Your papers please [what color is John Gilmore?]
Most people will be coded green and sail through. But up to 8 percent of passengers who board the nation's 26,000 daily flights will be coded "yellow" and will undergo additional screening at the checkpoint, according to people familiar with the program. An estimated 1 to 2 percent will be labeled "red" and will be prohibited from boarding. These passengers also will face police questioning and may be arrested. http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A45434-2003Sep8?language=printer
What color is John? He's Tie-Dyed, of course... You were expecting a single category they knew what to do with? Major Variola (ret.) wrote:
Most people will be coded green and sail through. But up to 8 percent of passengers who board the nation's 26,000 daily flights will be coded "yellow" and will undergo additional screening at the checkpoint, according to people familiar with the program. An estimated 1 to 2 percent will be labeled "red" and will be prohibited from boarding. These passengers also will face police questioning and may be arrested.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A45434-2003Sep8?language=printer
First answer: He's in red, no green, argggh! Second answer: We've changed the name of the program to ITAR so his lawsuit goes back to square 1! That's the plan! Third answer: CAPPS was just a clever distraction, the real program remains classified. Please step over here. Adam On Tue, Sep 09, 2003 at 02:27:23PM -0700, Bill Stewart wrote: | What color is John? He's Tie-Dyed, of course... | | You were expecting a single category they knew what to do with? | | Major Variola (ret.) wrote: | > Most people will be coded green and sail through. But up to 8 | >percent of passengers who board the nation's 26,000 daily flights will | >be coded "yellow" and will undergo additional screening at the | >checkpoint, according to people familiar with the program. An estimated | >1 to 2 percent will be labeled "red" and will be prohibited from | >boarding. These passengers also will face police questioning and may be | >arrested. | > | >http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A45434-2003Sep8?language=printer -- "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." -Hume
"Instant Ciphertext-Only Cryptanalysis of GSM Encrypted Communications," by Elad Barkan, Eli Biham, Nathan Keller http://cryptome.org/gsm-crack-bbk.pdf (18 Pages, 234KB) Abstract. In this paper we present a very practical cipher-text only cryptanalysis of GSM encrypted communications, and various active attacks on the GSM protocols. These attacks can even break into GSM networks that use "unbreakable" ciphers. We describe a ciphertext-only attack on A5/2 that requires a few dozen milliseconds of encrypted off-the-air cellular conversation and finds the correct key in less than a second on a personal computer. We then extend this attack to a (more complex) ciphertext-only attack on A5/1. We describe new attacks on the protocols of networks that use A5/1, A5/3, or even GPRS. These attacks are based on security flaws of the GSM protocols, and work whenever the mobile phone supports A5/2. We emphasize that these attacks are on the protocols, and are thus applicable whenever the cellular phone supports a weak cipher, for instance they are also applicable using the cryptanalysis of A5/1. Unlike previous attacks on GSM that require unrealistic information, like long known plaintext periods, our attacks are very practical and do not require any knowledge of the content of the conversation. These attacks allow attackers to tap conversations and decrypt them either in real-time, or at any later time. We also show active attacks, such as call hijacking, altering data messages and call theft.
participants (4)
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Adam Shostack -
Bill Stewart -
John Young -
Major Variola (ret.)