[Clips] US CODE: Title 50,1811. Authorization during time of war
--- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: clips@philodox.com Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 14:19:04 -0500 To: Philodox Clips List <clips@philodox.com> From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah@shipwright.com> Subject: [Clips] US CODE: Title 50,1811. Authorization during time of war Reply-To: rah@philodox.com Sender: clips-bounces@philodox.com <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode50/usc_sec_50_00001811----000-.html> U.S. Code collection TITLE 50 > CHAPTER 36 > SUBCHAPTER I > ' 1811 Prev | Next ' 1811. Authorization during time of war Release date: 2005-03-17 Notwithstanding any other law, the President, through the Attorney General, may authorize electronic surveillance without a court order under this subchapter to acquire foreign intelligence information for a period not to exceed fifteen calendar days following a declaration of war by the Congress. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah@ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' _______________________________________________ Clips mailing list Clips@philodox.com http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah@ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
Bob Hettinga wrote:
TITLE 50 > CHAPTER 36 > SUBCHAPTER I > ' 1811
' 1811. Authorization during time of war
Notwithstanding any other law, the President, through the Attorney General, may authorize electronic surveillance without a court order under this subchapter to acquire foreign intelligence information for a period not to exceed fifteen calendar days following a declaration of war by the Congress.
Bob, That's a pretty short and uncomplicated paragraph even in view of your well-known attention-deficit issues. Was there some part of the phrase you quoted: "for a period not to exceed fifteen calendar days following a declaration of war by the Congress" that you were unable to understand? GH _________________________________________________________________ Dont just search. Find. Check out the new MSN Search! http://search.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200636ave/direct/01/
At 8:43 PM +0000 12/20/05, Gil Hamilton wrote:
Was there some part of the phrase you quoted: "for a period not to exceed fifteen calendar days following a declaration of war by the Congress" that you were unable to understand?
I'm just wondering exactly what part of their collective asses they're going to pull a justification out of, is all. Thank you for playing, and for your keen grasp of the obvious. Cheers, RAH -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah@ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
"R. A. Hettinga" <rah@shipwright.com> writes:
U.S. Code collection
TITLE 50 > CHAPTER 36 > SUBCHAPTER I > ' 1811 Prev | Next
' 1811. Authorization during time of war
Release date: 2005-03-17
Notwithstanding any other law, the President, through the Attorney General, may authorize electronic surveillance without a court order under this subchapter to acquire foreign intelligence information for a period not to exceed fifteen calendar days following a declaration of war by the Congress.
Yes, Bob. For a period not to exceed fifteen calendar days. Following a declaration of war. By the congress. Perry
At 4:38 PM -0500 12/20/05, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Yes, Bob. For a period not to exceed fifteen calendar days. Following a declaration of war. By the congress.
Again, Perry, expect nothing to come of any of this. Except bleating. Lots of bleating. Write code, dude. Quit bleating. Cheers, RAH -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah@ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
"R. A. Hettinga" <rah@shipwright.com> writes:
At 4:38 PM -0500 12/20/05, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Yes, Bob. For a period not to exceed fifteen calendar days. Following a declaration of war. By the congress.
Again, Perry, expect nothing to come of any of this.
Except bleating.
Lots of bleating.
Write code, dude. Quit bleating.
The "bleating" has already had a serious effect. More "bleating" may yet end the current administration's ambitious for the expansion of their powers. .pm
At 6:55 PM -0500 12/20/05, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
The "bleating" has already had a serious effect.
Please. The dogs bark, but the caravan moves on. Now, if wiretapping were as obsolete as cracking wax seals and envelopes, *that* would be something. Cheers, RAH -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah@ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Camels, fleas, and princes exist everywhere." -- Persian proverb
On Tue, Dec 20, 2005 at 06:55:20PM -0500, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Write code, dude. Quit bleating.
The "bleating" has already had a serious effect. More "bleating" may yet end the current administration's ambitious for the expansion of their powers.
