Cypherpunks, Feds, and Pudgyfaced Voyeurism
The cypherpunks list has become a popular tourist destination in the last two years for voyeuristic Feds in Washington and Oregon. This monitoring has been less cyber-stalking of the chargeable sort, and more a kind of spectator sport, something to chat about with fellow TIGTAians at the water cooler, and maybe launch some investigations every now and then. We all know that, from his own testimony, a pudgyfaced Jeff Gordon has become enraptured by the cypherpunks list. We know from exhibits that he subscribes to the list from apparently a Hotmail account, but the relevant headers were redacted so we don't know which one. We also know that Gordon & co infiltrated the common law court and Libertarian Party and monitored the "northwest libertarians" mailing list. Anyone attending the first Seattle-area cypherpunk meeting next week may want to check for Gordonian bodywires. The real surprise is not that investigator-stalkee Gordon has extended his arguably unethical pursuit of Bell and cypherpunks, but that other area Feds have joined the fun. For instance, Assistant U.S. Attorney Floyd Short teaches a course on cybercrime at the University of Washington law school on Thursdays, and has reportedly made the cypherpunks list a part of his class. Short has also spoken about the cypherpunks list and its relation to online lawlessness during at least two speeches, I'm told. The cypherpunks list, in other words, is a staple of law classes not because of participants' views about privacy -- but because of the number of their number who are now serving time. One assistant U.S. Marshal in charge of moving Jim Bell from the downstairs holding pen to the courtroom confessed to me yesterday that he's a cypherpunks fan. Not in the ending-the-nation-state-through-crypto sense, but he finds the list interesting enough to read on a daily basis through the inet-one archive site. He was puzzled about why it's been down; the speculation seems to be that it's related to cyberpass' problems. He told me he's been a list reader for about two years. Someone could make a tidy profit by compiling a complete cypherpunks archive and selling it to the Feds on CD-ROM for use in prosecutions. Note that if Bell had not posted under his real name to cypherpunks during his investigation of federal agents last year, he would not be facing perhaps five more years in prison. The government buttressed its case against Bell by using each message that could conceivably be relevant as structural support for its Good Society vs. Internet tale to the jury. Email to the cypherpunks list appears dozens of times in the government's pretrial list of exhibits. Assistant U.S. Attorney Robb London led the jury on a post-rich digression about plausible deniability that included posts from occasional participants like Michael Froomkin and Black Unicorn. London argued that Bell's investigation gave him plausible deniability for stalking. During closing arguments yesterday, London brought it up once more: "Let's talk about plausible deniability. It's a whole big part of what the cypherpunks are into." You'll recall that London and Gordon were involved in the prior prosecution of Carl Johnson, another cypherpunk regular. Perhaps the Feds are frustrated since during their obsessive-compulsive cyphersurveillance, they can only listen and not post in response to windy rants about the perils of big government. At least not under their real names. The Tacoma courtroom is a sterile place, kind of Singapore-meets-the-Bastille. Not helping the atmosphere is the half-dozen agents, some armed, who populated the audience benches during the Bell trial. In addition to two reporters, only one non-Fed observer showed up every day; she took notes and posted them to the cypherpunks list. When this unnamed 'punk introduced herself to Bell's parents after a week of being anonymous, all the Feds' heads swivelled to hear what her name was. Like the old-media types they are -- London says he's a former legal reporter for The New York Times -- the Feds hardly appreciated online reports from the trial by John Young and that anonymous local cypherpunk. London, whose courtroom demeanor veers between snide and surly, griped loudly during a recess last week about "glorified stenographers" taking up space in the courtroom. The six bodyguards offered up appropriate nasty glares. But Gordon seems to be the true antipunk. (London has indicated he didn't want to prosecute this case, and missed out on a more high-profile one because of it.) After the jury delivered their partial verdict, Gordon leaned over from his seat at counsel table and asked London to seal the court records. London dutifully requested that U.S. District Judge Jack Tanner seal any information or exhibit or transcript that included home addresses of alleged stalkees. Now, those data are arguably key to the government's case against Bell -- did he drive to this address or not? -- and were discussed at great length in open court. Tanner denied the motion, and Gordon wasn't happy. You can be sure that Tanner has learned all about the "TannerWatch" website, and is hardly amused by it. You can also bet that some unnamed agent will be watching who asks for copies of the court file -- they seem to fear that some local 'punk will try to obtain Bell's diary, which was introduced as evidence and seems to include not just inaccurate home address of government agents, but accurate ones as well. Watch for more investigations here -- apparently court information does not want to be free. Anyone know if that grand jury meeting in the Seattle federal courthouse is still in session? It would be interesting to find out why local papers didn't cover the trial, even after some residents repeatedly suggested they do so. The only other reporter there besides your humble correspondent was a Washington, DC correspondent one from 60 Minutes. Other reporters from local newspapers had covered unremarkable pre-trial hearings at great length, but failed to cover a fairly unusual trial. I'm told they didn't want to have to fight subpoenas. As a former journalist himself, London probably knew exactly how to handle them -- and avoid potentially unfavorable press coverage. Government prosecutors now appear to qualify as technical experts on the cypherpunk phenom, having scrutinized listmember behavior as ants under lenses. London told the jury yesterday that "the one unifying theme that defines someone as a cypherpunk on the Internet is the ability to encrypt mail." One could say the same thing about a NAI marketing flack, but that wouldn't be as quotable. It's all so sad and predictable and sad again. The cypherpunks list had its glory days: Wired magazine cover stories, blossoming technology, and, yes, even those damnable tentacles. Now it's become a convenient way for the Feds to land convictions. -Declan Washington, DC April 11, 2001 Background: http://www.cluebot.com/search.pl?topic=ap-politics http://www.mccullagh.org/subpoena/ This article is at: http://www.cluebot.com/article.pl?sid=01/04/11/238254
On Wed, 11 Apr 2001, Declan McCullagh wrote:
It's all so sad and predictable and sad again. The cypherpunks list had its glory days: Wired magazine cover stories, blossoming technology, and, yes, even those damnable tentacles. Now it's become a convenient way for the Feds to land convictions.
Perhaps it is time to consider a new and different mailing list which accepts messages ONLY from remailers. It would be publicly archived and unmoderated just as cypherpunks is, and monitored by the lions just as cypherpunks is, but now that the thought-crime laws are setting in full force, it could provide a forum where there wouldn't be such a simple evidentiary chain from post to poster. Given the recent spate of events, and the fact that some forms of political speech now seem to be a crime, or at least grounds for legal harassment and admissible as evidence of other crimes, I will probably have to set up such a list -- more info when it's ready to accept posts. The best name (cypherpunks) seems to be taken. Hmm. I will have to consider. The naming of things is a ticklish business. Bear
Hmm. Anyone know what are some extant web-to-email remailers, and what Type I remailers exist? -Declan On Wed, Apr 11, 2001 at 06:43:10PM -0700, Ray Dillinger wrote:
On Wed, 11 Apr 2001, Declan McCullagh wrote:
It's all so sad and predictable and sad again. The cypherpunks list had its glory days: Wired magazine cover stories, blossoming technology, and, yes, even those damnable tentacles. Now it's become a convenient way for the Feds to land convictions.
Perhaps it is time to consider a new and different mailing list which accepts messages ONLY from remailers. It would be publicly archived and unmoderated just as cypherpunks is, and monitored by the lions just as cypherpunks is, but now that the thought-crime laws are setting in full force, it could provide a forum where there wouldn't be such a simple evidentiary chain from post to poster.
Given the recent spate of events, and the fact that some forms of political speech now seem to be a crime, or at least grounds for legal harassment and admissible as evidence of other crimes, I will probably have to set up such a list -- more info when it's ready to accept posts.
The best name (cypherpunks) seems to be taken. Hmm. I will have to consider. The naming of things is a ticklish business.
Bear
Bear wrote:
Perhaps it is time to consider a new and different mailing list which accepts messages ONLY from remailers. It would be publicly archived and unmoderated just as cypherpunks is, and monitored by the lions just as cypherpunks is, but now that the thought-crime laws are setting in full force, it could provide a forum where there wouldn't be such a simple evidentiary chain from post to poster.
Cypherpunks is an excellent practice ground for electronic HUMINT, email and cyber profiling, cyberthreat assessment, and tech investigation. Perhaps a more pragmatic reason: The increasing use of email profiling / internet profiling as part of employment background checks and due diligence investigations. ~Aimee
To answer my own question, in part: http://www.publius.net/rlist.html -Declan On Wed, Apr 11, 2001 at 10:09:15PM -0400, Declan McCullagh wrote:
Hmm. Anyone know what are some extant web-to-email remailers, and what Type I remailers exist?
