If I were a remailer operator, I'm not sure I'd like this. Active cooperation with another remaler operator means that if he/she/it does something illegal, you could be dragged in on 'conspiracy' charges, regardless whether you actually had any knowledge of the the other operators nefarious activities. Peter Trei

---------- From: An Metet[SMTP:anmetet@freedom.gmsociety.org] Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 11:17 PM To: cypherpunks@lne.com Subject: RE: CNN.com on Remailers

...

Remailer operators should have permanent encrypted links to one another, with constant (or at least message-uncorrelated) traffic volumes. They can still use latency, message pools, and other features, of course. But when it comes time to deliver messages to the next remailer in the list, that should be done with a reliable and direct connection that doesn't have to depend on the vagaries of sendmail, procmail, Microsoft servers or the many other layers that get in the way. This would both increase the reliability of the remailer network and improve its security by hiding inter-remailer traffic.

Great idea! Cypherpunks write code. Let us know when you have something we can look at.

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