Paul Ferguson:

The biggest threat to any security, on any basis, is the threat of human nature. The chances of someone factoring your PGP encoded message is somewhere in the range of slim-to-none, but the chances of someone (you) -physically- compromising their key is much, much higher.

I'd like to strongly second this, and add my own twist. The problems of making & breaking ciphers are being hashed out, both in open literature and closed quarters (eg NSA), by many highly specialized minds far more focused on these problems than almost all of us on this list. The most important cypherpunks issues are being almost completely ignored by these academics: practical implementation of remailers, most issues dealing with software- based digital cash, reliable key handling, trustworhy key distribution, construction of "webs of trust", implementation of these schemes with all of their pitfalls (legal, social, etc.), commercialization, etc. In most of these cases, the protocols (ciphers, remailing mixes, digital cash, etc.) can theoretically be "broken" by a powerful agent, but the real question is what practical, cheap steps can we take to make things more expensive for those with little respect for our privacy or liberty. Our design criterion should not be max(their expense) but min(our expense/their expense), where "our expense" includes the time needed to hack, test, deploy, and integrate these systems into the social net.fabric. Furthermore, the antagonistic agent in almost all cases will have far less than the full computing power or crypto expertise of the NSA at their disposal, and it's merely speculative fun to try to cover every possible attack at this time. Romana Machado's "Stego" is a great example of useful steganography that address the simple practical issue of hiding data in Mac PICT files without worrying about the many theoretical, statistical ways to detect encryption hidden in pattern- containing pictures. Even if PGP could be broken by the NSA that's no reason not to use it, unless something significantly better comes along. Real crypto-anarchy is quite imperfect, but vastly superior to no privacy at all, the panoptic world to which the Internet sans cypherpunks seems to be heading. Internet commercialization in itself is a _huge_ issue full of pitfall and opportunity: Mom & Pop BBS's, commercial MUDs, data banks, for-profit pirate and porn boards, etc. are springing up everywhere like weeds, opening a vast array of both needs of privacy and ways to abuse privacy. Remailers, digital cash, etc. won't become part of this Internet commerce way of life unless they are deployed soon, theoretical flaws and all, instead of waiting until The Perfect System comes along. Crypto-anarchy in the real world will be messy, "nature red in tooth and claw", not all nice and clean like it says in the math books. Most of the debugging will be done not in any ivory tower, but by the bankruptcy of businesses who violate their customer's privacy, the confiscation of BBS operators who stray outside the laws of some jurisdication and screw up their privacy arrangements, etc. Anybody who thinks they can flesh out a protocol in secret and then deploy it, full-blown and working, is in for a world of hurt. For those who get their Pretty Good systems out there and used, there is vast potential for business growth -- think of the $trillions confiscated every year by governments around the world, for example. At the last Bay Area meeting Tim May asked "what is the low-hanging fruit"? A few pieces I see involve implementing _some_ of the discussed remailer function. The non-SMTP socket solution looks attractive, even if limited to TCP (which most if not all current remailers run over anyway). Non-SMTP sockets cut through the Gordion Knot of the many attacks Hal Finney listed, making them far more expensive, but not attempting to make them "theoretically impossible". A sockets solution seems much easier to implement, thus much more likely to be implemented, than the huge piece of software needed to address address each of the 15-odd attacks in a theoretically strong way. Nick Szabo szabo@netcom.com