-Declan
On Wed, Apr 11, 2001 at 06:43:10PM -0700, Ray Dillinger wrote:
On Wed, 11 Apr 2001, Declan McCullagh wrote:
It's all so sad and predictable and sad again. The cypherpunks list had its glory days: Wired magazine cover stories, blossoming technology, and, yes, even those damnable tentacles. Now it's become a convenient way for the Feds to land convictions.
Perhaps it is time to consider a new and different mailing list which accepts messages ONLY from remailers. It would be publicly archived and unmoderated just as cypherpunks is, and monitored by the lions just as cypherpunks is, but now that the thought-crime laws are setting in full force, it could provide a forum where there wouldn't be such a simple evidentiary chain from post to poster.
Given the recent spate of events, and the fact that some forms of political speech now seem to be a crime, or at least grounds for legal harassment and admissible as evidence of other crimes, I will probably have to set up such a list -- more info when it's ready to accept posts.
The best name (cypherpunks) seems to be taken. Hmm. I will have to consider. The naming of things is a ticklish business.
Bear
The best name (cypherpunks) seems to be taken. Hmm. I will have to consider. The naming of things is a ticklish business.
"cypherpunken" __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Get email at your own domain with Yahoo! Mail. http://personal.mail.yahoo.com/
The "secret-admirers" list strips all headers (except the Subject:) from submissions and is gatewayed to/from alt.anonymous.messages. The list intro may be found below. If there was enough interest, it could be hooked up to the CDR instead, or made standalone. Thanks, -Brian __________________________________________________________________________ I would like to announce the "secret-admirers" mail list. The "secret-admirers" list is intended to function in a manner similar to the well-known Usenet newsgroup "alt.anonymous.messages". This newsgroup serves as a dead drop for communications in which the recipient wishes to remain unknown. While access to a Usenet news server is unavailable in many environments, the ubiquity and flexibility of e-mail may be advantageous for the following reasons: - Penetration: More people having access to (pseudo|ano)nymizing tools is generally a good thing. - Pool Size: Higher utilization of the message pool may frustrate traffic analysis. The list may be gateway back into alt.anonymous.messages or vice versa. CDR-like nodes for redistribution may be established to reduce load on individual nodes. - Filtering: E-mail filtering tools are widely available, allowing recipients to draw only pertinent messages from the pool by filtering on tokens which have been negotiated out-of-band or by the public key to which a message has been encrypted. The mail list is unmoderated and accepts messages from any submitter. Submissions should be sent to "sa@minder.net". TO SUBSCRIBE to the list, send a message with "subscribe secret-admirers" in the body to majordomo@minder.net. The more subscribers, the better, even if procmail just sends it to /dev/null. TO UNSUBSCRIBE from the list, send a message with "unsubscribe secret-admirers" to majordomo@minder.net. On Wed, 11 Apr 2001, Morlock Elloi wrote:
The best name (cypherpunks) seems to be taken. Hmm. I will have to consider. The naming of things is a ticklish business.
"cypherpunken"
__________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Get email at your own domain with Yahoo! Mail. http://personal.mail.yahoo.com/
if the problem is about keeping ourselves out of trouble re: statements or association with others on this list, I have some observations: first- if defeating traffic analysis is important, hiding message headers and using anonymizing services isn't going to help very much. the existing newsgroup system is trackable (even through anonymizing services). The scenario: someone watches mr. white. mr. white xmits a message to anonymizing service at 9:00pm. at 9:03pm the service routes message to newsgroup. unless the message is encrypted for the anonymizing service, decrypted (to reveal destination) by the anonymizing service, then delays delivery for a random amount of time (5 mintues to 5 hours) to the true destination, the message traffic or content could be pegged to a person. ...plus i don't fully trust anonymizing services because i haven't met the individuals running them, and i've not seen the technology to know there isn't a backdoor, etc. potential solution: need an anonymizing service with encrypted inputs and outputs, along with an encrypted gateway between the newsgroup and the anonymous service. perhaps several unrelated anonymizing services use the newsgroup's public key and only xmits traffic to the newsgroup service using that key...plus the key should change every week. and no one should be able to send messages directly to the newsgroup, even if the public key is known. of course all messages sent to an anonymizing service should be signed using the anonymizing service public key, and posters should not be allowed to post to the same anonymizing service more than 3-4 times before switching services. this can be done if we drop the notion of using a single nym for online messages. btw, would not use PGP for the sigs, either. we should be doing exactly what govts do...use proprietary algorithms which aren't published but are frequently changed. there is enough expertise on this list (i belive) to perform basic cryptanalysis on proposed algorithms, and if we change the system frequently enough it would cause cryptanalysts a tremendous headache -- becomes too expensive to manage if enough messages are encrypted over time. we don't need to create a new AES...just need to make sure there isn't ever enough traffic flow to crack one system before we switch methods/systems. (yep i'm one of those who actually think it's not so great to have publicly available algorithms...makes cryptanalysis much easier even when an algo. is theoretically unbreakable.) second- perhaps the lawyers in this group could provide a standard disclaimer which we could all attach to our sig....you know, something along the lines of 'this message is part of an ongoing satire...don't sue me or take me seriously...' is this possible?? i assume probably not, but it's worth investigating. third- isn't there something terribly anonymous about a huge mailing list like this? i mean if we all simply took care of ourselves and went to whatever lengths we needed to protect our own identities, why complicate the mailing list? if anyone is interested in exploring the first option above, i'd be willing to offer design suggestions or assist in coordinating a red team exercise against the system. let me know. phillip
-----Original Message----- From: owner-cypherpunks@Algebra.COM [mailto:owner-cypherpunks@Algebra.COM]On Behalf Of Brian Minder Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2001 11:41 PM To: cypherpunks@minder.net Subject: Re: Cypherpunks, Feds, and Pudgyfaced Voyeurism
The "secret-admirers" list strips all headers (except the Subject:) from submissions and is gatewayed to/from alt.anonymous.messages. The list intro may be found below. If there was enough interest, it could be hooked up to the CDR instead, or made standalone.
Thanks,
-Brian
__________________________________________________________________________ I would like to announce the "secret-admirers" mail list.
The "secret-admirers" list is intended to function in a manner similar to the well-known Usenet newsgroup "alt.anonymous.messages". This newsgroup serves as a dead drop for communications in which the recipient wishes to remain unknown.
While access to a Usenet news server is unavailable in many environments, the ubiquity and flexibility of e-mail may be advantageous for the following reasons:
- Penetration: More people having access to (pseudo|ano)nymizing tools is generally a good thing. - Pool Size: Higher utilization of the message pool may frustrate traffic analysis. The list may be gateway back into alt.anonymous.messages or vice versa. CDR-like nodes for redistribution may be established to reduce load on individual nodes. - Filtering: E-mail filtering tools are widely available, allowing recipients to draw only pertinent messages from the pool by filtering on tokens which have been negotiated out-of-band or by the public key to which a message has been encrypted.
The mail list is unmoderated and accepts messages from any submitter. Submissions should be sent to "sa@minder.net".
TO SUBSCRIBE to the list, send a message with "subscribe secret-admirers" in the body to majordomo@minder.net. The more subscribers, the better, even if procmail just sends it to /dev/null.
TO UNSUBSCRIBE from the list, send a message with "unsubscribe secret-admirers" to majordomo@minder.net.
On Wed, 11 Apr 2001, Morlock Elloi wrote:
The best name (cypherpunks) seems to be taken. Hmm. I will have to consider. The naming of things is a ticklish business.
"cypherpunken"
__________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Get email at your own domain with Yahoo! Mail. http://personal.mail.yahoo.com/
Roger, wilco. I can add at least some of these suggestions into 'igor'. On Thu, 12 Apr 2001, Phillip H. Zakas wrote:
if the problem is about keeping ourselves out of trouble re: statements or association with others on this list, I have some observations:
first- if defeating traffic analysis is important, hiding message headers and using anonymizing services isn't going to help very much. the existing newsgroup system is trackable (even through anonymizing services). The scenario: someone watches mr. white. mr. white xmits a message to anonymizing service at 9:00pm. at 9:03pm the service routes message to newsgroup. unless the message is encrypted for the anonymizing service, decrypted (to reveal destination) by the anonymizing service, then delays delivery for a random amount of time (5 mintues to 5 hours) to the true destination, the message traffic or content could be pegged to a person. ...plus i don't fully trust anonymizing services because i haven't met the individuals running them, and i've not seen the technology to know there isn't a backdoor, etc.
