Re: "Spoiling" digital cash
"George" writes:
Th idea is, when buying some good or service with digital cash, the customer first forwards the cash to the vendor in some transformed way such that the vendor can't yet spend it, but can verify that it is good cash of the correct amount, and that the customer will no longer be able to spend it.
The idea is, if the vendor follows through on his side, the customer will supply the additional information the vendor will need to redeem the cash. The customer can still rip the vendor off by refusing to do so, but he has no incentive, the money's already gone for him. Conversely, an unscrupulous "vendor" could in principle trick a customer into throwing away money on nothing, but he would gain no profit in doing so.
Yep, see Marcus Jakobsson, "Ripping Coins for Fair Exchange", http://www-cse.ucsd.edu/users/markus/rip.ps. The idea is analogous to tearing a $100 bill in half and giving half to the taxi driver so he'll wait while you go take care of some business. The two halves together are worth $100, but either alone is worthless. Once you give him the first half you're out $100, so you have no incentive to cheat him by not giving the other half when you come back. A simplification of Jakobsson's scheme works with Chaumian blinded cash where the bank's RSA exponent e = e1*e2, where e1 > 1 is an odd integer and e2 is prime. The passenger (in the taxi example) withdrew the coin by choosing a value x which had some special structure, blinding it and getting a signature s on x such that s^e = x, mod n. To spend the coin normally he would reveal x and s which the bank would accept as it satisfies this relation. To rip the coin, the passenger gives the taxi driver t = s^e1, along with x. The driver can verify that t^e2 = s^(e1*e2) = s^e1 = x mod n which tells him that it is a real coin. He also sends (t, x) to the bank, which verifies that no such x has been spent before (no double spending) and also stores x as a ripped coin such that only the driver can spend it. When the passenger comes back he gives the taxi driver s, the real RSA signature, so the driver can now spend the coin for good. The passenger can't renege and spend the coin himself because the driver has put a block on that x value in the database.
On Tue, 11 Dec 2001, Anonymous wrote:
To rip the coin, the passenger gives the taxi driver t = s^e1, along with x. The driver can verify that t^e2 = s^(e1*e2) = s^e1 = x mod n which tells him that it is a real coin. He also sends (t, x) to the bank, which verifies that no such x has been spent before (no double spending) and also stores x as a ripped coin such that only the driver can spend it.
Who pays for all this checking? Not only does this require the taxi driver to have a considerable store of computational and algorithmic 'equipment' but he's also got to have a comm channel to the bank. This don't sound cheap to execute at all... -- ____________________________________________________________________ Day by day the Penguins are making me lose my mind. Bumper Sticker The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage@ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------
At 09:48 PM 12/10/01 -0600, Jim Choate wrote:
On Tue, 11 Dec 2001, Anonymous wrote:
To rip the coin, the passenger gives the taxi driver t = s^e1, along with x. The driver can verify that t^e2 = s^(e1*e2) = s^e1 = x mod n which tells him that it is a real coin. He also sends (t, x) to the bank, which verifies that no such x has been spent before (no double spending) and also stores x as a ripped coin such that only the driver can spend it.
Who pays for all this checking? Not only does this require the taxi driver to have a considerable store of computational and algorithmic 'equipment' but he's also got to have a comm channel to the bank.
This don't sound cheap to execute at all...
Oh, you mean like the $5 charge that Mastercard/Visa charge merchants... this *corroborates* the stuff Hettinga has been saying about it being cheaper to use certain kinds of payment than others.
On Mon, 10 Dec 2001, David Honig wrote:
this *corroborates* the stuff Hettinga has been saying about it being cheaper to use certain kinds of payment than others.
Actually Hettinga's observation is rather obvious. The concept that all exchanges will cost the same is rather self-destructing. Nothing newe there. -- ____________________________________________________________________ Day by day the Penguins are making me lose my mind. Bumper Sticker The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage@ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------
participants (3)
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Anonymous
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David Honig
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Jim Choate