private credential/ecash thread on slashdot (Re: announce: credlib library with brands and chaum credentials)
Credentica (Stefan Brands ecash/credentials) U-prove library and open source credlib library implementing the same are on slashdot: http://yro.slashdot.org/yro/07/02/20/2158240.shtml Maybe some list readers would like to inject some crypto knowledge into the discussion. There is quite some underinformed speculation as critique on the thread... Its interesting to see people who probably understand SSL, SMIME and stuff at least at a power user if not programmer level, try to make logical leaps about what must be wrong or limited about unlinkable credential schemes. Shows the challenges faced in deploying this stuff. Cant deploy what people dont understand! Adam -- http://www.cypherspace.org/credlib/ On Fri, Feb 16, 2007 at 11:14:39AM -0500, Adam Back wrote:
Hi
I implemented Chaumian and Brands credentials in a credential library (C code, using openSSL). I implemented some of the pre-computation steps. Have not made any attempt so far to benchmark it. But thought I could take this opportunity to make it public. I did not try to optimize so far. One optimization opportunity at algorithm level, is you dont need witness indistinguishability on a single attribute credential, which saves some of the computations.
http://www.cypherspace.org/credlib/
Ben, if you have a partial implementation of Camenisch credentials, you could maybe do some comparisons of that against this C implementation.
On 2/20/07, Adam Back
... http://yro.slashdot.org/yro/07/02/20/2158240.shtml
Maybe some list readers would like to inject some crypto knowledge into the discussion.
there are some good replies, just need more moderation from the clue-full :)
There is quite some underinformed speculation as critique on the thread... Its interesting to see people who probably understand SSL, SMIME and stuff at least at a power user if not programmer level, try to make logical leaps about what must be wrong or limited about unlinkable credential schemes. Shows the challenges faced in deploying this stuff. Cant deploy what people dont understand!
indeed. there was one insightful response to the unlinkability aspect, and that is the inevitable venality of the credential authorities. perhaps i'm just overly cynical, but without a trustworthy and secure CA the privacy assurances provided by such credentials are fairly limited. (and as detailed elsewhere, for most uses the CA's won't issue to anonymous entities) still, much better than what we've got now... p.s. the lending protection aspect of credentials is dark comedy. encode something into a credential that alice would never want to share, credit card #, bank access details, etc. lol
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Adam Back -
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