On Tue, 25 May 93 21:26:20 EDT, Bill_Stewart <uunet!anchor.ho.att.com!wcs> wrote - [ ... referring to earlier discussions on TEMPEST, ELINT and COMINT topics]

I'm not arguing about whether the stuff works, I believe that :-)

It does, and I can expand further in subsequent paragraphs.

VT100s and Brother electronic typewriters are two other classic emitters; I hadn't heard that the IBM was loud, but it's certainly a good target.

He used a very simplistic example, one which is electro-mechanical, as another list participant already pointed out. The same ELINT potential eavesdropping techniques exist, which range from keyboard monitoring (passive and active) to synchronic monitoring of "visual displays," which by all rights, parallels the electronic equivalent of monitoring your "visual" data; what is written to your visual display.

The wording *is* relevant when you're discussing whether a proposed acronym is real or made-up-to-fit, and as I said,

...

I never saw TEMPEST expanded as an acronym in any of the documents I read. and the proposed expansions are really stretching credibility, as were the quoted article's contentions that using TEMPEST protection was illegal.

TEMPEST was/is a specification that was written/developed to safeguard classified communications which were transmitted electronically, and rightly so. Digital Cryptanalysis is easy to record, measure and study; emissions are emissions. Its a well known fact that INT agencies were/are active in monitoring secure communications _recording_ for years, simply on the basis that the keys would be eventually compromised. The technical specifications of TEMPEST implementations on _SECURE_ systems are classified, likewise, the tempest requirements on confidential and FOUO (For Official Use Only) communications are less classified, at least to the level of their traffic. This was/is done in anticipation of secure, captured traffic analysis being eventually compromised. I have reason to believe that this exactly the tactics being mined now by the FBI/NIST/NSA. (whoops, slap my wrist) Traffic analysis is a dangerous concept when used in the wrong context, especially in a big brother capacity. Additionally (no classified information divulged here!), both the US INT agencies and the KGB sponsored intelligence agencies, recorded _all_ intercepted communications regardless of cryptographic tolerance, eventually under the guise that they would be compromised. This idealism alluded to the fact that compromised keys could be used to analyze past communications and provide information on future strategies.

*Clipper is a trademark of Intergraph.

Oh, don't be silly. Uncle Sugar has already "officially" re-dubbed the chip the "Key Escrow" Chip. Silly, isn't it? Our Government is cheating us. Something needs to be done. Who's going to do it? Personally, I'm going to take fergp's suggestion and "question the powers that be." If any of you have a conscious, I'd suggest doing the same. To Eric Raymond: Include info on anon remailers and why they are important. Tell 'em "nobody" sent you. ;-) Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?