CDR: How the Feds will try to ban strong anonymity
I wrote in another thread:
framework to reasonably exist. Cypherpunkish technology will create underground markets, anonymous distribution methods, and so on, and the only way to enforce such regulations will be for the Feds/Mounties to take drastic steps. (For instance, strong anonymity is an emergent property of a distributed network combined with strong encryption. Restricting strong anonymity means key escrow.)
Perhaps I overstated my argument above. It seems to me that if the Feds want to restrict strong anonymity, they have some choices: * Make it a felony (death penalty may have some deterrent effect) to take advantage of it. * Require key escrow/key recovery/message recovery/Clipper * Require that anonymous remailers or similar devices implement identity escrow/keep logs * Ban Internet service providers/backbone providers from accepting traffic from an anonymous remailer node (a tricky tactic, this, since end-of-chain remailers are relatively few compared to the middle-of-chain ones, at least today). * Do the same thing with outgoing traffic directed to the first remailer node * Ban the operation or hosting of remailers, and work internationally to do the same thing, through G8, Council of Europe, UN Anything else? -Declan
Declan McCullagh wrote:
... Restricting strong anonymity means key escrow.)
Perhaps I overstated my argument above. It seems to me that if the Feds want to restrict strong anonymity, they have some choices:
<<the choices>>
Anything else?
Routinely monitor communications lines. Allow unlimited data collection for traffic analysis. Allow monitoring of content. Make the use of crypto prima facie evidence of criminal intent. (Begin a public awareness campaign comparing having crypto on your computer to walking around a parking lot with a slim-jim.) Allow seizure of hardware or black bag bugging. To show we're tough on cyber-criminals, we'll allow it without a judge's signature. This hits a lot more than anonymity, of course, but it's for the chiiiildren. Require ISPs to get a license to operate. Terms can be set arbitrarily high. (Bonus points if you make them pay for the monitoring hardware, software, and governmental labor.) Require (though allowing might be enough) telcos to place limits on the kind of traffic that may pass over their wires. If a block doesn't have full headers identifying source and destination (both of which must be registered with some, uh, registry) it can't pass. Mandate IPv6, with the embedded MAC address or whatever they were going to put in it. Processor IDs, a la P-III, which must be encoded in all sorts of traffic. Don't allow unsigned email; require that all internet users get a signing certificate from the Post Office, which of course can tie certs to computer IDs, TrueNames, and land address. In general, look at what China is doing. Britain and Russia, too. About a year ago I put some work into a book, _Crashing the Web_ (working title, of course). It focused on governmental or corporate options to kill the Wild Wild West. I abandoned the book around December when someone, I forgot who, came out with a book covering much of the same ground. I might be able to resurrect some of my notes and early drafts, but they were probably lost to my boneheaded drive wipe six months ago. (Yes, I make backups. Yes, I encrypt my backups. No, I don't necessarily remember the passwords. Yes, I'm a retard.) Drop me a line if you'd like me to rummage around. Thanks a lot. I was about to go to bed, and now I'll have Big Brotherish dreams. -- Steve Furlong, Computer Condottiere Have GNU, will travel 518-374-4720 sfurlong@acmenet.net
On Sun, 8 Oct 2000, Steve Furlong wrote:
In general, look at what China is doing. Britain and Russia, too.
Britain is doing a lot less than you seem to think. The RIP act has been passed, but to a rising chorus of protests from all sides, including industry. Actual implementation of the bill will not occur for some time (1-2 years). In the meantime opponents of the bill are preparing their legal cases, arguing that the act is in violation of various European Union directives. At the practical level, UK ISPs have seen no change at all. -- Jim Dixon VBCnet GB Ltd http://www.vbc.net tel +44 117 929 1316 fax +44 117 927 2015
At 02:39 AM 10/8/00 -0400, Steve Furlong wrote:
Require ISPs to get a license to operate. Terms can be set arbitrarily high. (Bonus points if you make them pay for the monitoring hardware, software, and governmental labor.)
Wasn't a "license to drive" on the "info superhighway" bandied about when the latter term was sickeningly popular?
-- At 03:33 PM 10/8/2000 -0400, David Honig wrote:
Wasn't a "license to drive" on the "info superhighway" bandied about when the latter term was sickeningly popular?
Everything on the internet is a packet with a destination address and a return address. To create a police state on the internet, all that is necessary is to ensure a one to one correspondence between an internet address, and a human face that can be beaten to pulp. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG pD3OD3dQvezWFoEs0LDHKlTbvPLK6g9Kimvf8sCw 4a2OWl4LDCwch1uxN5RhKE2WcXiypgOUzDXrva9l7
At 04:30 PM 10/8/00 -0400, you wrote:
-- At 03:33 PM 10/8/2000 -0400, David Honig wrote:
Wasn't a "license to drive" on the "info superhighway" bandied about when the latter term was sickeningly popular?
Everything on the internet is a packet with a destination address and a return address. To create a police state on the internet, all that is necessary is to ensure a one to one correspondence between an internet address, and a human face that can be beaten to pulp.
Maybe that is why IPSec seems to have never considered DHCP or PPP IP pools in its design. --- | Terrorists - The Boogiemen for a new Millennium. | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | | | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/ |alan@ctrl-alt-del.com|
At 03:33 PM 10/8/00 -0400, you wrote:
At 02:39 AM 10/8/00 -0400, Steve Furlong wrote:
Require ISPs to get a license to operate. Terms can be set arbitrarily high. (Bonus points if you make them pay for the monitoring hardware, software, and governmental labor.)
Wasn't a "license to drive" on the "info superhighway" bandied about when the latter term was sickeningly popular?
That used to be called "Unix". --- | Terrorists - The Boogiemen for a new Millennium. | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | | | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/ |alan@ctrl-alt-del.com|
participants (6)
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Alan Olsen -
David Honig -
Declan McCullagh -
James A.. Donald -
Jim Dixon -
Steve Furlong