You don't have to write code if the bleating succeeds first. And if the bleating doesn't, no amount of code will save our ass. "Mandatory authentication to be online" and "run an anonymizer, get fined $$$/go to jail" is all it takes. So bleat early, bleat often. -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]
At 9:10 AM +0100 12/21/05, Eugen Leitl wrote:
You don't have to write code if the bleating succeeds first. And if the bleating doesn't, no amount of code will save our ass.
So...what? Don't write code? Didn't you ever learn any logic? Cheers, RAH -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah@ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
On Wed, Dec 21, 2005 at 12:41:33PM -0500, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
At 9:10 AM +0100 12/21/05, Eugen Leitl wrote:
You don't have to write code if the bleating succeeds first. And if the bleating doesn't, no amount of code will save our ass.
So...what? Don't write code?
Write code. Participate in the political process. Both are not mutually exclusive.
Didn't you ever learn any logic?
You need to work more on your reading comprehension. -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]
At 7:06 PM +0100 12/21/05, Eugen Leitl wrote:
Write code. Participate in the political process. Both are not mutually exclusive.
One is useful. The other is, at best, masturbatory. Physics causes politics, not vice-versa. Cheers, RAH -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah@ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
RAHweh wrote...
One is useful. The other is, at best, masturbatory.
Now always. If a political discussion can uncover likely threat models, then there's some distinct usefulness. Also, the politics of dis-intelligence is also useful. Those worries about super-quantum-TEMPEST is a good example: "Oh don't you bother with your cute lil' crypto systems, because we can just watch you at your keyboard anyway..." So if there's some way to modify "write code" to include "code-impacting political discussion", then I agree, but I also agree it still gets rather masturbatory. But then again, it's not like any male has ever wanted to masturbate before... -TD
And it is still not impossible, not even improbable, that public use of crypto was, is, not a disinfo op to red flag communications that need to be intercepted. Not a hell of a lot has been written lately, if at all, how public crypto came into wide use, the battle to free it from regulation, the rise of belief that some types were mathematically impregnable. There was discussion a few years back here about the disappearance of some able contributors, and wishes they do well in their new, more comfortable habitats. Whether any are aiding and abetting the latest SHAMROCK redux or the SHAMROCK that never died might be clued by the coincidence of the discovery of PK just at the time Church Committee hearings were being held to ostensibly defang NSA. Cypherpunks' role in this dissemination of crypto takeover of the workld is a good place to start that story. No, not the ones written in the early days to prime public interest, cloaked in libertarian camouflage of hollywoodish antiauthoritarianism. What could be informative are the stories about where the crypto-wizards are now employed. Steven Levy might do an update, or a host of others who got a boost parlaying the adventures of the crypto-rebels -- which hooked me via Levy's NY Times mag piece in 1994. How public key crypto, for example, got a toehold on climbing out of GCHQ's and NSA's clampdown. Serendipitous research, says the legend, perhaps aided with hints from the bowels of NSA, or perhaps from elsewhere not yet revealed. It wouldn't be the first time a long-running deception has been used to encourage trust in reputedly impregnable systems. Is NSA regularly cracking all encryption or not, whether or with a foolproof algorithmic tool (again and again discounted by the best and brightest of the cryptographers) is that what the Times will not write about. Or via exploitation of faulty implementation. There are regular calls to trust no infosec system that is not continually monitored by experts. A lesson taught by the government pros as well. Who watches who in this backscratch is not well covered, at least outside classified gatherings -- not that crypto contractors are now regular participants in these, having embraced NDAs as a way of survival, and golden opportunity. 9/11 has lifted many small boats in commerce and education and NGOs. How many crypto-rebels been brought in from the cold to demonstrate implementation vulnerabilities absolutely controlled by NDAs. That, too, would not be the first time. Screaming rebels oft reap the benefits of calling attention to themselves. Those that somehow never go to jail and accuse those who do of being bumbling idiots. There was also discussion years back about who were the most likely coverts on cpunks. The rubric was that it didn't matter, even narcs were welcome for mathematics would defeat their bosses. Impregnable mathematics gradually withered as a protective rationale with the rise of the threat of faulty implementaion, black bag jobs, keystroke loggers, insider betrayal, and the gamut of traditional security failures, the very same ones used to build and maintain the most gigantic expensive national defense system ever, with plenty of contracts to recruit whoever disagreed, well, disagreed enough to get a special invitation or a hint about how to build a superduper security method. Security pros claim you can't be too paranoid, that 100% security is impossible, that, to be sure, is likely to boost demand for their protection racket. Religious faiths have become wealthy preaching that, some even killing infidels to protect market share.
At 10:33 AM -0800 12/22/05, John Young wrote:
And it is still not impossible, not even improbable, that public use of crypto was, is, not a disinfo op to red flag communications that need to be intercepted.
"You just keep on thinkin' Butch. That's what you're good at." -- Harry "Sundance Kid" Longbaugh Cheers, RAH -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah@ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
On 12/22/05, John Young <jya@cryptome.net> wrote:
... Is NSA regularly cracking all encryption or not, whether or with a foolproof algorithmic tool (again and again discounted by the best and brightest of the cryptographers) is that what the Times will not write about. Or via exploitation of faulty implementation.
faulty implementations meaning side channels leaking key material. i know that Glenn at Centaur/VIA is concerned about perceived pressures to keep crypto out of processor cores. consider this rumor but i'd love to see someone follow up on this story. with cache/memory timing, differential power analysis, even acoustic side channels weakening software cipher implementations (and hardware to a lesser degree) i can't help but wonder why Intel and AMD have not deployed entropy, digests, block ciphers and Montgomery multipliers in their cores - it takes very little die space and provides a huge return. makes my inner paranoid twitch... </VIA whoring> with that said, i think it's clear that a properly designed crypto system could be considered secure. the government still uses AES256 for their top secret datum, and the NSA license of ECC could be interpreted as a vote of confidence in that PK system. (or is this just another ruse? :)
There are regular calls to trust no infosec system that is not continually monitored by experts. A lesson taught by the government pros as well. ... Impregnable mathematics gradually withered as a protective rationale with the rise of the threat of faulty implementaion, black bag jobs, keystroke loggers, insider betrayal, and the gamut of traditional security failures...
with ciphers and protocols maturing is the next frontier for cypherpunks decentralized reputation and trust metrics applied to process, persons, and systems? the world around these theoretically secure ciphers is full of holes as you describe.
Coderman wrote...
with that said, i think it's clear that a properly designed crypto system could be considered secure. the government still uses AES256 for their top secret datum, and the NSA license of ECC could be interpreted as a vote of confidence in that PK system. (or is this just another ruse? :)
Well, I'd consider it secure in the following sense: NSA can probably break it via manipulating some microscopic vulnerability, but it will take time and money. For all but Al Qaeda, that's going to be good enough: NSA won't reveal what it's got to even local law enforcement, unless it's really really necessary (ie, they'll lose lots of funding or bigshot jobs). This means that, unless I've got a special delivery for the beltway area, local thugs won't come pounding at my door. (And if I did have such a special delivery, I won't be using any technological channels at all.) -TD
On Tue, 20 Dec 2005, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Yes, Bob. For a period not to exceed fifteen calendar days. Following a declaration of war. By the congress.
Which declaration we are missing. There is no formal state of war here. -- Yours, J.A. Terranson sysadmin@mfn.org 0xBD4A95BF Just once, can't we have a nice polite discussion about the logistics and planning side of large criminal enterprise? - Steve Thompson
On Tue, Dec 20, 2005 at 09:04:30PM -0600, J.A. Terranson wrote:
On Tue, 20 Dec 2005, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Yes, Bob. For a period not to exceed fifteen calendar days. Following a declaration of war. By the congress.
Which declaration we are missing.
There is no formal state of war here.
"We always have been at war with Oceania bin Laden". It is remarkable that in the U.S. lying about the location of the presidential dick is almost enough for impeachment, whereas starting wars and trampling all over the Constitution doesn't even raise eyebrows. -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]
participants (8)
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coderman
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Eugen Leitl
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Gil Hamilton
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J.A. Terranson
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John Young
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Perry E. Metzger
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R. A. Hettinga
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Tyler Durden