potential solution: need an anonymizing service with encrypted inputs and outputs, along with an encrypted gateway between the newsgroup and the anonymous service. perhaps several unrelated anonymizing services use the newsgroup's public key and only xmits traffic to the newsgroup service using that key...plus the key should change every week. and no one should be able to send messages directly to the newsgroup, even if the public key is known. of course all messages sent to an anonymizing service should be signed using the anonymizing service public key, and posters should not be allowed to post to the same anonymizing service more than 3-4 times before switching services. this can be done if we drop the notion of using a single nym for online messages. btw, would not use PGP for the sigs, either. we should be doing exactly what govts do...use proprietary algorithms which aren't published but are frequently changed. there is enough expertise on this list (i belive) to perform basic cryptanalysis on proposed algorithms, and if we change the system frequently enough it would cause cryptanalysts a tremendous headache -- becomes too expensive to manage if enough messages are encrypted over time. we don't need to create a new AES...just need to make sure there isn't ever enough traffic flow to crack one system before we switch methods/systems. (yep i'm one of those who actually think it's not so great to have publicly available algorithms...makes cryptanalysis much easier even when an algo. is theoretically unbreakable.)
second- perhaps the lawyers in this group could provide a standard disclaimer which we could all attach to our sig....you know, something along the lines of 'this message is part of an ongoing satire...don't sue me or take me seriously...' is this possible?? i assume probably not, but it's worth investigating.
third- isn't there something terribly anonymous about a huge mailing list like this? i mean if we all simply took care of ourselves and went to whatever lengths we needed to protect our own identities, why complicate the mailing list?
if anyone is interested in exploring the first option above, i'd be willing to offer design suggestions or assist in coordinating a red team exercise against the system. let me know.
____________________________________________________________________ The ultimate authority...resides in the people alone. James Madison The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage@ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------
Hi Brian, On Wed, 11 Apr 2001, Brian Minder wrote:
The "secret-admirers" list strips all headers (except the Subject:) from submissions and is gatewayed to/from alt.anonymous.messages. The list intro may be found below. If there was enough interest, it could be hooked up to the CDR instead, or made standalone.
I've been thinking about your project, I like your idea and wish you the best. I don't think it would be appropriate for the CDR because we have a specific focus (that does include anonymity) and it doesn't include being a mule for a stream of anonymous messages of god knows what subject matter. I will be including information on the SSZ CDR homepage about it, unless you object. On the other hand, if you find that your single server can't handle the load please keep me in mind. I have the resources to support such a mailing list and especially like the 'distributed' nature you refer to. Once I get my part of the 'Hangar 18' Plan 9 resource space up and running I hope to use my 'igor' remailer project for something quite similar. I'm sure there will be room to collaborate once I get my ducks in a row. ____________________________________________________________________ The ultimate authority...resides in the people alone. James Madison The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage@ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------
On Wed, 11 Apr 2001, Morlock Elloi wrote:
The best name (cypherpunks) seems to be taken. Hmm. I will have to consider. The naming of things is a ticklish business.
"cypherpunken"
"cypherkraft"? ____________________________________________________________________ The ultimate authority...resides in the people alone. James Madison The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage@ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------
The List with No Name, brought to you by Sergio Anonymous Leone, all the way from Spaghetti Valley. Morlock Elloi wrote:
The best name (cypherpunks) seems to be taken. Hmm. I will have to consider. The naming of things is a ticklish business.
"cypherpunken" Get email at your own domain with Yahoo! Mail. http://personal.mail.yahoo.com/
You mean like the 'igor' project I mentioned a while back? I"m accepting suggestions that don't fall into the 'Stick it up your ass' category. Those you can keep :) On Wed, 11 Apr 2001, Ray Dillinger wrote:
Perhaps it is time to consider a new and different mailing list which accepts messages ONLY from remailers. It would be publicly archived and unmoderated just as cypherpunks is, and monitored by the lions just as cypherpunks is, but now that the thought-crime laws are setting in full force, it could provide a forum where there wouldn't be such a simple evidentiary chain from post to poster.
