Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=05/05/13/0250226 [1]DocMurphy asks: "I'm working with some dissidents who are looking for ways to use the Internet from within repressive regimes. Many have in-home Internet access, but think it too risky to participate in pro-freedom activities on home PCs. Internet cafis are also available, but although fairly anonymous, every machine may be infected with keystroke loggers that give governments access to and knowledge of 'banned' sites. Dissidents not only want to remain anonymous themselves, but also wish to not compromise the sites they access. Any suggestions for products/procedures/systems out there making anonymous access & publishing a reality under repressive regime run Internet access?"

There were some good ideas presented, the best of which were probably to first compose an email at home, then PGP encrypt it, then stego-ize it, then put it on a USB token and bring it to the internet cafe, and send it there. For receiving, download a bunch of junk from a mailing list used for this purpose onto the token, go home and de-stego and de-PGP it. This doesn't work though for web browsing. For that you need a real time channel. You can go to various proxies, and some people run them specifically to help the Chinese, the slashdot replies talked about this. But first, the Chinese block them when they find out, and second, it makes you look suspicious if you're visiting one. Be nice if there were a high bandwidth stego channel that was widely available. For example, imagine an open source P2P multi player game which intentionally included a reasonably high bandwidth channel of random data. It would be a service to the public to play this game and thereby provide people who need it the ability to communicate undetectably. Dissidents could use a hacked version which would replace some of the random noise bits with their messages. Only the recipients could distinguish the results from noise. CP