Re: [cryptography] OTR and deniability
On Fri, Jul 15, 2011 at 6:45 PM, Marsh Ray <marsh@extendedsubset.com> wrote:
On 07/14/2011 01:59 PM, Steven Bellovin wrote:
Put another way, the goal in a trial is not a mathematical proof, it's proof to a certain standard of evidence, based on many different pieces of data. Life isn't a cryptographic protocol.
The interesting thing in this case though is that the person providing the plaintext log file is:
a) a convicted felon b) working for the investigators/prosecutors (since before the purported log file's creation?) c) himself skilled in hacking
Those bullet points are far more likely to be brought up at trial than any of the security properties of OTR. Defense counsel has to weigh the benefits of presenting evidence -- will it get some point across, or will it be lost on the judge/jury? I submit that a military judge or a panel of commissioned officers (and maybe some enlisted personnel) is unlikely to appreciate the finer mathematical points, and more likely to fall back on "but there are these logs, right there, and the feds say they're authentic." The defense has plenty of Lamo's own documented actions to use to undermine his credibility. There's much to be said for "baffle them with bullshit" (not that there's necessarily any bullshit even involved), but a jury that doesn't understand an argument is likely to dismiss it as bullshit. Best, --mlp _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
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Meredith L. Patterson