On Tue, Mar 6, 2012 at 23:04, Paul Syverson <syverson@itd.nrl.navy.mil> wrote:

The suggestion was that people _stop_ working on defeating the GPA, which is unrealistic as both too strong (global) and too weak (passive).

While this may be true in the theoretical sense, it doesn't mean that one can't make correlation attacks less practical. I find it hard to believe that right now NSA, for instance, has Tor traffic analysis tightly integrated into its worldwide communications sniffing framework, simply because it's too much of a logistic problem, and anonymous networks are unlikely to be sufficiently high-profile targets so as to warrant expending the resources to deal with the logistics (yet). But I think that it is entirely believable that NSA has a dedicated project (even if only for research purposes) where the traffic from all known relays (a relatively stable pool of ~3000 nodes?) is sniffed and analyzed b that would be relatively simple to setup and maintain, given the unlimited interception capabilities. And you can combat the latter b by extending and popularizing the entry bridges concept, implementing exit bridges, making all clients relays by default (even if that won't contribute significant bandwidth), etc. -- Maxim Kammerer LibertC) Linux (discussion / support: http://dee.su/liberte-contribute) _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE