RE: Gentlemen reading mail part II
Interesting. I guess my basic question is, is there a subset of counter-surveillance actions that can be taken that, while not ensuring secure communications, forces eavesdropping parties to take 'radical' measures in order to obtain the desired information? In other words, if they have to deploy a black-bag operation every few weeks, then that makes the odds of them being 'outed' sooner rather than later much greater. It might even deter survelliance except "when it really counts". But then again, if the walls really have ears, then there's not much that can be done. Perhaps Koffi Annan was completely aware of this but counted on normal diplomatic protocol to prevent embarrasing and public exposures...(and that may be all that's really needed at the UN after all...) -TD
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Tyler Durden wrote:
Sure there is. Plenty. You feed'em barium and see how they react - or if they somehow tip their hand by acting on the information fed to them. In this case, that would have been unlikely useful as these are pros. For example, one way to piss them off is to attempt to sing when you have zero singing skills, and do it for hours on end, purposely off key, abusing whatever instrument is available... Or playing something very annoying/disturbing over and over again... Large doses of Aphex Twin or Beavis and Butthead, dogs barking, etc. Ditto on unimportant phone and cell conversations, especially while driving in your car, or for even more phone fun, call yourself from the cell phone and let the minutes add up and playing some of the above, or better yet, put the cell phone and phone handset together and let the sweet digital feedback built up. Whatever you're paying in cellphone minutes is far less than what they're wasting on surveillance, that's for sure. Or, instead of having fun with them, you go about your business pretending to be on the side of those bugging you, then do whatever it is you need to do anyway and surprise them at the last moment. This involves typing one memo on your desk computer in the office, and delivering a totally different - perhaps handwritten at the last moment before it's actually needed, then make lots of public noise loudly about being hampered, etc. (This is likely what he did to avoid being found in the woods with his wrists slashed...) [Hmmm, I really should have substituted that "you" with the more English "one" in order to clarify that I don't mean the nym known as Tyler Durden, of course... but that would be a bit too British for my taste.] :)
At 07:42 AM 3/1/2004, sunder wrote: >>Interesting. >>I guess my basic question is, is there a subset of counter-surveillance >>actions that can be taken that, while not ensuring secure communications, >>forces eavesdropping parties to take 'radical' measures in order to >>obtain the desired information? In other words, if they have to deploy a >>black-bag operation every few weeks, then that makes the odds of them >>being 'outed' sooner rather than later much greater. It might even deter that may be all that's really needed at the UN after all...) How about a pseudo random "conversation" generator appliance for the person trying to mask their speech. If it closely models the vocal tract, language and language characteristics of the speaker it might be extremely difficult to remove as background noise. steve --- Outgoing mail is certified Virus Free. Checked by AVG anti-virus system (http://www.grisoft.com). Version: 6.0.605 / Virus Database: 385 - Release Date: 3/1/2004
participants (4)
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Steve Furlong -
Steve Schear -
sunder -
Tyler Durden