Ivan Krstic <krstic@fas.harvard.edu> writes:

Calling this "piercing network anonymity in real time" is highly misleading; in reality, it's more like "making it bloody obvious that there's no such thing as network anonymity".

No. Ever hear of Chaum's "Dining Cryptographers" [1]? Anonymity right there at the table. Been around for almost twenty years. Strong anonymity is available today using chains of random-latency, mixing, anonymizing remailers based on mixmaster [2], of which there is a thriving worldwide network [3].

The best one can hope for today is a bit of anonymous browsing and IM with Tor ...

Tor is indicted by its own documentation: ... for low-latency systems like Tor, end-to-end traffic correlation attacks [8, 21, 31] allow an attacker who can observe both ends of a communication to correlate packet timing and volume, quickly linking the initiator to her destination. [4] [1] "The Dining Cryptographers Problem: Unconditional Sender Untraceability," D. Chaum, (invited) Journal of Cryptology, vol. 1 no. 1, 1988, pp. 65-75. ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/papers/chaum.dining.cryptographer s.gz http://www.e-ztown.com/cryptopapers.htm http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/context/143887/0 [2] http://sourceforge.net/projects/mixmaster/. [3] See usenet newsgroup alt.privacy.anon-server. [4] http://tor.eff.org/cvs/tor/doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo@metzdowd.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]