igor (v 0.1) 4-11-01 A remailer for Plan 9 by James Choate ravage@ssz.com http://einstein.ssz.com/hangar18 One of the primary values of the Internet is email. It provides a reliable and consistent link across time and space. It is the proto-typical killer app. However, to use email effectively there should be two additional features. We don't promise more don't exist. The first feature is the ability to reflect or remail a single email to many recipients. The second is to strip identifying header information from the sender prior to the subscriber getting it. igor does not use 'embedded routing commands' like many other anonymous remailer packages. We believe that tampering or altering the body of the email is simply wrong. We offer two way to input data into igor. The first is through Subject: line escaped commands and the second is through additional header files. An example of each is, Subject: Some title or other [igor: some_commands, must_come_last] or, X-igor: some_commands This allows the first remailer to strip the command data out and then process the email as if igor had never been involved. igor supports limited routing selection, which is intended to make traffic analysis harder. igor sends individual emails embedded in igor-specific header info to eliminate as much interaction with the email itself. All inter-igor traffic is encrypted with PK's managed by the Evil Geniuses. With respect to key management, I am not a big believer in current schemes. I don't believe the 'PGP Ring of Trust' is workable because of scaling problems. What I intend is for each remailer to 'know' only a small group of other remailers (limited to three for testing, but the design will support an unlimited number technicaly). So, when igor_1 hands off to igor_2, all igor_2 knows is that he's k in a n-length chain. He subtracts one and randomly selects another igor other than igor_1 to send it to. The remailer igor_2 sends it to, igor_3, will NOT know about igor_1 so it is completely possible that igor_3 may send an email right back to igor_1 for delivery to the recipient. Provided of course that igor_1 and igor_3 have had prior communications. The intent, at least in simple principle, was to allow each key to be 'authorized' to the standards of each operator. I felt this offered a reasonably strong approach and should handle scaling well. On the flip sice, if igor_2 sends covor traffic he won't send it to igor_1 for that mail. I felt that sending igor_1 any sort of traffic was counter productive unless you always sent traffic back to the initiator remailer. This seems 'evil' to me. It's a start... My current problem is deciding what encryption scheme to use for inter-igor relays...? Plan 9 is an operating system developed by the fathers of *nix to 'fix' the problem of *nix. The system has integrated and fully scalable I/O-authorization kernels, process kernels, and file system kernels. Each kernel is connected through a authorization mechanism that doesn't send keys over the network. The low level network layer, Plan 9, is currently implimented with DES. At some point this should be replaced with something a tad more stout. It also needs a mechanism to anonymize file and process space access. Strong crypto is clearly a pre-requisite for this. Once those features are in place a true 'Data Haven' could be easily implimented. Plan 9 is open source and can be obtained from, http://plan9.bell-labs.com The only transvestite operating system in existence, and so what if the bunny is ugly? Route Commands (ie igor: * * ...): strip Strip the From: header zombie Strip the From: header and replace with From: Walking Dead route# Route the message through # other igor nodes, not selectable by the user, where # is from 1 to 3. route0 is assumed and means send to recipient directly cover Provide cover traffic for each outbound email by sending all know igors a single bogus email. This provides n-copy cover traffic. subscribe $ Subscribe to mailing list $ who $ Who is subscribed to list $? info $ Provide info on list $ help Request an info-help file igor Configuration Parameters (igor.conf): MyPubKey This remailers public key, non-traffic related encryption key. Used for encrypting traffic or data. MyOwnKey This remailers private key, non-traffic related de-cryption key. Used for decrypting traffic or data. MyPubRing My public key ring, this contains a mapping of each 'authorized' igor remailer we will operate with. We use this key to encrypt traffic TO the listed remailers. There are no line length limits. e.g. igor@foo.bar#242ds032fdsasetewdvdsasdfewwere... igor@bar.org#2303210343203828353234898324397... cypherpunks@ssz.com#23XD24398dDWSc35K2)3C2#d... ... MyOwnRing My private key ring, this contains a mapping of each 'authorized' igor remailer we will operate with. We use this key to decrypt traffic FROM the listed remailers. GHeader: $ Place this at the beginning of all emails through this remailer GFooter: $ Place this at the foot of all emails through this remailer Open: *, *, *, ... These mailing lists will provide all info to any reqeustor List: *, *, *, ... These mailing lists will provide info only to a current subscriber Close: *, *, *, ... These mailing lists will not provide any info Verify: *, *, *, ... These mailing lists always verify each operation through the Evil Geniuses. ArchDir $ The archive files should go in the $ directory Archive: *, *, *, ... These mailing lists will create an archive file, #.arc User Accounts: igor - remailer contact account (mail address that executes program) master - owner of remailer (a person who receives status and such) undead - another trusted 'igor' remailer Standard Accounts: master:some_user:{list of other users} igor:master:{list of other users} list_name:igor:{lot of subscribers, a file} Copyright 2001 All rights reserved Permission to use for non-commercial purposes only is granted. ____________________________________________________________________ The ultimate authority...resides in the people alone. James Madison The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage@ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------
participants (10)
-
Aimee Farr -
Brian Minder -
Declan McCullagh -
Declan McCullagh -
Jim Choate -
Jim Choate -
Ken Brown -
Morlock Elloi -
Phillip H. Zakas -
Ray Dillinger