In Message Wed, 2 Dec 92 20:17:19 -0600, Karl L. Barrus <tree.egr.uh.edu!barrus@netcomsv.netcom.com> writes:
1) Alice chooses x, r Alice computes B = r^3 * f(x) mod n Alice sends the following message to the bank via an anonymous remailer
:: withdraw <account name> <B = r^3 * f(x) mod n> Reply-To: <an anonymous remailer> <remailing request to Alice encrypted with appropriate remailer public key>
What happens if the bank mails $$$ to Alice. Somebody intprive Alice of HER money. I havn't read much about digital money protocols so correct me if I'm wrong. TTFN! DrZaphod [AC/DC] / [DnA][HP] [drzaphod@ncselxsi.uucp] Technicolorized
Dr. Zaphod writes:
What happens if the bank mails $$$ to Alice. Somebody intprive Alice of HER money. I haven't read much about digital money protocols so correct me if I'm wrong. TTFN!
Well, I intend for the communications themselves to encrypted as well. This would call for the remailing request to also somehow include Alice's public key, and Bob's communications to include his public key, etc. This will prevent intercepted mail from tampering and keep the anonimity. . Possibly the bank will have two public keys: one for money, and one for mail. However, in the initial phase to keep things simple, the messages won't be encrypted - only the remailing info will. This will implement the anonymous part, and allow transactions, but will provide no protection against intercepting mail, etc. Heck, the initial system will only allow withdrawals and deposits of a constant denomination, so I'll worry about spoofing later :-) I'm operating under the premise of getting something out that is usable but not full blown. So extra denominations, fully encrypted messages, etc. will be added later. Also, I received a mail from rjc@gnu.ai.mit.edu (Rob Crowley?) - whose mail I seem to have misplaced - voicing concern over proving deposits in the event that the bank can't be trusted. Any of the digital currency protocol articles discuss this issue? I guess I need to visit the library again and do some more research, after finals. /-----------------------------------\ | Karl L. Barrus | | barrus@tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) | | elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu | \-----------------------------------/
participants (2)
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DrZaphod
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Karl L. Barrus