust will be expanded extensively without requiring much if any user intervention. The existing key-exchange protocols (reading fingerprints) are always available to those who need them. I also look forward to redeployment of Stuart Stubblebine's PGP Pathfinder or equivalent. A graphical representation of the degrees of separation in PGP goes a long way toward increasing usability of this lossy web of trust. I support the standardization of a X-My-PGP-Key type mail header, though clients should be able to go find keys based on signatures anyway. On Fri, Dec 07, 2001 at 11:42:26PM -0800, Seth David Schoen wrote:

(1) What's the best design for an "informal key exchange" scheme in which active MITM attacks may be permitted, but privacy against passive wiretapping (as well as trivial impersonation attacks) is maintained? How can this be implemented with the smaller amount of user interface, while maintaining the largest amount of compatibility in both directions with existing e-mail privacy systems for sophisticated users?

The Semiautomatic Web of Trust is the solution you seek! If you don't agree, please tell me why.

(2) What's the best way to get such a system designed and deployed to the general public? How can an organization like EFF best help accomplish this? Whose help do we need?

My goal is to produce a best practices RFP that defines an attribute in OpenPGP for this purpose, and then seek support from the various implementers of OpenPGP. I think the EFF is well situated to garner support from these developers by supporting SWOT as a means of improving PGP usability. Let the flames begin, but don't forget to CC me directly. Thanks, pablos. - -- Paul Holman Kadrevian Nonlinear Accelerator pablos@kadrevis.com 415.420.3806 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (Darwin) Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org iD8DBQE8GbqeiOayAT9atWkRArn5AJ48+/hNYUfdIwTDqEEpy40WPYhI3wCdEym9 ez63byZ6ELj21PzODuwCusg= =aK3S -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----