On 11/28/2011 05:42 PM, Brian Conley wrote:

Hi all,

First of all, thanks Brett for that article about Area SpA, great news!

Secondly, I'm in the middle of some research into how satellite communications are being used by activists, as well as how they are being used/intercepted by Syrian authorities in an attempt to quell the uprising. I've read a number of articles in a disjointed fashion, and am just now beginning to coordinate my efforts. I am working on a series of best practices for being "most safe" as I'm not sure we can offer much better than that with regard to satellite equipment, furthermore I'm hoping to provide an educated understanding of just what the risks are and what might be done to mitigate them. However my impression is that the guide will primarily be about understanding the full extent of the risk you place yourself in.

I have heard rumors about Syria's capacity direct from Syrian activists, including that some calls made with thuraya phones have been recorded, and that a phone simply making a call, for the first time, in a distant location was tracked by syrian authorities. unfortunately, as many of you know, such anecdotes are not as helpful as they might seem, and that its important to understand, as best we can, just why thuraya phones seem to be "less safe" than inmarsat or iridium, and to ensure that syrians don't become lax and begin to depend on an alternate tool to thuraya such as inmarsat phones, only to find themselves equally targeted via that means, though it may take the regime longer to establish practices.

Anyhow, what I'm looking for are accounts of how satphones have been used/tracked in syria, as well as articles about syria's capacity to monitor satellite transmissions. Separately I'll be researching the practical capabilities of various satphones to ensure that readers of the guide have access to the best information available, though this will obviously need to evolve over time.

Hi Brian, Access has also heard a number of reports from Syria that Thuraya satellite devices have been giving away the location of the device operators as soon as the devices are used. Our reports suggest this is limited to Thuraya devices only, and that the use of satellite technology from other providers does not seem to have the consequence of position information leakage to the authorities at this time. We do know that Thuraya devices transmit their location periodically as part of their communications protocol[1][2]. While this information is encrypted there seems to be some doubt as to the strength of that encryption. The US military complex did not have much faith in it and seems to have been able to bypass or crack the encryption to access the location information of Thuraya devices used by Iraqi Government officials[2]. While it is not clear exactly how this was achieved we do know that Thuraya devices were manufactured by Boeing and this fact may have contributed to an easy decryption route for US forces. In addition to this the location information clearly appears in unencrypted form in server logs at Thuraya itself[1]. This is worrying as it turns out that Thuraya is predominantly owned by Etisalat, a telco from the UAE with a dark history regarding surveillance of their users[3]. Etisalat have telecommunications interests in places including Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka. Etisalat was also alleged to be involved in a $39 billion scam in 2010 in India[4], and they deployed and manage the internet censorship system under the direction of the authorities in the UAE[5]. Due to the above-mentioned technical and ownership issues we recommend civil society do not use Thuraya satellite devices in the MENA region. To our knowledge devices from other vendors do not seem to be affected at this time. Access is working to gather further evidence from the ground in Syria and elsewhere in the MENA region to shine further light on the possible misuse of Thuraya satellite device location information. We also welcome any further information from anyone on this mailing list. [1] http://americas.xsatglobal.com/news.php?ArticleID=13 "XSAT USA plays role in recent K2 mountain rescue Thursday, 14-Aug-08 XSAT USA played an intricate role in the survival of two climbers after the recent mountain disaster on K2. A team of twenty two explorers were attempting to successfully reach the summit and descend the deadly K2 when disaster struck. While descending the mountain, an ice wall collapsed upon the weary climbers and destroyed the ropes and lines necessary for the safe descent. Team members were scattered throughout the mountainbs b dead zoneb with no possible chance of survival without a rescue attempt. Survivor Wilco Van Rooijen used a Thuraya Satellite Phone to contact his brother in desperation. Rooijenbs brother contacted Tom Sjogren of the mountaineering website ExplorersWeb. Tom then reached XSAT USA President Jan Rademaker on Friday, August 1 at 10:30 p.m. in need of Satellite GPS coordinates from Van Rooijenbs call history. XSAT employees in Dubai managed to access the information necessary to mount a rescue attempt through Thuraya, a satellite communication company based out of Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. When Rooijen used his phone to call his brother, his GPS location was saved at the Thuraya ground station in Sharjah, UAE, giving Pakistani helicopters a chance to rescue two of the stranded climbers. The men were successfully rescued and taken to a Pakistani hospital for frostbite treatment." [2] http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htecm/articles/20030424.aspx "April 24, 2003 During the Iraq war, the coalition unexpectedly ordered all civilians (mainly reporters) near coalition military units to immediately turn in their Thuraya satellite phones. These phones, made by Boeing, are satellite phones that also incorporate normal cell phone service and GPS capability. The phones were provided by a cell phone company in the United Arab Emirates. Thuraya recently announced that while the phones did transmit the GPS location periodically (to insure a good satellite signal), the information was sent in encrypted form and only someone with access to the codes, or with powerful decryption capabilities, could get the location information (of the phone broadcasting the information). Boeing is a major American defense contractor, and the U.S. has the most powerful decryption capabilities on the planet. It is suspected that the United States did use access to decrypted Thuraya GPS signals to make bombing attacks on known Iraqi government users of Thuraya satellite phones." [3] http://www.itp.net/561962-etisalats-blackberry-patch-designed-for-surveillan... "July 14, 2009 Etisalatbs BlackBerry patch designed for surveillance Expert says software developed by surveillance firm SS8 The battery-sapping "performance patch" that Etisalat sent to its BlackBerry subscribers over the last few days was designed to give the UAE operator the ability to read its customers emails and text messages, a Qatar-based software expert told CommsMEA yesterday." [4] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2G_spectrum_scam [5] http://opennet.net/research/profiles/uae "07/Aug/2009 United Arab Emirates" -- Gustaf BjC6rksten Technology Director Access https://www.accessnow.org GPG ID: 0xFEB3D12A GPG Fingerprint: C10F FC31 B92A 3A32 40A0 1A72 43AC A427 FEB3 D12A _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. 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